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misinformation through online communities. In particular, this dissertation argues that the 
rhetorical concept of ethos should draw on the idea of agency as it has been taken up in technical 
communication scholarship to account for the myriad cultural and technological factors that 
contribute to the construction of credibility in online spaces. As a way of integrating the concepts 
of ethos and agency, the author introduces Memetic Rhetorical Theory (MRT), which is an 
evolutionary model for understanding how elements of rhetorical action co-evolve to create 
communities with shared rhetorical principles that work together to determine the success or 
failure of newly-introduced information. 
This dissertation begins with a characterization of what some have called the “post-fact” 
era as demonstrative of the need for new understandings of how ethos develops in various 
communities. Next, it discusses Memetic Rhetorical Theory in detail, including its history in the 
field of memetics and its application to modern rhetorical study. The case study chapters conduct 
memetic rhetorical analyses of the Whole30 community Facebook page and the spread of 
#fakeprotests following the 2016 presidential election, demonstrating that the interface features 
of the social media sites that house these movements work symbiotically with the cultural 
content of the movements themselves to determine the kinds of information that are considered 
credible within the community. The dissertation concludes with the argument that MRT and 
memetic rhetorical analysis can help technical communicators to intervene more productively in 
the spread of misinformation online by offering a more comprehensive understanding of the 
formation of ethos in these spaces and allowing technical communicators to draw responsibly on 
those constructions of ethos when introducing new or corrective information.  
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Chapter 1: The Post-Fact Phenomenon 
 
Introduction 
In recent years, concern regarding the spread of 
inaccurate or misrepresented information through digital 
communities has gained traction in the public imagination. 
In many ways, this concern simply builds on previously 
existing understandings of the unreliability of internet 
sources. Cautions about the reliability of information found 
on the internet were common for myself and other students 
by the time we reached middle school in the early 2000s, 
and personal guides for navigating the pitfalls of fake news 
and false data have begun to spread quickly on social media 
(Kiely & Robertson, 2016 among others. Also see Figure 1 
as an example of the easily-accessible format that such 
resources often use). The question remains, however, if so 
much information is readily available to help readers 
distinguish between reputable sources and misinformation, 
why do false stories and made-up facts continue to spread 
like wildfire? With a world of information at our fingertips 
and the available means to sort through it reliably, why can 
no one seem to agree about what is true and what is not 
within digital communities? 
Internet technologies are progressive in their role of decentralizing discursive authority 
Figure 1: Example of an online resource to 
help identify fake news 
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by shifting the barriers to knowledge production and distribution, and they also provide a useful 
way of documenting the spread of misinformation that is not always available in other media. 
However, the spread of misinformation is neither new nor unique to the internet; as a 
phenomenon, this process has been around since the advent of the rumor, and even now 
misinformation is not confined to online spaces, but instead moves among communities that exist 
both on and offline, often simultaneously. As such, while this dissertation will focus primarily on 
digital communities and the spread of (mis)information online, this focus should be understood 
as one facet of a larger discussion that would include intersections of all communities: digital, 
traditional, and hybrid. 
Within this context, I interrogate how and why (mis)information is able to spread so 
quickly through online communities, as well as the reason why interventions in that process are 
so often unsuccessful. This project points to the need for critical awareness of the ways that the 
technologies that we use to communicate on a mass-scale shape, and are shaped by, the 
ideologies and rhetorical practices that define our communities both large and small. 
The spread of misinformation causes confusion, disputes, and often physical harm both to 
proponents of the information as it is presented and to those who seek to debunk digital myths. In 
this context, the term “spread” does not refer to people receiving information that they then 
recognize as false, but rather to the commitment of entire digital communities to ideas that are 
based on faulty scientific practice, miscommunications, or outright lies. In many cases, as 
Chapter 4 of this dissertation in particular shows, these commitments end up defining the 
communities that embrace them while also becoming integral to the rhetorics of those 
communities. Examples of this phenomenon, from the anti-vaxxer movement to “fad” diets to 
conspiracy groups and fake news, permeate modern discourse and cause significant concern for 
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journalists, academics, and responsible citizens of all kinds. If and when misinformation is 
debunked, often by sources that fit traditional models and instructional definitions of credibility, 
the debunking seems to have little to no effect on the digital communities who have embraced 
this misinformation. In fact, very often the debunking is disregarded as poor or inadequate 
research, or even a deliberate attempt at misinformation itself. In other words, these communities 
often understand the work that debunks or disrupts ideas that they have already embraced as 
“fake news.” 
The interesting thing about this phenomenon is that once a community has developed a 
commitment to a particular piece of information, or the expectation that a certain kind of 
information exists, the source of that information seems to become irrelevant, as does the 
credibility of anyone who challenges it. This phenomenon—explored through the brief example 
below and further in subsequent chapters of this dissertation—calls into question exactly how 
accurate our existing understandings of what constitutes credibility might be, and therefore how 
effective our current attempts to intervene in the spread of misinformation are. If attempts to 
disrupt or intervene in the spread of misinformation are based in traditional understandings of 
credibility, but those understandings are no longer meaningful for digital communities, then 
these attempts at disruption or intervention are ultimately doomed to fail. In the discussion that 
follows, I call for an understanding of credibility (of ethos) that is contextually situated in both 
the technological and ideological structures that make communities sustainable and that 
recognizes the interconnected and evolutionary nature of these structures. This is not necessarily 
a re-defining of ethos but rather an interrogation of how the qualities that various communities 




In rhetorical and popular discourse alike, there is a prevailing history of characterizing 
credibility as the purview of an individual or an institution—as a quality invested in a specific 
and identifiable set of standard characteristics. These characterizations, while often nuanced and 
culturally situated, contribute to an understanding of credibility, of authorial ethos, as 
contextually static and uniquely humanistic. Think, for example, of the ways in which research 
writers are taught (often by us as rhetoricians, technical communicators, and all varieties of 
writing instructors) to evaluate sources: look for the author and their credentials (qualities of the 
individual authorial voice), look for the website or source domain (qualities of the institution 
claiming ownership of the information), and confirm disputed information with additional 
credible sources (chosen using the same criteria). 
In this dissertation, I interrogate the ways in which rhetoricians and technical 
communication scholars1 have characterized the factors that determine the credibility of 
information by discussing the concepts of ethos and agency as they have been taken up in 
rhetoric, technical communication, and contributing fields. This literature review also explores 
the relationship between the concepts of ethos and agency and how they contribute to the success 
of rhetorical action. Further, I develop a theoretical framework and methodology, Memetic 
Rhetorical Theory, which brings these concepts into conversation with one another as a way of 
understanding how existing characterizations of ethos might fall short of offering productive 
understandings of credibility as it manifests in digital communities. I explore this theoretical 
framework and methodology through two cases that capture different facets of the adaptive 
                                                 
1 While I would consider all technical communication scholars to also be rhetoricians, I 
recognize that this characterization is not universally accepted and that there are some technical 
communication scholars who would distance themselves from rhetorical studies. Likewise, there 
are rhetoricians who do not consider themselves technical communication scholars. 
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characterization of ethos in digital communities and conclude with a discussion of what that 
adaptive characterization of ethos means for attempts to intervene in the spread of 
misinformation. 
This chapter functions as the introduction and a way of orienting rhetoric and technical 
communication scholars to the project and to Memetic Rhetorical Theory. As such, it 
characterizes the need for a comprehensive analytical framework to better understand how 
networks of actors work to create new definitions of credibility in digital communities. This 
chapter also lays the foundation for the argument that this more comprehensive understanding 
creates opportunities for interventions that allow for more successful communication across 
communities, since it facilitates more productive understandings of how each community 
distinguishes between fact and fiction. 
The second half of Chapter 1 discusses the existing theories in rhetoric and technical and 
professional communication specifically relating to the concepts of ethos and agency and then 
discusses intersections between these terms, drawing on previous work by techno- and cyber-
feminists. Following this literature review, I argue that further examination of community-based 
ethos and rhetorical agency as interconnected concepts is necessary to understand the spread of 
(mis)information online. This understanding functions as the first step toward productive 
intervention in and social engagement with the “post-fact” era. Chapter 1 closes with a specific 
articulation of intervention as the purview of technical communicators as well as an outline of 
the remaining chapters of this dissertation. 
The Post-Fact Phenomenon 
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To understand this “post-fact” movement contextually, it is first necessary to interrogate 
our2 modern understandings of what, exactly, facts are and how they fit discursively with our 
understanding of the world. As an illustrative example, consider the circumstances surrounding 
the advent of popular usage of the term “alternative facts” in political discourse in the United 
States. The 2016 United States Presidential Election was historic for many reasons: it featured 
the first female presidential candidate to represent a major party in the United States as well as 
the only victorious candidate in a presidential election to have no record of public or military 
service. According to some, the aftermath of the election was also record-setting in its own way. 
Donald Trump had run a highly visible and unusually controversial campaign, resulting in both 
enthusiastic support from his base as well as vehement opposition from others. By the end of the 
campaign, it seemed that very few people in the United States were neutral about Trump. 
Perhaps it was these high-running emotions that led Trump himself to predict that his 
inauguration would have “an unbelievable, perhaps record-setting turnout” (Nuklos, 2017). This 
claim, though made publicly by the then-president-elect in an interview with The New York 
Times, could easily have been dismissed as typical braggart behavior; however, it was not. The 
question of crowd numbers quickly became a point of contention between the administration and 
many media sources when the numbers were, reportedly, not record-breaking. This debate 
culminated in a statement made by White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer during a press 
conference on January 21, 2017, on the day of the inaugural ceremony. At this conference, 
Spicer claimed pointedly that the crowd “was the largest audience ever to witness an 
inauguration—period—both in person and around the globe” (Cillizza, 2017). Spicer’s claim 
                                                 
2 When I say “our” here, I am referring to myself among members of the population of the 
United States of America. I lack the experience or sufficient research support to make any 
internationally-based claims. 
 7 
was contradicted by the majority of mainstream news outlets, who identified the crowd size as 
significant, but notably smaller than the first inaugurations of both Barack Obama and Ronald 
Reagan. 
This debate, while puerile and ultimately insignificant in terms of major issues facing the 
United States in 2017, became the exigence for a term that would play a significant role in 
defining concerns about American culture in the modern era. Spicer came under fire almost 
immediately by fact-checkers and media outlets who challenged him for publicly sharing figures 
that ran counter to official reports by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 
among other sources. Coming out in defense of Spicer, administration spokesperson Kellyanne 
Conway clarified that Spicer had, in fact, not lied. He had simply offered “alternative facts” that 
presented information counter to the narrative of the mainstream media. 
Media, Bias, and The Cultural Expectation of Alternative Facts 
Conway’s re-framing of Spicer’s representation of the crowd size through the use of the 
term “alternative facts” fit well with the already murky definitions of truth and fact—as well as 
bias—in popular media. Bias and subjectivity are long-established characteristics of human 
communication, particularly as framed by comparative and cultural rhetoricians (Baca & 
Villanueva, 2008; King, Gubele, & Anderson, 2015; Mao, 2013; Powell, 2004, 2008). As used 
by these scholars, and as commonly accepted by rhetoricians more broadly, bias and subjectivity 
are characteristics of world views and communicative actions based on experience. They are 
natural and even formative, though subject to critique and reflection. 
When used in discourse regarding journalism and popular media, however, the term 
“bias” takes on a very different connotation. In their book Guardians of Power: The Myth of the 
Liberal Media, Edwards and Cromwell (2006) argued that while journalism in the mainstream 
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media is built on codes of ethics that emphasize impartiality, media outlets are owned by a select 
set of corporations. Further, Edwards and Cromwell claimed, public recognition of the biases 
inherent in corporately-owned media outlets creates the perception that “the mainstream media” 
are intentionally dishonest. In other words, the public is well aware that journalists, by training 
and tradition, are meant to offer facts rather than opinions; they should convey events, not 
ascribe value judgements to them. This is the distinction between understanding objectivity as a 
state of being rather than as a writing style, the former being impossible, the latter highly prized 
in many fields of discourse. Unfortunately, this distinction is easily muddled or ignored, 
particularly when audiences have deep personal and emotional investments in the discourse, as 
we often do in politics. 
The American public has historically been highly critical of failures in objectivity as a 
writing style when used by journalists (Edwards & Cromwell, 2006; McChesney, 2008; Cramer 
& Eisenhart, 2014). However, the introduction of the concept of alternative facts emphasized a 
new facet to this concern for objectivity; namely, the American public began to demonstrate 
increased awareness that the act of reporting events is, in itself, a value judgement because those 
facts have persuasive power. If President-Elect Trump says that his inauguration boasted the 
most populous crowd in history, then any media report to the contrary becomes not a description 
of an event (objective, according to Cramer & Eisenhart) but a judgement placed upon a person, 
and so a matter of opinion. Anyone seeking to report on events, then, is in a very difficult 
position; there is now a very prominent public understanding that, while facts may be objective, 
they are not value-neutral. The debate surrounding the size of the inaugural crowd demonstrates 
this tension well. 
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Many mainstream media sources expressed frustration that simply showing an image of 
the crowd failed to provide a definitive determination of its size, thereby resolving the 
disagreement (Frostenson, 2017; Hunt, 2017; Robertson & Farley, 2017). However, the idea that 
the crowd size was larger than reported is heavily rooted in distrust of the media and the idea that 
the media manipulate information, including altering photographs, to fit a pre-established 
agenda. Long-established—and now ideologically validated—allegations of bias contribute to 
this distrust. These allegations of bias, coupled with easy access to other images that appear to 
show a larger crowd, allow the images that depict the smaller crowd to be easily dismissed 
within these certain communities. Spicer himself even claimed that one oft-referenced image in 
which the crowd looks smaller than that of past inaugurations was framed with the specific 
intention of minimizing the crowd size. He said, “Photographs of the inaugural proceedings were 
intentionally framed in a way, in one particular Tweet, to minimize the enormous support that 
had gathered on the National Mall” (Qiu, 2017). This accusation and others like it demonstrate a 
belief that some reporters are not above manipulating photographs, either physically in the way 
the shot is set up or digitally through ex post facto alterations, to influence public perceptions. 
Thus, we have at least two conflicting sets of facts that seem to be supported by evidence that 
various communities deem credible based on their communal experiences and established value 
systems. It is difficult, if not impossible, to convince either group to question the facts they have 
embraced specifically because the standards for credibility that help convey those facts are not 
consistent across communities (in this case, the communities tend to define themselves by 
political party affiliation). 
If Not Facts, Then What? A Literature Review Surrounding Ethos 
and Agency 
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The Oxford English Dictionary defines “post-fact” as “relating to or denoting 
circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals 
to emotion or personal belief” (2017). There are significant discrepancies in the application of 
this term, although common themes associate it with hot-button political discourse and the 
common practice of relying on digital media sources for information. Alexios Mantzarlis, for 
example, notes that media sources are most likely to reference a “post-fact era” or “post-fact 
society” when they catch politicians in a lie (2016). He also notes, however, that it is absurd to 
argue that attempts to lie to the public are indicative of a drastic change in society—people in 
general, and politicians in particular, have lied all throughout history. We are simply more likely 
to notice inconsistencies now because such a wealth of information is widely and instantaneously 
available online (Mantzarlis, 2016). 
When I use the term “post-fact,” then, I am not referring to the existence of more false 
information, but rather to the tendency prominent in modern discourse to dismiss credible 
information, particularly when it challenges existing/dominant understandings of an issue within 
a certain context or community. This tendency is, of course, problematic for any society that 
relies on civic discourse, but it raises a particularly interesting question for rhetoricians, who 
have historically interrogated modes of persuasion, including loci of ethos, and systems of 
logical reasoning. When it seems large portions of the population are no longer willing to listen 
to established reason, or that we are unable to determine whom to believe regarding matters of 
observable fact, a deeper interrogation into these modes of persuasion and the technical 
apparatuses that support and disrupt them becomes necessary. 
The following literature review explores how other scholars have interpreted the 
rhetorical appeal of ethos and argues that, while these interpretations have served their purpose 
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well in rhetorical discourse, they have thus far not engaged sufficiently with the related concept 
of agency as it has been taken up by technical communicators and digital rhetoricians. Rhetoric 
is broadly conceived as the study of persuasion and the post-fact issue is, at its core, a question of 
how and why so many people are easily persuaded by information that is demonstrably false. 
Our traditional understandings of ethos, or the origins of credibility, are insufficient for 
understanding why large groups of people think and behave the way that they do because, in our 
modern digital information age, credibility is created not only by personal interactions and 
cultural institutions, but also by myriad other factors that affect how, when, and why information 
is passed among communicants, whether it is believable or not. 
This discussion of ethos builds on rhetorical definitions of the term that have evolved 
from its introduction in the classical era. Aristotle characterized ethos as the appearance or 
performance of credibility in accordance with certain standards of character. Herrick (2001) 
points out that these standards of character (competence, good intentions, and empathy) were 
determined through “careful study of what Athenians consider to be the qualities of a trustworthy 
individual.” In other words, the rhetor who portrays ethos during his oration draws on an 
established identity of a credible persona and attempts to mimic that persona in his delivery. 
Plato, conversely, argued that the goodness inherent in a person, rather than performed by a 
person as a strategy, was what allowed that person to possess ethos. Regardless of these 
significant differences, these ancient Greeks (as well as Romans Quintilian and Cicero) attribute 
ethos to some connection between the rhetor, his audience, and characteristics that he possesses 
or performs. I would like to add to this characterization of ethos by interrogating the mechanisms 
through which those characteristics, which differ from culture to culture and from situation to 
situation, come to be invested with this quality of credibility. In connecting ethos with agency, I 
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argue that it is a confluence of cultural ideologies and communicative technologies that 
determine the qualities necessary for credibility to exist within a community. For example, while 
Aristotle argues for a performative understanding of ethos, the addition of agency to this 
definition points to the fact that such a performance is only possible for a rhetor in a context 
where the audience can observe his body language and hear his voice. As such, the agency of the 
physical construction of the agora interacted with other cultural elements and practices to place 
rhetorical value on these characteristics that could be performed by a speaker. 
I suggest that we think of ethos as a characteristic of the internal environments that digital 
communities create based on their shared rhetorical practices. As a rhetorical conundrum, the 
rapid spread of misinformation online requires an expanded definition of the concepts of both 
ethos and agency as they manifest in rhetorical theory. While these concepts are closely related, 
they are not synonymous, nor do we yet have work that puts them into conversation with one 
another as a way of more productively understanding digital rhetorics. 
This discussion is based in the understanding that communities create, and are defined 
by, their own internal rhetorics. As such, rhetorics are fluid, adaptive, and integral to the 
communities associated with them. It is this characteristic of community rhetorics that allows 
successful communication, and therefore persuasion, to take place among community members. 
This understanding is also closely tied to a parallel interpretation of culture as the defining 
characteristic of a community. As groups of people live and communicate with one another, they 
gradually develop patterns of speech and ways of thinking that reflect their shared interactions. 
Over time these solidify into what we might recognize as key cultural elements—beliefs, values, 
speech patterns, even logical constructs. These cultural elements form the boundaries of 
communities and help members of communities recognize one another and, as such, the 
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rhetorical practices that define communication within that community. For this reason, when I 
discuss rhetoric or rhetorical practices in this dissertation, these terms should always be 
understood as explicitly cultural; I will not make distinctions between “digital rhetorics” and 
“cultural rhetorics” because I understand both of these as ways of discussing the community- 
based nature of rhetorical action. To quote Angela Haas, “Rhetoric is always already cultural” 
(2012), and digitality is simply a feature of how certain communities communicate to develop 
that culture. The following discussion of ethos likewise relies on this understanding of rhetoric. 
Culturally Situated Ethos 
For the purposes of this project, I define ethos—broadly and simplistically—as the 
contextual quality of a particular text, individual, or piece of information that allows it to be 
valued by members of a community to which it is communicated. Rhetorical study has a history 
of characterizing ethos as a quality of an individual, or as authority derived from an institution. 
While Quintilian’s characterization of “a good man speaking well” is now both quite dated and 
intensely problematic, the association between this definition, as well as other ancient definitions 
of ethos discussed previously, and the idea of an embodied characteristic enacting a set of 
recognizable virtues often remains prominent in even the most progressive definitions of ethos. 
Drawing on the idea of an audience recognizing virtue or goodness in a speaker, and therefore 
holding that speaker’s words in higher esteem, many rhetoricians continue to interrogate how 
writers and speakers (as individuals or institutions) might create or perform ethos in a given 
context. Patricia Bizzell (2006) points out the ways in which activist Frances Willard was able to 
cultivate rhetorical ethos by performing recognized tropes of Methodist womanhood to call her 
followers to the movement for women’s suffrage, while Carolyn Skinner (2009) follows similar 
logic in her analysis of anatomy and physiology lecturer Mary Gove’s credibility—a difficult 
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construction for a woman of science in the mid 1800s—and its relationship to traditionally 
positive or “feminine” qualities that her audiences were willing to attribute to her character. 
These examinations take into account that ethos, rather than being an inherent characteristic of 
an individual, is derived from a relationship to one’s culture and community. 
The relationship between an individual and their community is never static; rather, it is 
always in flux. Nedra Reynolds (1993) specifically articulates ethos as location regarding the 
social and cultural position from which a speaker/subject establishes authority. She says, “In this 
view ethos is not something “embodied” by the classical orator with his audience, nor it is 
crafted in solitude by the modernist artist in his garret (Brodkey). Ethos, like postmodern 
subjectivity, shifts and changes over time, across texts, and around competing spaces” (p. 326, 
emphasis in original). Reynolds’s characterization aligns well with the ways that ethos has been 
taken up by feminist rhetoricians as a characteristic that is contextually responsive and indicative 
of the speaker/subject’s relationship to her surroundings and topic of discussion. For example, 
Coretta Pittman (2006) draws on Aristotle’s emphasis on the ability of the moral performance of 
an individual to hold persuasive power, and then complicates this understanding by pointing out 
that because our interpretation of moral character is culturally dictated, this process often results 
in the exclusion of certain groups. Specifically, she demonstrates the ways in which black 
women writers are more likely to have their moral character questioned because of the ways that 
Western classical models of ethos stigmatize these individuals. 
These culturally situated definitions of ethos are illustrative in the sense that they point to 
contextual constructions of credibility that happen outside the individual; they refer to a person’s 
ability (or lack thereof) to fit with a set of cultural expectations that both shape the rhetorical 
situation and exist independently of that individual. Often they point to communal beliefs or 
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ideologies that dictate what constitutes moral or acceptable behaviors and then discuss 
relationships between those mandates and the individuals in question. This relationship between 
cultural ideologies and the individual is important, but it is not the whole picture. Technical 
communication scholarship adds to this discussion by pointing to instances where cultural 
ideologies confer ethos on things that are not human, specifically on networks and genres. 
Recent work has both built upon and complicated this understanding of ethos as 
culturally situated by placing the locus of ethos in networks or genres. Julia Marie Smith’s 
(2017) chapter “A Gay Girl in Damascus: Multi-vocal Construction and Refutation of Authorial 
Ethos,” is a prime example of this redistribution, as she attributes ethos to the development of 
networks of recognized accounts through social media. In this chapter, Smith notes the readiness 
and tenacity with which digital communities put faith in the persona of Amina, who claimed to 
be a lesbian, Syrian-American activist living in Damascus. In reality, Amina3 was the online 
persona of Tom MacMaster, a straight man living in the southern United States (Smith, 2017). 
Even after an exposé verified by MacMaster himself, many of Amina’s admirers refused to 
believe that they had been duped. In this case, the ethos of the network was so powerful that, 
even when parts of that network publicly disavowed Amina, the remaining sectors were able to 
sustain her persona as a credible one for some time. Notice here as well that Amina herself was 
no longer communicating directly with any members of this community; she had never 
physically existed, and her online identity had been dissolved. Her ethos, then, could not reside 
in any manifestation of her personhood but rather in a collective understanding agreed upon by 
her network of followers. Amina’s story is not unique, for another compelling example, consider 
                                                 
3 In this section I refer to the persona of Amina as “she” and “her” despite her lack of corporeal 
existence. I made this rhetorical choice because, as Smith points out, the persona of Amina 
became real to the community that embraced her. 
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the case of Jenna Abrams—a conservative online persona recently exposed as a Russian media 
bot. Both of these examples offer the possibility of understanding the locus of ethos as outside 
the human body, yet still conferred using culturally constructed characteristics that are 
recognized as credible within the community. 
While the conferral of ethos on a non-human might at first seem strange, it is in fact not 
all that unusual in technical communication scholarship. In their analysis of ethos in technical 
manuals, Frost and Sharp-Hoskins (2015) argue that it is often not only possible, but necessary to 
separate the idea of credibility from a human body. In technical manuals, which 
characteristically exclude the name of the author or authors and often appropriate text from other 
sources, the ethos must belong to the document itself rather than the individuals who wrote it for 
the document to have its intended effect, thereby avoiding misuse of the product. This 
interpretation aligns well with our usual understandings of genres as technologies that shape 
discourses; following this logic, genres themselves, in addition to individual documents, can 
enact ethos. 
All of the definitions of ethos discussed thus far have relied on the ability of an audience 
to recognize (whether present or performed) certain traits within a speaker, network, or 
document. However, the unanswered question of how that recognition occurs remains. In the 
following discussion of agency, scholars demonstrate the power of non-human actors to 
influence rhetorical practice. It is this influence, exerted by spaces, objects, technologies, 
systems, and humans alike, that allows for communicative action and therefore the 
demonstration of the cultural qualities through which ethos is conferred. As such, a thorough 
consideration of agency is necessary for productive understanding of how ethos manifests in 
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various communities and, as such, why those communities bestow credibility in the ways that 
they do.  
Rhetorical Agency 
For the purposes of this dissertation, I define rhetorical agency as the power to influence 
or affect the dynamics of rhetorical action. While ethos describes the credibility or trust that 
community members invest in individuals, networks, and institutions, agency points to the ways 
in which both human and non-human actors (to use the Latourian term) shape those communities 
by allowing communication to take place. In this definition, agency does not imply either intent 
or cognition as humans understand it; instead, as a concept, agency is entirely separate from any 
suggestion of consciousness, thought, or personhood. Rhetoric is a human phenomenon. As such, 
it is neither possible nor productive to attempt to separate rhetoric from human participants. My 
claim that non-humans can and do have agency in rhetorical situations does not refute this 
concept. Rather, it suggests that humans interact with our environment and the things, people, 
and ideas that make it up in ways that shape our rhetorics. Humans—our thoughts, our feelings, 
our bodies, our cultures—are still very much at the center of rhetorical activity; we simply act in 
response to other influences, both human and non-human, that shape our rhetorical practices as 
well as our cultures and technologies. 
In our actions we respond to things out in the world; sometimes those things are human 
and sometimes they are not. When we use tools and technologies, consciously and to achieve our 
own purposes, we make use of the affordances and constraints that they have (in simple terms: 
the things they do). In other words, the cultural construction of meaning is a process that is both 
interactive and collaborative among human and non-human actors. In response to a hot, sunny 
day, a person might sit under a tree that provides shade, or (to modify a classic example) we use 
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hammers (not marshmallows) to pound in nails. It is the characteristics of these objects, these 
actors, that help to shape the actions of human participants. In other words, these non-human 
actors exert influence by how they exist in the world in relation to other things; they allow, or do 
not allow, certain activities to take place. To draw on the model of thinking provided by Jim 
Johnson (1988), “every time you want to know what a nonhuman does, simply imagine what 
other humans or other nonhumans would have to do were this character not present” (p. 299). 
Furthering this explanation, Johnson describes the work that would need to be done to replace 
the existence of a hinge on a door (a nonhuman actor): 
To size up the work done by the hinges, you simply have to imagine that every time you 
want to get in or out of the building you have to do the same work as a prisoner trying to 
escape […] plus the work of those who would rebuild the prison’s […] walls. If you do 
not want to imagine people destroying walls and rebuilding them every time they wish to 
leave or enter a building, then imagine the work that would have to be done in order to 
keep inside or keep outside all the things and people that, left to themselves, would go the 
wrong way. (p. 299) 
The hinge in this example, by virtue of its existence and presence in the situation, makes various 
human behaviors likely or possible. Of course, the hinge does not mean to do this; it has no 
intentions, no thought, no consciousness as human beings understand these concepts. However, 
because of its presence, human actors behave differently. The dynamic of the space and the 
interactions that take place within it change. 
The hinge, of course, is a microcosmic example in that the environment it influences is 
relatively small (a room or building, the occupants thereof, and the situations they encounter). 
The hinge is also open to some degree of agentic interpretation because it was created by a 
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person to fulfill a purpose. Macrocosmic instantiations of this process are both more complex 
and less capable of being associated primarily with individual human actors. Consider, for 
instance, the essentially universal responsiveness of human cultures to the physical and 
geographical environments in which they exist. Jared Diamond’s (1997) transdisciplinary work 
Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies offers a close examination of this cultural 
response to environmental factors while also foregrounding the relationship between cultural 
responses to physical conditions (arid landscapes, for example) and the hegemonic ideologies 
that arise from the disparities those conditions create. 
These hegemonic ideologies themselves might also be considered agentic non-human 
actors, as agency is not limited to physical or tangible artifacts but can include actors such as 
social systems or power structures as well. Things like gender and patriarchy, race, sexuality, 
(dis)ability, social class, and the many other identity characteristics that we might think of are 
not human themselves, nor do they possess the kind of central consciousness that we might 
associate with an anthropocentric definition of agency; however, they absolutely exert influence 
in rhetorical environments and shape rhetorical action. Foucault (1977) characterizes some 
iterations of these systems in his discussion of the social conditioning and disciplining of bodies, 
as does Butler in her 2004 book Undoing Gender. 
Both rhetoricians and technical communication scholars more specifically have noted the 
ability of non-human actors to shape rhetorical environments. Frost and Haas (2017), for 
example, note that the mediation of ultrasound technology acts as a gatekeeping mechanism for 
women’s access to and understanding of their reproductive healthcare, though the technology 
often goes un-critiqued. Brock and Shepherd (2016) likewise articulate this phenomenon, and its 
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rhetorical erasure, in their examination of matching systems used by Google, Match.com, and 
Facebook that push users to engage with certain kinds of content. They claim: 
As rhetoricians we often engage in one of the most powerful existing enthymematic 
activities: we convince ourselves that we are actively making decisions about how to 
participate in a given system when, in reality, we accept options made apparently 
available to us from a set of constrained possibilities. In other words, we allow ourselves 
to be persuaded that we are the only agents involved in a particular situation when, in 
reality, there are networks of visible and invisible actors working to persuade us to 
specific ends—often including further participation in relevant persuasive computational 
systems. (p. 18) 
Brock and Shepherd are specifically discussing website interfaces in this paragraph, but it is not 
difficult to extend that application to the various interactions between humans and non- human 
actors that have formed the bulk of this section. The language, in fact, bears a striking 
resemblance to the ways in which socially critical rhetoricians have critiqued the erasure of 
privilege in dominant discourses (Haas, 2012, among others). In both cases, non-human 
structures (i.e., algorithms and socio-cultural hierarchies) exert rhetorical influence that affects 
human discourse and activities as well as beliefs. While these structures are rendered invisible by 
both their wide prevalence and the apparency of human agency, they remain agentic within the 
rhetorical situation. Furthermore, their invisibility only strengthens their agency, as it results in 
fewer opportunities for critique. 
Rhetorics of place tend to emphasize the rhetorical agency of geographic locations in 
relation to the cultural associations that various groups have with those locations. Places, these 
scholars argue, hold cultural memory in a way that shapes the communities who interact with 
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them (Bar-Itzhak, 1999; Endres, Senda-Cook, & Cozen 2014; hooks, 2004). Rhetorics of space 
focus on the rhetorical power that the physical construction of a location possesses. Scholars who 
engage with rhetorics of space (Andrews, 2017; Dickenson & Ott, 2013; Rickert, 2013; Soja, 
1989; Swarts, 2007) contend that observable features of a location influence both how people 
interpret that location and how they interact with each other because of that interpretation. Work 
that combines rhetorics of place and rhetorics of space (Bray, 1997; Wright, 2005) invests 
cultural capital in features of a location and therefore suggests a symbiotic relationship between 
cultures and the locations in which they develop. Space and place, then, are examples of factors 
that shape community interactions and therefore rhetorical practices. They are not humans in and 
of themselves, but they are features that humans recognize and respond to. 
The same is true whether the spaces are physical, as in the works discussed above, or 
digital, as in the forums and social media sites in which digital communities develop. These 
spaces become invested with cultural influence; their digital makeup becomes the foundation for 
the communicative practices that define communities. As Beck (2015) demonstrates, cookies and 
web beacons store user information to customize user experiences online, allowing algorithms to 
adapt certain content on digital sites to suit particular users. Technological interfaces play a 
powerful role in shaping “post-fact” discourses for precisely this reason. The personalized 
algorithms built into digital technologies provide an unusually powerful filtration system that 
help to create highly polarized communities wherein communicative norms are established by 
the combination of site features and commonalities in tagging criteria that filter users to those 
sites. Pariser (2011) calls this phenomenon a “filter bubble” and points to the lasting impact that 
it has in closing users off from diversified information sources. 
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The obfuscation of the agency of non-human actors, whatever form they may take, 
creates an environment in which the only influential factors that human actors are aware of are 
our own choices. This, in turn, removes the possibility for these human actors to critique the 
systems to which we belong, and in which we participate every day. We think that our choices 
are our own, but they are integrally linked with the confluence of factors exerting agency in a 
rhetorical situation. The assumption that agency is the purview of humans alone likewise 
obscures the systems through which communication takes place. These systems allow (or 
prevent) the performance of ethos in various ways, helping to determine how credibility 
manifests within communities. 
Ethos and Agency Together: The Need for Memetic Rhetorical Theory 
Existing literature has yet to bridge the gaps among agency of the myriad human and 
non-human actors discussed in this literature review and the ways in which that agency intersects 
with the construction of ethos in rhetorical environments (including the digital). It is at this 
intersection that I situate myself and the work in the following chapters. This project requires an 
examination of the intricacies of spaces, places, technologies, and artifacts alongside the social 
systems that shape (and are shaped by) them all. Techno- and cyberfeminists have begun this 
work already in their interrogations of the ways that technologies can both reinforce and 
challenge hegemonic social structures (Beck, Blair, and Grohowski, 2015; Blair, Gajjala, and 
Tulley [eds] 2008; Frost and Haas, 2017; Gajjala and Oh, 2012; Gruwell, 2015). 
Taken together, the understandings of ethos and agency as defined in the last few pages 
suggest that there must be a system of interactions and a confluence of material and immaterial 
factors that determine how and why communities become invested in certain kind of 
information. Rather than relying on established patterns of institutionally conferred expertise or 
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academic research, most communities look for and recognize responsive manifestations of 
credibility that are rooted in communicative practices that characterize those communities. The 
existing rhetorical models employed by technical communicators are unable to account for the 
extreme discrepancies that we are observing in closed-community communications, specifically 
because they attempt to engage with these considerations in isolation, rather than as a coherent 
but evolving system. In response, I developed a theoretical framework, Memetic Rhetorical 
Theory (MRT), which consists of an evolutionary model of analysis for recognizing how certain 
pieces of information become persuasive in different communities. Each of the bodies of theory 
discussed and reviewed in this chapter have contributed to the development of this theoretical 
framework. This dissertation develops and applies MRT, which provides a comprehensive 
framework for identifying, analyzing, and intervening in the confluence of factors that influence 
(in)effective communicative action, especially in digital spaces. MRT also provides a model for 
understanding rhetorical systems and emphasizes the successful spread of cultural elements 
through coadaptation, seeking to understand how a variety of factors, from socially systemic 
influences to features of specific technologies, evolve together to form the distinctive rhetorics 
that determine the success or failure of communication in a particular scenario. MRT is relevant 
in both digital and non-digital environments; however, I focus specifically on digital 
communities because so much popular media has argued that the internet is to blame for the 
“post-fact” era due to the mass influx of information and a widespread inability to sort through it 
in productive ways. While I complicate this argument, its persistence points to a tension within 
digital rhetorics that I propose MRT could solve. The following chapters approach the idea of 
“post-fact” by examining how complex environments formed by groups of co-adapting cultural 
 24 
elements work to create new definitions of credibility in digital communities and how those 
definitions of credibility shape the way that communities distinguish between fact and fiction. 
MRT considers that a community, as a whole, is more likely to be persuaded by an idea 
that adapts easily to the core beliefs of that community, to the rhetorical practices that its 
members use to communicate with one another, and to the technologies that facilitate that 
communication. These interpretations of agency and ethos discussed in this chapter offer critical 
perspectives that inform understandings of the relationship between these two concepts and the 
ways they work together to influence the spread of information through digital communities. 
MRT does not seek to replace these theories, but rather to offer a way of weaving them together 
to afford more cohesive, comprehensive analyses that have greater potential to lead to productive 
intervention through successful communication. 
While MRT is, as the name suggests, a rhetorical theory, I consider this to be a technical 
communication project for two interconnected reasons. First, technological interfaces play a 
powerful role in shaping “post-fact” discourses specifically because the personalized interfaces 
built into digital technologies provide an unusually powerful filtration system that helps create 
highly polarized communities. This self-perpetuating cycle is a significant part of what made the 
spread of a fake news item so difficult to disrupt. Each of the two analyses offered in this 
dissertation represents the creation of interrelated communities that form based on ideologies 
shared and perpetuated through technological interfaces. These communities, because they are so 
ideologically isolated, are characterized by rigidly co-adaptive groups of ideas that are 
increasingly resistant to new or contradictory information, hence “post-fact”. Second, and 
following logically, interventions that disrupt this process will need to address these flaws in the 
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interface, which means that these interventions will likely need to be the work of technical 
communicators. 
Chapter 2 establishes MRT as both a rhetorical theory and as a methodological 
framework that will be applied to the cases in Chapters 3 and 4. Building on the simple overview 
of MRT offered above, the chapter discusses the origins of memetics (the field from which I 
draw portions of Memetic Rhetorical Theory) and its recent history, including the places where it 
falls short as a neuro-biological theory. Next, I argue for the application of memetics in a 
rhetorical model (hence, Memetic Rhetorical Theory- MRT) that helps us to understand how 
effective communication and persuasion happens in digital communities. The bulk of Chapter 2 
focuses on explanations and illustrative examples of key tenets of MRT to create a through 
explanation of the theoretical work that frames the entire dissertation, and Chapters 3 and 4 
specifically. Chapter 2 concludes with a general discussion of methods of memetic rhetorical 
analysis. 
Chapter 3 applies Memetic Rhetorical Theory to the network of Whole 30 online 
communities, most of which function as support groups or motivational sites for individuals 
completing the “Whole 30 Challenge”—an eating program that focuses on the elimination of 
certain food groups in pursuit of a healthier lifestyle. The program includes a book titled It Starts 
With Food, which creator Melissa Hartwig later expanded into a series, and now includes several 
different but overlapping digital communities. Chapter 3 begins with a memetic rhetorical 
analysis (according to the methods outlined in Chapter 2) of It Starts With Food, as well as other 
books published as a part of the Whole 30 collection prior to November 2016. This analysis then 
extends to the Whole30 Community Facebook page, identifying the ways in which the 
community on this page takes up or disregards the content of the books. In particular, the 
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memetic analysis in this chapter demonstrates that the community on the Whole30 Community 
Facebook page engages primarily with content that corresponds to features of the page interface, 
and that the inclusion of various elements in the books authored by program creator Melissa 
Hartwig is not a definitive indicator of ethos in this new environment. 
Chapter 4 applies MRT to understand the proliferation of a particular fake news item that 
gained traction in conservative online forums during the 2016 USA Presidential Election—the 
“bussing in” of protestors to a convention in Austin, TX, by the Hillary Clinton Campaign. This 
case provides a productive perspective for understanding how digital communities shape 
concepts like fact and credibility specifically because the original author of the tweet that was 
cited as evidence of the bussed-in protestors retracted his claim less than 4 hours after the post, 
and instead indicated that the busses he had photographed were in town for an entirely different 
purpose. While his original claim spread quickly through conservative websites, the following 
retraction died out almost immediately. Site analysis for this case will center around Twitter via 
the hashtags associated with the event, as well as a Facebook group where the original image 
was shared. This case provides an example of spread of misinformation through association with 
and adaptation to the existing the existing community rhetorics. 
The final chapter reiterates my previous argument that MRT is a more comprehensive 
way of understanding the rhetorics of digital communities. However, it extends this argument 
beyond academic analyses and into potential realms for intervention. The application of MRT 
calls for critical reflection on the forces that shape rhetorical environments in all kinds of 
communities, and for implementing that reflection in a way that allows us to draw on the existing 
ecologies to introduce new information in a more productive way. The chapter closes with an 
example of one such successful intervention as well as a caution that intervening in problematic 
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systems is a gradual and often-times unrewarding process, as successful interventions must draw 
in part on the features of the ecology that are already in place. 
 
Chapter 2: Memetic Rhetorical Theory 
Introduction and Overview of Chapter 2 
Chapter 1 articulated the growing concern in both academic and popular circles that the 
United States is becoming a “post fact” society. With the rapid spread of misinformation, 
especially in online spaces, the existing models that rhetoricians have for understanding ethos as 
it relates to community interactions need to be re-evaluated. In particular, these understandings 
of ethos need to expand to include critical reflections on how the distribution of agency in 
rhetorical communities affects the construction of ethos in these spaces. In this chapter, I offer a 
step toward that understanding in the form of Memetic Rhetorical Theory (MRT), a rhetorical 
theory and methodological framework for understanding the rapid spread of misinformation 
online. MRT offers a framework for understanding the connections between existing concepts in 
rhetoric and technical communication (concepts like tropes, genres, actors, and technologies, 
among many others) and emphasizes the connection between these concepts by characterizing all 
of them as kinds or categories of memes. MRT then uses the co-adaptive nature of memes as a 
way of understanding how the distribution of agency in rhetorical environments alters 
understandings of ethos in those ecologies. 
This chapter begins with a brief discussion of memetics, the field that serves as one of the 
foundations for MRT, as well as a discussion of common critiques of the limitations of that field. 
Next, I articulate key principles within the fields of rhetoric and technical communication that 
point to the need for Memetic Rhetorical Theory and explore the principles of that theory in 
detail. This discussion forms the bulk of this chapter as well as the methodology for this 
dissertation project. I follow this discussion with an introduction to appropriate methods for 
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conducting a memetic rhetorical analysis based on the methodology of MRT. The chapter 
concludes with why and how I applied MRT to the cases discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Framing MRT in Rhetorical Study 
The literature review offered in Chapter 1 discusses ethos and agency as rhetorical 
concepts. Specifically, this literature review characterized ethos as credibility that is derived 
from cultural context, and agency as the ability to exert influence that shapes that context. As 
such, in order to understand ethos, and therefore how ethos is cultivated for and through 
misinformation in digital communities, scholars must take agency into account by interrogating 
the ways in which cultural ideologies and technologies work together to form networks of 
influence that define the culture of communities (what I will later call memetic ecologies). This 
body of work has helped point to the need for a model for understanding how these networks are 
created and the effect that this process has on rhetorical action. In this chapter, I offer such a 
model in the form of Memetic Rhetorical Theory (MRT), an understanding of rhetoric that draws 
on the field of memetics to recognize the evolutionary and environmentally-situated nature of 
rhetorical action. This rhetorical model is particularly helpful for understanding the spread of 
misinformation online because it emphasizes the network and the environment as key factors in 
determining the factors that define ethos in a given situation. 
As an evolutionary model, MRT relies on the understanding that the rhetorical 
environments created by intersecting networks of actors not only exist and exert influence, they 
also are continually growing and changing. The information transmitted within these 
environments must likewise grow and change to adapt successfully to its surroundings, thereby 
effecting successful communication and rhetorical action. This changeability of communication 
is reminiscent of Ridolfo and DeVoss’s (2009) concept of rhetorical velocity as well as 
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Lawrence Lessig’s (2008) remix, with one crucial difference: Memetic Rhetorical Theory 
expands on these concepts by asserting that ideas spread and evolve in response to the 
environments into which they are introduced, not only as the result of conscious changes made 
by human (re)writers. 
The following section offers a brief history of memetics as a field of study, including the 
key features of the science of memetics. This history is intended to provide context for the 
application of memetic terms and analytical models to rhetorical analyses by pointing out the 
overlapping goals of memetics and rhetoric. In this section, I will also point out the ways my 
application of memetic theory to rhetoric diverges from some scholars’ interpretations of 
memetics. Later in this chapter, I construct Memetic Rhetorical Theory by tying memetic tenets 
and terminology together in order to create a method of analysis I call memetic rhetorical 
analysis. 
Understanding Memetics As a Field of Study 
Memetics is a distinct field of study focusing on the evolution 
of culture through the transfer of ideas, information, or 
communicative activities. The origins of this field lie in Richard 
Dawkins’s 1976 book The Selfish Gene, which focuses on the gene as 
an important element of evolutionary biology, although the study and 
application of memetics have evolved significantly from this 
foundation. 
The field of memetics begins with the definition of the meme 
itself. This definition, of course, relies on an understanding of the term 
meme outside of the usual colloquial usage. This colloquial usage 
Figure 2: "Hey Girl" meme according to 
colloquial usage 
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understands a meme as a particular communicative genre consisting of image/word pairings on 
the internet. Most people recognize this term as referring to an image, usually shared through 
social media, with an ironic or humorous caption overlaying the picture although it can refer to 
audio clips, gifs, and other representative forms as well. Many of these are based on well-
recognized images that convey cultural meaning of their own, like the massive body of “Hey 
Girl” memes that idealize actor Ryan Gosling as the perfect embodiment of a man who is both 
physically attractive and sensitive to the needs of his (female) partner (see Figure 2).4 Other well-
known examples of this kind of meme5 include Socially Awkward Penguin, Sarcastic Wonka, 
and LOLCats (See Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Other examples of image-macro colloquial memes 
While these are examples of memes as defined by both memetics and MRT, the theoretical 
definition of the term meme as it applies in this project goes well beyond this isolated genre. It is 
                                                 
4 It would require another whole dissertation to discuss the nuance and cultural factors—both 
constructive and problematic—inherent in this genre and common instantiations of it. For now, 
suffice it to say that these are the artifacts that many people recognize as “memes” in popular 
discourse, and, while they are examples of the kinds of memes that I am discussing here, they are 
only a minute representation of a much larger theoretical concept.  
 
5 This is an example of an image macro. In this context, not all memes are image macros, but all 
image macros are memes. 
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therefore helpful, from this point forward, to disassociate the term meme from this genre, 
specifically, and instead think of it in the theoretical terms that follow. 
When Richard Dawkins first introduced the term meme, he was looking for a way to 
define what he called “the basic unit of cultural transmission” (Dawkins, 1989) and he wanted a 
term that would invoke both the idea of imitation, which he considered central to the replication 
of cultural elements, and the idea of evolution, which was his model for how these elements 
grow and change together. Thus, he combined the words mimesis, from the Greek word meaning 
“to imitate,” and gene, as in the primary building block of genetic evolution, to create the word 
meme (Dawkins, 1989). 
From this point, however, the definition of the meme began to grow and change, from 
broad but limited understandings like that of the Oxford English Dictionary, to significantly 
more specific definitions formulated by memeticists, including later iterations by Dawkins 
himself. Nick Rose summarizes these in his article “Controversies in Meme Theory”: 
The definition of a meme is currently ambiguous. A meme can be found variously 
described as; a unit of imitation (Dawkins), a unit of information residing in a brain 
(Dawkins), culturally transmitted instructions (Dennett), any permanent pattern of matter 
or information produced by an act of human intentionality (Csikszentmihalyi), roughly 
equivalent to ideas or representations, a unit of information in a mind whose existence 
influences events such that copies of itself get created in other minds (Brodie), actively 
contagious ideas (Lynch), a mental representation (Gabora), or a self-replicating element 
of culture passed on by imitation (Oxford English Dictionary), etc. (Rose, 1998) 
These definitions can be split fairly clearly into internal interpretations of memetics, which locate 
the meme inside the human brain, and external interpretations which place the focus on 
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communities and cultures built of human interactions. I situate myself among the externalists, as 
Memetic Rhetorical Theory will not offer any suggestions about the internal workings of the 
human brain but instead focuses on how memes help to define ethos within communities by 
facilitating communicative and rhetorical action. 
The boundaries of memetics as a field are contested even among its proponents. As a 
starting point, consider the definition offered by The Journal of Memetics: Evolutionary Models 
of Information Transmission, the only peer-reviewed academic journal devoted solely to 
memetic theory and investigation. This journal defines its subject as follows: 
Memetics is the theoretical and empirical science that studies the replication, spread and 
evolution of memes. Its core idea is that memes differ in their degree of "fitness", i.e. 
adaptation to the socio-cultural environment in which they propagate. Because of natural 
selection, fitter memes will be more successful in being communicated, "infecting" a 
larger number of individuals and/or surviving for a longer time within the population. 
Memetics tries to understand what characterizes fit memes, and how they affect 
individuals, organizations, cultures and society at large. (Journal of Memetics, “Subject 
Domain: Memetics” para. 2). 
The “socio-cultural” focus of memetics, as this definition characterizes it, along with the 
descriptive model of evolution borrowed from biology, has allowed memetics to attract 
researchers and proponents from both the natural and social sciences as well as the humanities. 
Dawkins, of course, was a biologist. Susan Blackmore has an academic history in psychology 
and the study of consciousness and is well known as a prominent researcher in memetics to this 
day; her 1999 book The Meme Machine is often cited as one of the foundational works of 
memetics. Daniel Dennett (see 1991 published book Consciousness Explained for example), 
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while he is generally a contemporary of Blackmore within the field of memetics, is a well-
recognized philosopher. 
While interdisciplinarity is a strength of memetics in many respects (Conte, 2000), this 
diversity would also become the basis for a debate that would severely hinder the progression of 
memetics as an interdisciplinary but independent field of study. This debate focused on the 
question of whether memetics should be studied as a phenomenon that is internal to the human 
brain and therefore reflective of the beliefs of an individual in concert with that individual’s 
physiology, or as a phenomenon that explores interactions in culture and society. At its core, this 
question is a debate over how to define, locate, and represent culture; with home fields ranging 
from biology and medicine (Dawkins, Gatherer) to philosophy (Edmonds, Dennett) to 
psychology (Blackmore, Marsden, and Rose), differing definitions of culture are essentially 
unavoidable. However, the discussion of how to define culture is never taken up by memeticists 
at all. Instead, much of the published scholarship in this field focuses on attempts to define and 
locate the meme itself. As one might imagine, any consensus regarding this definition was 
impossible without a previously agreed upon definition of culture (since memes are universally 
acknowledged as “units of culture”). Models developed by social psychologists and philosophers 
lacked the physical instantiations that biologists sought, while biological models failed to address 
social interactions that were of interest to social scientists. A rhetorical reading of both The 
Journal of Memetics and Robert Aunger’s edited collection Darwinizing Culture: The Status of 
Memetics as a Science show memeticists speaking past, rather than to, one another. As such, 
much of the scholarship within The Journal of Memetics consisted of contested definitions and 
methods that would apply only to the field of study of the original author, meaning these articles 
were largely unable to build upon one another’s work. The multi- article debate between Aaron 
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Lynch (1998) and Michael Best (1998) regarding methods in memetics is a key example of this 
friction, but there are many others. 
Because of these tensions, the field of memetics began to stagnate. The Journal of 
Memetics ceased production in 2005, and those who continue to publish work in memetics, like 
Susan Blackmore and Daniel Dennett (and myself, as evidenced by this dissertation), do so 
primarily through discussion of the contributions that memetic frameworks can make in their 
home fields of study. 
Foundations of Memetic Rhetorical Theory 
Rhetoric is a cultural phenomenon and it can very well be considered the basic 
instantiation of, and exigence for, culture itself. Angela Haas (2012) articulates this connection to 
culture while pointing to the ways in which critical race theory can help to make apparent the 
white male rhetorics that saturate technical communication discourse: 
I understand rhetoric as the negotiation of cultural information—and its historical, social, 
economic, and political influences—to affect social action (persuade). I also believe that 
every culture has its own rhetorical roots, traditions, and practices. Although sometimes 
forgotten, rhetoric seeks engagement with and participation in effective and responsible 
civic discourse. Rhetoric is a ‘techne’, or art of knowing—a revealing, an opening up. 
[…] In sum, rhetoric is always already cultural. It takes into account that subjectivity and 
knowledge are interrelated. Despite that rhetoric relies on stabilizing this knowledge in 
order to represent it to others, that knowledge can only be fixed momentarily and 
tentatively because dynamic social, historical, cultural, political, and economic factors 
continue to influence its production—and what individuals can know and the knowledge 
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that rhetoric can represent is limited. Thus, rhetoric is a result, a precursor, and a limit to 
productive knowledge making. (p. 287). 
If we accept this definition (which I do) then the link between rhetoric and culture should be 
integral to our understandings of both. As such, the questions that memetics tried to answer in 
the past regarding how culture spreads are really the same questions that rhetoric has been trying 
to answer all along: How does communication happen? Why does rhetoric work? 
Because we understand rhetoric as a cultural phenomenon, and indeed because rhetorics 
are what define the boundaries of culture itself, the model of cultural transmission offered by 
memetics can be illustrative for both rhetoricians and technical communicators. Memetics offers 
a mechanism for understanding the relationships between the cultural, technological, and 
environmental factors that shape work in rhetoric and technical communication; it is a way of 
putting the various factors that determine rhetorical success in conversation with one another to 
better understand and intervene in those processes. Technical communication is a rhetorical 
activity that is steeped in cultural exigency as well as cultural implications (Haas, 2012; Katz, 
1992). As such, to do technical communication work well and to intervene productively in 
technical communication scenarios requires a thorough understanding of the cultural situation 
into which that work enters. This understanding relies on attention paid to the network of actors 
that create this cultural and rhetorical environment. 
Rhetoric has long been concerned with the issue of agency. In particular the scholars 
referenced in Chapter 1 demonstrate a distinct split among rhetoricians and technical 
communication scholars regarding the ability of non-humans (things, objects, natural 
phenomena, ideas, systems) to have agency: that is, whether anything that is not human can act 
or have influence without human direction. In discussions of culture (and therefore also 
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discussions of rhetoric) this debate becomes problematic specifically because our operative 
understandings of both rhetoric and culture characterize them as interrelational, human 
phenomena. This would seem to preclude the idea that anything other than humans can exert 
influence over either culture or rhetorical action. This interpretation, however, suggests a very 
limited understanding of the spheres of influence that shape communication, and therefore 
cultural development. 
The issue, at least for rhetoricians, is not “can culture exist independently from humans,” 
but rather “can factors other than human actions influence human culture?” Critical examination 
of many of the existing theories in rhetorical study would suggest a resounding “yes” in answer 
to the second question. The following paragraphs briefly summarize some of the ways that 
rhetoricians have demonstrated the agency of non-human entities in rhetorical action. Taken 
together, then, this brief overview of existing rhetorical theories demonstrates how, consciously 
or not, rhetoricians have historically often engaged with these entities, which we now recognize 
as memes, as agentic in their own rights. 
This question is most readily recognizable in the suggestion of rhetorical agency of non- 
human objects and material items (alternatively, and less specifically, called “things”). While 
technical communication scholars often associate this assumption with Latourian philosophy, 
specifically Actor Network Theory (Latour, 2005, 2011), and digital rhetoricians draw it 
commonly from Object Oriented Ontology and related fields (Barnett & Boyle [eds.], 2016; 
Bogost, 2007; Bryant, drawing on Heidegger, Harman, Morton), this understanding is also 
common to Indigenous philosophies and rhetorics (Powell et al., 2014; Haas, 2012), rhetorical 
applications of phenomenology (Ahmed, 2006; Couture, 1998), and New Materialisms 
(DeLanda, 2011; Gries, 2015; Ahmed, 2006). The breadth of this work suggests that this 
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characterization of rhetorical agency as existing outside the sole purview of human action is by 
no means new for rhetoricians. 
In fact, even the most arguably humanist branches of rhetorical theory assume the 
rhetorical agency of social systems which, while they might be made up of human interactions, 
are certainly not human themselves, nor can they be accurately described as conscious in the way 
that humans are. These include rhetorical theories that critique power systems such as gender and 
patriarchy, race, sexuality, (dis)ability, social class, and the many others that shape society and 
determine how we relate to ourselves and others (Haas, 2012; Jung, 2014; Spivak, 1988; 
Mohanty, 1988). Foucault has contributed a lot to our understanding of how these kinds of 
systems work, as has Bourdieu. In fact, social structures and systems of power are so pervasively 
persuasive and systemic that they form their own internal logics (Ratcliffe, 2005). Examinations 
of these systems constitute entire sub-fields of rhetorical study situated within communities and 
at their intersections. These include feminist rhetorics, queer rhetorics, disability rhetorics, and 
rhetorics drawing on critical race theory. 
Rhetoricians and other scholars have also begun to interrogate the spread or transmission 
of communication over time. In their article “Composing for Recomposition: Rhetorical Velocity 
and Delivery,” for example, Jim Ridolfo and Danielle DeVoss build on previous work by 
Lawrence Lessig (Remix, 2008) to argue for a process included in the invention stage of 
composing that would encourage composers to think about how others might use or revise the 
work that they are creating in the future, anticipating that these future users will likely change the 
work to suit their own needs. They call this concept “Rhetorical Velocity” and offer the 
following definition: 
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Rhetorical velocity is, simply put, a strategic approach to composing for rhetorical 
delivery. It is both a way of considering delivery as a rhetorical mode, aligned with an 
understanding of how texts work as a component of a strategy. In the inventive thinking 
of composing, rhetorical velocity is the strategic theorizing for how a text might me 
recomposed (and why it might be recomposed) by third parties, and how this 
recomposing may be useful or not to the short- or long-term rhetorical objectives of the 
rhetorician. (2009) 
In this definition, and throughout their article, Ridolfo and DeVoss articulate the need for a 
theoretical understanding that texts (and other compositions) move beyond their original authors 
and into new spaces to serve new purposes. This understanding is reminiscent of previous work 
by compositionists who interrogate the ways that writers build on the work of others who came 
before them, such as the concepts of “patchwriting” articulated by Rebecca Moore Howard 
(1995, 1999), or “assemblage” (Johnson-Eilola and Selber, 2007). These scholars are concerned 
with best practices by authors/ composers in the production of texts as well as with rhetorical 
issues relating to the interpretation of that text by an audience. I draw on Ridolfo and DeVoss, 
Lessig, Howard, and Johnson-Eiloa and Selber for their understandings of the movement of 
information and its change over time as rhetorical processes, though this project is less 
concerned with the choices that authors make as composers and more concerned with the uptake 
of various communicative elements in community discourses. 
As a rhetorician, Laurie Gries takes up this notion of movement and change over time 
similarly in her 2015 book Still Life with Rhetoric: A New Materialist Approach for Visual 
Rhetoric. Drawing on previous work in new materialism as well as visual rhetorics, Gries 
analyzes both the spread and the transformation of culturally significant images through popular 
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media. Likewise, Jenkins et al. (2013) characterize the relationship between the spread of such 
media and the sharer’s understanding of the social environment as follows: 
In a gift economy, circulated texts say something about participants’ perceptions of both 
the giver and the receiver; we all choose to share materials we value and anticipate others 
will value. People appraise the content they encounter according to their personal 
standards and the content they share based on its perceived value for their social circle. In 
other words, some of what is interesting to individuals may not be material they want to 
spread through their communities, and some media texts they spread may become more 
interesting because of their perceived social value. (p. 199) 
Both Gries and Jenkins et al. describe the movement of communication through environments; 
however, while Jenkins et al. focus on responsive choices made by users to develop cultural 
capital, Gries emphasizes the confluence of material and social factors that help to craft social 
responses. 
Memetic Rhetorical Theory 
In the development of Memetic Rhetorical Theory, I build on the work of these scholars 
by focusing on the ways in which combinations of technological, material, social, and rhetorical 
factors come together to create environments that determine how ethos is constructed in the 
communities within those environments. This model relies on the understanding of change over 
time and through transmission, like rhetorical velocity, but moves toward an understanding of 
this change as environmentally responsive, building on the model presented by Gries, rather than 
solely as the result of conscious changes made by composers. 
As the origins and even the name suggest, MRT incorporates memetics, which draws 
heavily on models provided by genetics that draw parallels between memes and genes. The vast 
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majority of published works focusing on memetics begin with a reference to Darwin’s The 
Origin of Species and most continue with biological metaphors throughout their discussion. This 
is not surprising considering Dawkins’s background in biology, but it is also illustrative 
considering that we have very few ways of talking about change over time and in response to 
situational stimuli that wouldn’t utilize terminology that has ties to evolution, a biological 
concept. If we are truly to argue that evolution is not solely a biological concept, that culture and 
cultural elements evolve as well, then we must also be willing to apply evolutionary terms in 
non-biological contexts. In my development of Memetic Rhetorical Theory, I spend significant 
time articulating these definitions. As such, I will not be abandoning terms with biological 
origins unless they are unclear or unhelpful in rhetorical study. Biology will just have to learn to 
share. 
Next, and more specifically to the development of Memetic Rhetorical Theory, critics 
point to the inability of memetics to account for physiological phenomena and/or to situate 
humans in relation to other species (as genetics does). However, neither of these issues are of 
concern in this particular project as I characterize rhetoric as a human phenomenon6 for the 
purposes of this discussion and rely on a rhetorical definition of the meme as outlined below. 
I see these critiques, while valid, as an issue of haphazard and inconsistently defined 
terminology. Rather than invalidating the concept of memetics, it simply necessitates a set of 
clear definitions that draw boundaries between memes and genes. Likewise, because rhetoric is 
not necessarily concerned with either brain chemistry or psychology of individuals, but rather 
with cultural communication, the most commonly cited methodological concerns with memetics 
                                                 
6 Discussions of animal instantiations of rhetoric are outside the scope of this project, as Chapter 
1 defines rhetoric as a characteristic of human culture 
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become irrelevant. Thus, the rest of this chapter focuses on the development of Memetic 
Rhetorical Theory (MRT), which combines the model offered by memetics with the theoretical 
foundations of rhetorical study. The articulation of this theory requires rhetorically informed 
definitions of terms common to existing memetic theory—such as meme, memeplex, co- 
adaptation, and replication—as well as the introduction of new terms necessary for a wholly 
external memetic rhetorical model, such as the concepts of memetic ecologies and memetic 
cataclysms. This is where I begin. 
 
Defining the Meme 
To develop Memetic Rhetorical Theory, I start with a definition of the meme that is 
applicable to rhetorical study, which differs only slightly from the definitions offered by 
memeticists in the past. This similarity is due in large part to the common goals among 
rhetoricians, technical communicators, and memeticists that I articulated in the previous section; 
we all are hoping to understand how and why successful communication happens. 
A meme in memetics and MRT is both a theoretical concept and an agentic actor that 
functions as a unit of communication. As such, in the formation of Memetic Rhetorical Theory, I 
rely heavily on Dawkins’ original definition of a meme (also used by Blackmore and others) as 
any feature of communicative interaction that replicates (that is, is used or appears more than 
once) and that, by virtue of its presence in an interaction, exerts influence over the content and 
outcome of it. Within this definition, oft-cited examples of memes include songs (Blackmore 
references “Happy Birthday”), words and phrases, and gestures; in these cases, “replication” 
relies on human memory and repetition of the meme from one human to another as the form of 
transmission. However, I distinguish my definition from that of both Dawkins and Blackmore 
with the addition of non-human actors as agents of communication. Using this understanding, 
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examples of memes include those previously referenced, but also include interface features, 
environmental factors, sounds, images, features of images or any other discrete element related 
to communication that may or may not rely solely on human beings for transmission. As such, I 
define a unit of any rhetorical action as a meme. 
At this point it is necessary to discuss the terms imitation and replication as these must 
necessarily be used differently in biology, where their use in memetics originates, than in 
rhetoric, where I am applying them now. As stated previously, a common critique of memetics is 
that it relies on biological terminology commonly associated with genes, thereby creating false 
equivalencies. This is true of the terms imitation and replication, which in genetics suggest 
identical recreation of the gene (Blackmore, 1999). Here, I attempt to break that pattern in two 
ways. First, I choose to abandon the term imitation in MRT7 because the connotations of 
conscious choice associated with this term are, for me, too strong to be overlooked and therefore 
likely to cause theoretical misunderstandings. Next, I offer a specifically rhetorical definition of 
replication. Rather than defining replication as the process of creating identical copies of the 
meme, which has been a pitfall of memetics in the past (see Sperber, 2000 among others), I 
define this term in MRT as meaning that a form of the meme has been reproduced that relies on a 
subset of the physical, sensory (i.e., visual, auditory, haptic, etc.), ideological, technological, or 
rhetorical features of the meme being replicated. 
In developing MRT I differentiate between two categories of memes: interface memes 
and content memes. Interface memes are features that have to do (functionally) with how 
information is transmitted within a system or community. They are features of the interface that 
                                                 
7 I understand that this would be appalling to Dawkins, and many other memeticists. However, it 
is necessary given the way that MRT understands agency. 
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work together to determine how community members interact with information in the system(s) 
that connects them and allows them to interact with one another. These are typically associated 
with what technical communicators recognize as genre features, including the order, style, and 
format in which information appears (Henze, 2013; Wall & Spinuzzi, 2018). These features 
replicate in the sense that they appear in every interaction between a user and that particular site 
function. For example, a common interface meme on the internet is a search bar. Search bars 
serve a particular rhetorical function, they derive contextual meaning from the situation or 
environment in which they appear (users know that typing content into the search bar on Google 
will yield different results than typing that same content into the search bar on Facebook), and 
they appear in many places on the internet, so a search bar fulfills all the necessary criteria to be 
considered a meme. While the search bars may look different on various sites, they function 
similarly and share enough visual similarities to allow users to recognize that function; therefore, 
they replicate. Content memes have to do with the construction of ideas that allow members of a 
community to understand one another. Repeating ideas, phrases, sounds, and categories of 
images (for example, “before and after photos”) are some examples of content-based memes. 
This distinction between content and interface memes is largely an organizational 
strategy and is contingent on the function of each meme within the system; these are not intrinsic 
designations. It is also important when thinking about these memes to recall that a meme cannot 
exist in isolation. As a unit of rhetorical action, it is defined (as in, it gains meaning and 
significance) through its relationship to other memes in the same space/ environment. As such, 
the designation here between content and interface memes is really a way of emphasizing the 
connection between form and function and making transparent the process by which form and 
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function evolve symbiotically (that is, they are dependent on one another and grow and change 
together). 
Content memes and interface memes work together to determine how information is 
transmitted and understood within a given system or community. Individual memes in both 
categories combine to shape the community. For example, categories of images, like the “before 
and after” pictures mentioned above, are content memes. In order to gain traction in a particular 
environment, however, those content memes require the presence of interface memes that will 
(a) allow for the inclusion of images, and (b) emphasize the connection between images and the 
functionality of the product/method being discussed either through association with text or by 
demonstrating this category of picture as standard practice. In other words, ecologies need 
interface memes that help community members to understand the significance of side-by-side, 
time-change photographs and connect those images to other memes within the environment. As 
such, both content and interface memes form the primary units of rhetorical action because their 
interactions with one another determine what actions succeed or fail in a given situation. 
An important distinction here, and one that has been contentious for memeticists in the 
past (Blackmore, 1998; Sperber, 2000), is that in MRT physiological phenomena are not memes 
except as they occur in relation to rhetorical action. The common example is laughter, which can 
be replicated in response to a listener hearing others in the vicinity laugh (hence the common 
adage “laughter is contagious”). As Sperber (2000) points out, laughter can hardly be an example 
of learned or imitated cultural interaction in all circumstances considering that infants too young 
for cultural integration laugh in response to visual or physical stimuli. Likewise, laughter can be 
triggered involuntarily in adults as a panic response to physical contact, like tickling. Therefore, 
automatic-response laughter of any kind cannot be a meme in MRT, since it is not rhetorical. The 
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same is true of other physical responses that can be triggered by observing the same responses in 
others in the vicinity, like yawning, sneezing, or vomiting, as well as specific behaviors or 
gestures that may be imitated without communicative repercussions (Blackmore, 1998). 
However, such phenomena can become memes in MRT when they function as 
participants in rhetorical action, such as when they act as social cues for acceptable behavior. 
Consider, for example, a workplace where jokes and comments about female employees’ 
appearances are common. Laughter, as a selected response to those comments in this context, 
indicates their acceptability and therefore functions as a means of establishing and 
communicating the ideologies at play in the local culture. In other words, the habitual presence 
of laughter becomes a meme in this situation because there is specific cultural8 meaning 
attached to it. 
It is this characteristic of functioning as participants in rhetorical action that helps us to 
distinguish between memes and non-memes that nevertheless are present and repeated in an 
environment. Communication and culture are integrally linked, with rhetoric acting as the bridge 
between these two concepts. As such, to understand memes from a rhetorical perspective, we 
must limit their definition to those things that act as communicative elements among humans, or 
non-human rhetorical actors. This also means that memes are always contextual in that they are 
defined by their relationships to the memes that surround them. I draw this distinction in part 
from Blackmore’s (1998) article “Imitation and the definition of the meme” which, while 
focused on distinctions between imitation, learning, and conditioning, offers one of the first 
unilateral dismissals of the experiential events of individuals as memes. This distinction is 
                                                 
8 I characterize culture here (like rhetoric above) as a human phenomenon. 
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important, as it establishes the meme as a purely social phenomenon and therefore places it 
within the realm of rhetorical study. 
Memes, according to this definition, are units of rhetorical action in the sense that they 
possess agency in the rhetorical situation. That is to say, they are the primary building blocks of 
the environments that determine the success of any new or existing rhetorical action; they exert 
influence in this way. In order to succeed, any new memes (new elements of rhetorical action) 
must respond to those that are already present. This is a manifestation of ethos that does not rely 
exclusively on a set of predefined characteristics, but rather on the confluence of factors that 
create rhetorical situations. 
In summary, memes in MRT are primary units of rhetorical action. In order to be 
considered a meme, a discrete element must meet the following criteria: 
• It must be repeated (replicated) at least once in addition to its original appearance in a 
given space; 
• It must fulfill a rhetorical purpose by facilitating communication or understanding 
among actors in a community; 
• It must derive meaning for that purpose from contextual relationships with other 
memes in the system. 
Rhetoricians and technical communicators have used a variety of terms to name various discrete 
elements of communicative action including “genres,” “tropes,” “logical constructs,” “actors,” 
“code features” and many others. According to the above definition, all of these are memes, as 
are other things like cultural values, ideas, and technologies. What is unique about the term 
meme is that it describes all of these things at once and in equal terms. Memetics provides a 
model that emphasizes the co-adaptive relationship between all of the features, ideologies, and 
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contextual references that go into a discursive item, like a document or a social media post, or a 
community. It gives us a way of talking about tropes and code segments—or any other disparate 
combination of relevant factors—in the same conversation, recognizing that they can all be 
constitutive elements of the same document or situation. 
Memes and Rhetorical Agency 
The question of the rhetorical agency of memes is both a central idea of MRT and a 
common critique of memetics broadly by humanists. In their book Spreadable Media, Jenkins et 
al raise this critique as follows: “While Dawkins stresses that memes (like genes) aren’t wholly 
independent agents, many accounts of memes and viral media describe media texts as ‘self- 
replicating.’ This concept of ‘self-replicating’ culture is oxymoronic, though, as culture is a 
human product and replicates through human agency” (p. 19). There are two problems with this 
argument. First, it is self-defeating on its face; if memes are elements of culture, and Jenkins et al 
claim that culture is a human phenomenon, then the claim that memes are self-replicating does 
not call human agency into question at all. Second, it engages and perpetuates a reductive 
understanding of rhetorical agency by setting up a false dichotomy between human agency and 
the agency of non-human actors. 
This argument supporting the agency of nonhuman actors, and therefore the agency of 
memes, in no way suggests that humans do not also have agency in these situations. The 
distinction between agency, which suggests action or influence, and intent, which suggests 
consciousness, is key to this understanding. While this distinction has been well-articulated in 
technical communication scholarship (Brock & Shepherd, 2016; Jung, 2014) and memetics 
(Blackmore, 1999; Marsden, 1998) alike, many scholars continue to gloss or ignore its 
implications in favor of more anthropocentric arguments (Jenkins et al., 2013, for example). This 
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is easily done, particularly because of the way that memeticists have haphazardly borrowed 
terminology from biologists. Dawkins’s original publication’s title, The Selfish Gene, seems to 
ascribe both emotion and intentions to both genes and memes, and the wording has stuck. 
Memes, Memeplexes, and Memetic Ecologies 
This social element of memes necessitates an understanding of how memes fit and work 
together; a productive study of memes should never consider them in isolation. In her book The 
Meme Machine, Susan Blackmore coined the term “memeplexes” as a shorthand for the more 
cumbersome “co-adapted meme complexes” (Blackmore, 1999). These are groups of memes that 
evolve together over time, building on each other’s successes and creating frames of reference 
that determine the survival rate of new memes that emerge near them. As such, memeplexes are 
characterized by the internal compatibility of the memes that they contain; they complement one 
another but are not identical. It is this compatibility function that allows memeplexes to act as 
both gatekeeping mechanisms and mutually constructive forces for emerging memes. Complex 
sets of memes that create the parameters of a rhetorical situation can therefore be understood as 
memeplexes. These might include culturally constitutive ideas like “the American Dream,” or 
gender roles, but they might also take the form of images comprised of recognizable traits (as in 
Gries’s Still Life With Rhetoric), specific phrases, or digital interfaces that shape user 
interactions. New memes are only able to survive in memeplexes with which they share 
characteristics that contribute to that internal compatibility. Any memes that do not possess these 
characteristics have no way of relating to the environment and therefore die out quickly, if they 
replicate at all. 
This co-adaptive characteristic of memeplexes points to a new, memetically-informed 
definition of ethos. Chapter 1 defined ethos as contextually constructed value or credibility, and 
 50 
MRT seeks to understand how that construction happens. Because memeplexes act as both 
building blocks and gatekeeping mechanisms to the introduction of new memes, it is the ability 
of a newly introduced meme to adapt to those memeplexes that determines whether or not it 
spreads. Memeplexes, then, are the contextual factors that construct value, and co-adaptation is 
the mechanism by which they do so. 
This co-adaptive characteristic is key to understanding why memes spread and, therefore, 
how information becomes persuasive in a given set of circumstances. In other words, this co- 
adaptive characteristic is the feature that allows a meme to cultivate ethos in a given situation. 
The more a meme spreads, the greater its ability to influence a given memeplex and affect the 
spread of other memes becomes, and so the more rhetorical agency it has. The more rhetorical 
agency a meme or memeplex has, the greater its ability to cultivate and maintain credibility, 
ethos, within the system becomes. The same process applies to memeplexes on a larger scale. 
Memeplexes, like the memes that constitute them, co-evolve to create larger, interrelated 
communities. I call these communities memetic ecologies because they are the environments 
created from memes, and into which memes enter. A memetic ecology can be massive, like the 
political landscape of the United States, or much smaller, like the interactive page operated by a 
particular animal rights group on Facebook or a community of people using the same Twitter 
hashtag. These memetic ecologies are defined by the memeplexes that make up their core 
features and values, and as such these memeplexes become strongly associated with the ecology 
as a whole. For example, if our memetic ecology is the political landscape of the United States, 
we know that it is defined by memeplexes like the myth of the American Dream, idealization of 
both democracy and capitalism, the image of the American Flag and its attendant cultural 
associations, the two-party system, the Constitution (both as a document and as an idea), and 
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many others. If, however, the memetic ecology is a community that centers on a particular 
Twitter hashtag—for example, #Whole30—then the constituent memeplexes might include 
idealization of thin, sexualized bodies, public ideologies that conflate “natural” foods with 
physical purity, and the site interface on Twitter that allows users to search for and follow this 
particular hashtag. 
Memetic Proliferation 
Memes, memeplexes, and the ecologies they create are never static. They constantly 
grow and change in response to the entrance of new memes or the continued evolution of those 
that are already present. This process is central to the idea of movement of the meme from one 
instantiation to another that has been consistent in memetics since Dawkins’s original 
articulation, and for movement to exist there must also be a temporal element to memetics. That 
is, memes spread, change, and evolve together through time. 
I call the spread of a particular meme or memeplex through a memetic ecology memetic 
proliferation. This term has roots in biology (think “cell proliferation”), but also works well 
because of its colloquial association with rapid increase in numbers, which is the basis for how 
memes come to influence a memetic ecology, especially in digital environments. Memes that 
proliferate enough to become lasting features of an ecology can be termed “successful.” 
Conversely, memes that die out quickly and fail to impact other memes within the ecology are 
failures. It is important to note that the proliferation of the meme is the only factor that 
characterizes its success or failure. As such, success and failure are not, and never can be, value 
judgements in MRT. Traditionally, success and failure have been considered inherently value-
laden terms, especially when placed in a neo-liberal context that equates value, success, and 
productivity. MRT, however, does not recognize inherent value, goodness, or merit in successful 
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proliferation of a meme. Instead, “success” in terms of memetic proliferation refers specifically 
to a substantial enough number of appearances of a given meme to allow that meme to exert 
influence in its ecology. It is a characteristic of the meme itself and is not indicative of any 
connection between that meme and a general benefit to the ecology or alignment of that meme 
with the specific goals of a human participant/ participants in that ecology.  
Success indicates only that a meme has spread enough to gain lasting traction and 
influence in the ecology in question. Brodie (2009) echoes this rejection of value judgment, 
saying, “If I talk about a good meme or a successful meme, I’m talking about an idea or belief 
that spreads easily throughout the population, not necessarily what we think of as a ‘good idea’”9 
(p. 15). This distinction is analytical and not enacted within the rhetorics of the community in 
question or necessarily the minds of individual community participants. They (collectively or 
individually) are always likely to believe or act based on the supposed merit of the meme, 
regardless of its factual veracity, utility, or effect. Gatherer (2002) defines this action based on 
the supposed merit of the meme as two specific kinds of behavior: 
1. Rational—defined as behavior based on factual information, that maximizes the 
long-term material welfare of the agent, and 
2. Irrational—defined as behavior based on incorrect premises, that is at best neutral to 
the agent’s interests, and in some cases potentially detrimental. (Gatherer, pg. 2). 
I take issue with Gatherer’s use of ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ for a number of reasons, not least the 
traditionally Eurocentric and masculinist associations of these words, but I do find value in the 
distinction that he draws based on outcome and the veracity (and we might add utility or effect) 
of the proliferation of the meme. What is key is the understanding that the lasting effects of the 
                                                 
9Here we might also say “good action,” “useful or useable interface” etc. 
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adoption of the meme to influence the community and the ecology in the long term, not 
necessarily the initial proliferation of the meme or memeplex. 
This phenomenon often results in the spread of memes that are harmful to the ecology, its 
constituent culture, and the participants in that culture for a number of reasons. Blackmore 
(1999) claims: 
Memes spread themselves around indiscriminately without regard to whether they are 
useful, neutral, or positively harmful to us. A brilliant new scientific idea, or a 
technological invention, may spread because of its usefulness. A song like Jingle Bells 
may spread because it sounds OK, though it is not seriously useful and can definitely get 
on your nerves. But some memes are positively harmful—like chain letters and pyramid 
selling, new methods of fraud and false doctrines, ineffective slimming diets and 
dangerous medical ‘cures’. Of course, the memes do not care; they are selfish like genes 
and will simply spread if they can. (p. 7) 
Participants, however, are unable to gauge that harm productively specifically because the harm- 
causing meme is so well-adapted to the memeplexes that make up the ecology. It is worth noting 
that the most powerful and well-entrenched memes and memeplexes across ecologies are those 
associated with human physical or psychological needs. Brodie explains, “the memes that appeal 
to people’s instincts are more likely to replicate and spread throughout the population than the 
ones that don’t” (Brodie, 2009, p. 18). Consider, for example, the well-established practice of 
utilizing fear-based rhetorics for political gain. One of the key “instincts” (what we might think 
of as core or foundational memeplexes to most ecologies because of human influence) that 
Brodie describes is an instinct toward safety or physical security. Fear-based rhetorics activate 
this instinct, which overrides less powerful memeplexes in the ecology, causing the memes 
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acting within the fear-based rhetorical memeplex to spread with much more success than would 
be otherwise possible. 
This distinction between memes that are “rational” (to use Gatherer’s problematic term) 
or helpful to the ecology, and memes that proliferate successfully is the crux of the distinction 
between understandings of ethos derived from the “good man speaking well” model explored in 
Chapter 1, and the definition of ethos as derived from the memetic ecology that is central to 
MRT. If as this model suggests, it is the relationship between the meme and the ecology that 
allows for successful proliferation, then neither the source of a piece of information nor its 
veracity are determining factors in its spread. Instead, information spreads if it is well suited to 
the ideological structure, cultural communicative practices, and mediational means of the 
environment in which it is introduced. 
Memetic Intervention and Memetic Cataclysms 
Because of the co-evolutionary nature of memetic ecologies, and the interconnected 
patterns that their constituent memeplexes create, it is nearly impossible to immediately dislodge 
an entrenched meme or memeplex from its established environment. The memeplexes that form 
a given ecology rely on one another, creating a system of mutual support that is largely self- 
sustaining. Consider, for example, the Ptolemaic (geocentric) model of the universe which 
retained its hold on astronomers, physicists, and mathematicians for over a thousand years 
(Jones, 2008). If we think of the Ptolemaic system as a memeplex, we might identify its key 
constituent memes based on ideas or principles that were central to the theory. According to 
Jones (2008), these would include the idea that the Earth is stationary, principles of eccentric 
motion, and an epicyclic model for how the other celestial bodies move. Other key constituent 
memes would include Ptolemy’s original medium of publication (his written works Almagest and 
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Planetary Hypotheses) which of course intersect with memeplexes of literacy and intellectualism 
beginning in the first century AD and continuing for hundreds of years, the personal ethos or 
author-function of Ptolemy and the others who followed this model (considerable, given the time 
span), early iterations of the scientific method focused on observation and mathematical analysis, 
and the pervasive idea of human exceptionalism in the universe (eventually supported with 
religious overtones by the intellectual and political influence of the church). Notice that these are 
a collection of ideas, physical objects, interfaces (which I would argue is an appropriate 
characterization of written literacy), and social forces, all of which intersect with and support 
each other. The Ptolemaic system memeplex, together with the religious/intellectual memeplex 
of the church, the newly evolving scientific method, and the intersecting memeplexes of social 
stratification and literacy, create a mutually dependent memetic ecology in which memes that fit 
with these structures proliferate easily and those that do not die off. 
This is what makes it so difficult to disrupt or disprove patterns and ideas that have 
already spread within a community; they become so intertwined with other patterns and ideas 
that removing one meme or memeplex would require the disruption of tens or hundreds of other 
memes and memeplexes. This pattern is illustrated clearly in the resistance that the Copernican 
(heliocentric) model of the solar system faced when it was introduced in 1543 (Wudka, 1998) 
and, to a greater extent, when it was advocated by Galileo Galilei more than 60 years later (Van 
Helden, 1995). On one hand, the Copernican system was at odds with many of the memeplexes 
that defined the ecologies of the mathematic, religious, and astronomical intellectual 
communities; it resisted human exceptionalism, famously contradicted the Bible, and disputed 
many of the mathematical formulas used to calculate everything from geographic positions to 
religious holidays (Wudka, 1998; Pogge, 2005; Van Helden, 1995). On the other hand, the 
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system made use of other existing memeplexes within these ecologies, such as adherence to the 
experimental scientific method, and even drew on some existing (though faulty) elements of the 
Ptolemaic model, such as the idea of circular orbits (Wudka, 1998). It is this mixture of 
adaptation to and disruption of existing memeplexes in the ecology that allowed for the eventual 
success of what is now called the Copernican Revolution, commonly characterized as a paradigm 
shift within scientific thinking. In terms of MRT, I would call this an example of successful 
memetic intervention specifically because of the process of disrupting an existing idea through 
successful adaptation of a competing idea. 
Notice, however, that this process was extremely gradual, constituting over 100 years of 
slight changes in a community that would be considered quite small by modern standards. This 
pace is characteristic of memetic interventions, which are gradual by definition. A successful 
memetic intervention must allow time for the disruptive, newly introduced meme to form bonds 
within existing memeplexes and thereby successfully adapt to its new ecology. The intervention 
then becomes, in true Darwinian fashion, a question of ‘survival of the fittest’ between the new 
meme and the one it seeks to replace. 
This process may serve to benefit the community through the introduction of more 
accurate or beneficial memes, but it may also have the opposite effect. Remember, success is not 
a value judgement. In our Copernican versus Ptolemaic example, the fittest meme(plex) was the 
one that stood up to the most rigorous scientific and mathematical interrogation in the end, 
because these were powerful internal logics within the ecology. The successful meme here 
happened to be the one that was also beneficial for the advancement of the sciences. However, in 
many other cases, unhelpful or harmful memes proliferate with greater success because they fit 
better with the existing memeplexes. For example, racism, sexism, and body-shaming are all 
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memeplexes that are ultimately harmful to society at large, yet they remain incredibly prevalent 
and tenacious in our collective social consciousness. 
Memetic intervention of this kind is by far the most common form of disruption of 
memetic ecologies. Even drastic changes, paradigm shifts, can usually be attributed to this 
introduction of new memes, or sets of memes, that re-shape the ecology through adaptation. 
However, there are some circumstances in which an ecology might change both suddenly and 
drastically in response to an external stimulus. I call this a memetic cataclysm because it 
essentially wipes out the existing ecology and replaces it with a new set of memeplexes derived 
from the cataclysmic event. For example, memetic cataclysms are typical of the violence 
inherent in colonial practices, where the cultures (and therefore the memetic ecologies) of 
indigenous populations are violently annihilated by the incoming colonizers. Events of this 
nature tend to involve substantial bodily harm to a significant portion of the community, but it is 
worth noting that the cataclysm may have different boundaries than the original ecology. 
From an ideological standpoint, this is unlikely to be an everyday occurrence in even 
moderately humane societies since, as we have seen, memes that disrupt the existing ecologies 
simply die off without making significant impact. For a memetic cataclysm to occur, then, there 
must be an event that eliminates or disrupts the relationships among such a high percentage of 
the operative memes and memeplexes in a given ecology that those that remain must restructure 
themselves in order for the ecology (and the rhetorical community) to survive. This event is, by 
definition, always an act of rhetorical violence, because it creates a crisis of identity for the 
community. However, it also often comes as the result of physical, embodied violence as well. 
This is the oft-noted political philosophy behind acts of terrorism; such acts are meant to 
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drastically disrupt well-established feelings of safety and security within a community, thereby 
altering the political environment. 
MRT provides a useful framework for articulating the ways in which agency distributed 
among content and interface memes in a memetic ecology determines ethos by either allowing or 
suppressing the proliferation of a newly introduced meme. This framework allows rhetoricians 
and technical communicators to more effectively interrogate how and why information, 
including misinformation, is invested with ethos in a given ecology, and to use that knowledge to 
craft more potentially successful interventions based on similar processes. The first step in 
designing those interventions, however, is developing a thorough understanding of the memetic 
ecology into which one wishes to intervene. I suggest developing this understanding through the 
use of memetic rhetorical analysis—a set of methods that I articulate in the following section. 
Memetic rhetorical analysis allows researchers to identify the key memeplexes to which 
newly introduced information must adapt, at least in part, in order to be successful. It does so by 
comparatively analyzing the prevalence of various memes as well as their co-adaptive qualities 
to determine where intervention is possible and what co-adaptive characteristics that intervention 
must contain in order to be successful. 
Methods: Performing a Memetic Rhetorical Analysis 
Memetic Rhetorical Analysis is useful for understanding how and why memes (and 
therefore information, technologies, tropes, ideas, etc.) spread through ecologies. As such, a 
memetic rhetorical analysis can take two forms: it can focus on one particular ecology and work 
to understand the memeplexes that have the greatest influence in that ecology which would help 
researchers to understand the kinds of new memes that might succeed in that ecology to allow for 
the most effective communication; or, a memetic rhetorical analysis could track the proliferation 
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of a specific meme or memeplex through an ecology or ecologies in order to understand why that 
proliferation was successful (or not) and, if any intervention strategies are necessary, which of 
these might be successful. Chapter 3 of this dissertation will be an example of the first kind of 
analysis, while Chapter 4 will be an example of the second. 
Demarcating the boundaries of the study is key because the distinction between a meme 
and a memeplex is often a question of the scope of the ecology under study. In a study of a large 
and complex ecology, it is likely more useful to use meme to describe features that might be 
considered memeplexes in a smaller ecology, as long as the constituent memes that make up 
those memeplexes are not individually relevant to the analysis. In a smaller, more locally focused 
study, however, something that would have been a memeplex in the larger study might function 
as the whole ecology, in which case the meme itself becomes a much smaller unit of analysis. As 
an illustrative example, consider the following analogy: To answer some kinds of research 
questions, a researcher may want to examine a single train on a track where the cargo, cars of the 
train, the engine, the caboose, the track, and the turns in that track are all memes that work 
together to get the train and its contents where they’re going. However, in a narrower study, it 
might be helpful to know how the component parts of the wheel work together, in which case the 
wheel system itself becomes a memeplex, located within the ecology that is the train-and- track 
combination. Conversely, in a broader study, a researcher might want to examine a whole system 
of trains on various tracks that allow a company to transport their product nationally. In this case, 
the trains themselves are a meme (or separate memes, if say, the make and model of individual 
trains cause them to serve different purposes in the system), as are the various track patterns, and 
the whole system of trains, tracks, and shipments is the memeplex. 
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Step 1 of a memetic rhetorical analysis, then, is to define the parameters of the study. If 
the goal of a study is to analyze a variety of memes/memeplexes in a single ecology then it is 
first necessary to determine the necessary boundaries of that ecology for the study in question. 
MRT suggests that, because all rhetorical action is a result of successful co-adaptation and 
evolution, existing ecologies build off others that came before them and overlap in many ways 
with others that exist at the same time. This overlap and evolution means that studies without 
firm spatial10 and chronological boundaries can quickly spiral out of control. As such, memetic 
rhetorical analysis of an ecology begins with a clear definition of the time and place (either 
physical or digital) in which the study will be bound. 
Memetic rhetorical analysis of a meme or memeplex and its proliferation begins with the 
identification and definition of that meme or memeplex. If it is a memeplex that you wish to 
study, you must also identify and define its constituent memes. Definitions of the memes should 
include the physical, sensory (i.e., visual, auditory, haptic, etc.), ideological, technological, or 
rhetorical features of the meme, so that you can track the replication of that meme as defined 
previously11. If you are tracking a meme or memeplex, you must also decide on an originating 
point, both spatial and temporal, of that meme. Keep in mind that all memes are evolutions of 
previous memes, so identifying an originating point for the meme that you wish to study is about 
finding the time and place when all the elements of your definition of the meme came together 
and were introduced as a single meme to a new ecology. 
                                                 
10 These can be physical spaces or digital spaces—in MRT there is no meaningful distinction 
between the two. 
11 Reminder: I define the term “replication” in MRT as meaning that a form of the meme has 
been reproduced that relies on a subset of the physical, sensory (i.e., visual, auditory, haptic, 
etc.), ideological, technological, or rhetorical features of the meme being replicated. 
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A productive memetic rhetorical analysis must also identify key memes or memeplexes 
that characterize the memetic ecology or ecologies in question. Remember that a meme in MRT 
as a unit of rhetorical action, and that memes by definition must replicate. However, only one 
replication within an ecology is necessary in order for a rhetorical element to be defined as a 
meme. The fact that a meme exists does not mean that it is successful, nor that it is key to the 
ecology—the repetition only indicates that it is present as a meme in that ecology. This is why 
memetic rhetorical analysis focuses on the identification of key memes, and not all memes, in an 
ecology. 
To identify key memes in a memetic rhetorical analysis, it is helpful to understand them 
as any one of a group of rhetorical features, whether content or interface based, which are 
necessary (either individually or combined together) for a communication to be understood and 
accepted by the community within a given ecology. The necessity of a particular feature is 
demonstrated through its repetition throughout the ecology—if this is a feature that knits the 
community together by establishing accepted rhetorical practice within the community, it must 
show up often. The more often it shows up, the more essential it demonstrably is to the ecology 
or to the community. Often here is a relative term, not a numerical designation. The more key 
memeplexes exist in an ecology, the more thinly the repetitions of each memeplex will be 
spread, making it impossible to provide a number or percentage that would indicate a key 
memeplex across all ecologies. Instead, this determination is made by comparing the frequency 
of appearance of various memes within an ecology. 
The next step in a memetic rhetorical analysis is to determine if the memes identified in 
the initial analysis are successful (that is, they spread and gain traction in the ecology) or not. 
This can be accomplished by selecting a different segment of the ecology—sometimes a later 
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date range within the same forum, or, as in this analysis of the Whole30, a transition to a 
different forum—and conducting the same kind of analysis to identify key content and interface 
memes. Those memes and memeplexes that repeat in both analyses have succeeded, meaning 
that they have continued to proliferate and become a part of the ecology, allowing other memes 
to build on them in turn. 
Finally, a productive memetic analysis should interrogate why some memes succeed 
while others fail by examining the memeplexes that they are a part of, and what features of the 
ecology changed or remained consistent among the segments analyzed. The success of a meme 
within an ecology indicates both its adaptive characteristics and the influence that it exerts, and 
therefore the ethos that it possesses and its agency to influence the ethos of other memes. 
Ethos as a Feature of Memetic Ecologies: Fake News and Junk 
Science 
The articulation of MRT offered in this chapter emphasizes the ability of a meme to adapt 
to its ecology as the primary—and, in fact, the only—indicator of its ability to succeed and 
spread. This understanding suggests a reinterpretation of ethos as derived from the memetic 
ecology, rather than an inherent quality of a speaker, document, or institution. This 
understanding can help digital rhetoricians and technical communicators to understand why 
misinformation spreads so easily through online communities, particularly when the source of 
the misinformation is unknown or apparently irrelevant. Memetic Rhetorical Theory suggests 
that the ecologies of online communities have evolved in such a way that misinformative memes 
are able to derive ethos from their relationship with previously existing memes and memeplexes 
present in these ecologies. 
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In the following chapters, I offer the results of a memetic rhetorical analysis of two 
communities: the Whole30 Community Facebook page (Chapter 3) and the political discourse 
community that coalesced around the idea of “fake protests” in Austin, TX following the 2016 
presidential election (Chapter 4). I chose these two digital communities as sites for memetic 
rhetorical analysis in part because digital spaces afford the opportunity for memetic proliferation 
that is both rapid and well-documented. While this process does occur in non-digital spaces as 
well, it becomes much more difficult to track without the steady documentation and 
automatically archived discussions that these digital spaces rely on. Furthermore, while these 
analyses demonstrate both goals of memetic rhetorical analysis as defined above, they also point 
to an apparent community dismissal of embodied ethos, as the original source of the content in 
each community is disregarded in various ways. The following memetic rhetorical analyses will 
reveal that this redistribution of ethos and its particular separation from embodied individuals is a 
frequent characteristic of social media platforms that allow or encourage sharing outside of 
friend groups, as ecologies based in these platforms rely in part on interface memes that 
rhetorically separate posts by individual users from their constructed online identities. With ethos 
tied to information, rather than individuals, in these contexts, the processes through which 
communities develop the characteristics from which ethos is derived become more transparent. 
The final chapter reiterates my previous argument that MRT is a more comprehensive 
way of understanding the rhetorics of digital communities. However, it extends this argument 
beyond academic analyses and into potential realms for intervention. For example, because 
digital spaces and technologies have such power in the construction of memetic ecologies, the 
persistent use of cookies on social media sites contributes substantially to the polarization of 
communities—practical application of MRT therefore calls for more responsible practices by site 
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developers that would impede, rather than facilitate, the process of isolating memetic ecologies. 
Likewise, the application of MRT calls for critical reflection on the forces that shape memetic 
ecologies in all kinds of communities, and for implementing that reflection in a way that allows 
us to draw on the existing ecologies to introduce new information in a more productive way. The 
chapter closes with an example of one such successful intervention. 
 
Chapter 3: The Whole30 Memetic Ecology 
Introduction 
Chapter 1 of this dissertation characterized ethos as a concept that is theoretically 
complicated and deserves new attention in what some have called the “post-fact” era. 
Furthermore, Chapter 1 suggested the addition of the concept of agency to discussions of ethos to 
address the ways in which cultural, technological, physical, and ideological factors come 
together to craft ethos contextually in various communities. Chapter 2 offered a framework for 
understanding the confluence of these factors in the form of Memetic Rhetorical Theory, which 
brings together various cultural and rhetorical actors and strategies (which we might understand 
as genres, tropes, technologies, features, or myriad other concepts) under the designation of 
memes. This designation encourages rhetoricians and technical communicators engaged with 
MRT to understand all of these elements as potentially equal and co-adaptive, rather than 
isolated or mutually exclusive. 
This chapter, Chapter 3, explores the Whole30 through memetic rhetorical analysis. The 
Whole30, as a popular nutrition program, offers insight into one way that scientific research 
spreads and is valued in online, non-academic communities. This analysis points to the value that 
this community places on the reporting of individual experiences, even from strangers, and the 
ways in which this self-reporting often outweighs what is traditionally thought of as credible 
scientific data. In an exploration of the memeplexes that characterize both the Whole30 books 
and the Whole30 Community Facebook page, this memetic rhetorical analysis shows that while 
the program was already primed with content memeplexes that encourage this valuation of 
personal experiences before it moved into a digital space, the co-adaptation with the interface 
memes that define the Whole30 Community Facebook page strengthened this valuation in the 
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digital space. This analysis will show that because of the co-adaptation of these content and 
interface memes, the qualities from which ethos is derived in the ecology of the Whole30 
Community Facebook page focus on the reporting of individual (though functionally 
anonymous) experience, and not on scientific study. The chapter will conclude with a discussion 
of the ways in which the disparity between this definition of ethos and academic definitions of 
scientific ethos that focus on credentials and methods of study creates a fissure between scientific 
researchers and the publics with whom they communicate, resulting in concerns about “junk 
science” from academic and public audiences alike. 
About the Whole30 
Weight loss regimens and fad diets are among the most common and easily accessible 
examples of conflict among public audiences and scientific practitioners. Even a casual 
observation of public weight loss discourse shows contradictory ideas (is animal fat helpful or 
harmful for weight loss? Do we need to eat carbs if we aren’t endurance athletes?) and leaves 
many dieters frustrated and skeptical of nutritional science. The Whole30 is one such nutritional 
program 12; it provides guidelines for a particular style of eating and challenges participants to 
commit to this eating program for a 30-day time period without lapses. This program originated 
in 2009 through a series of blog posts authored by its creators, Melissa and Dallas Hartwig. It 
gained further popularity with the 2012 publication of It Starts With Food, Melissa and Dallas 
Hartwig’s guide to what they characterize as a “powerful 30-day nutritional reset.” Since that 
time, the program has expanded to include several more books, a thriving online community 
                                                 
12 Most Whole30 texts and communities steer away from the term “diet” because diets are 
associated with temporary eating changes whereas the Whole30 is supposed to be a permanent 
lifestyle change. The eschewing of “diet” terminology is very common among all kinds of 
nutritional/eating change groups (i.e., diets often pretend not to be diets so as to avoid the 
negative connotations of dieting). 
 67 
spanning the program website and several social media channels, and participants around the 
world. The focus of this program is on spending 30 days practicing what the Hartwigs call 
“Eating Good Food” or, to put it a different way, not eating all of the following: 




● Grains of any kind, including corn, rice, oats, and wheat as well as quinoa, and 
amaranth 
 
● All forms of beans, including soy products and their derivatives 
 
● Dairy of all varieties 
 
● Any food with MSG or sulfites 
 
● Or any food that is made from compliant ingredients but visually or psychologically 
mimics “bad foods.” (Whole30-ers call this “Sex With Your Pants On” or #SWYPO 
alluding to the idea that by eating these foods Whole30-ers are cheating 
psychologically, even if they aren’t cheating technically, ingredient-wise). 
The theory behind these restrictions is that they prevent participants from consuming foods that 
might trigger personal sensitivities, like hidden allergic reactions, and they deny participants the 
possibility of eating for emotional reasons. The intensive restrictions also encourage conscious 
eating habits, such as reading nutrition labels on packaged foods, and are characteristic of a 
nutritional “reset” that the program creators claim re-orients the body biologically to have a 
healthier relationship with food. 
Disruption of Scientific Ethos in the Whole30 
The rhetorical communication of the Whole30 program deliberately calls academic 
understandings of scientific/medical/nutritional credibility into question. The Facebook 
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Community page, which is home to significant online interaction within this program, 
encourages this reinterpretation of ethos though a combination of rhetorically agentic interface 
features and accepted community standards for online communicative behavior. 
The Whole30 books (which form the exigency for the online communities) contain 
explicit conversations about building the credibility of the program. There is a significant amount 
of seemingly valid nutritional science that is built into the Whole30 program. Melissa Hartwig 
herself is a certified sports nutritionist, and the use of elimination diets to gauge the effects of 
certain food groups on an individual’s medical condition is not uncommon. In fact, much of the 
“scienc-y stuff” (to use the official Whole30 terminology) that the Whole30 literature references 
appears to come from peer-reviewed medical, nutritional, and even psychological journals,13 
though other sources are also included. However, even within the context of the books, the 
connection between academic/scientific research and the information provided is deliberately de- 
emphasized. Within the texts, the Hartwigs discuss the credibility of the program (the fact that it 
“works” for dieters in various ways) as being separate from its connections with established 
scientific methods. Specifically, they say that the credentials that they as authors hold, and the 
peer-reviewed research built into the program are (and should be) insufficient to convince people 
that the program works. They explain: 
We have scientific studies to back up our recommendations. We have years of experience 
and documented Whole30 results to confirm we’re on the right track. It’s the best of both 
worlds—the academic evidence and the boots-on-the-ground experience that comes from 
working with thousands of people and getting amazing results. Win-win. 
                                                 
13 This is based on observation of the “References” sections listed in It Starts with Food, and 
Food Freedom Forever. I will discuss the relationship between the scientific information and the 
cited sources later in the chapter. 
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But none of those published studies take into account your life, your history, your 
context. The most relevant form of experimentation for you is self-experimentation, so 
you can figure out for yourself, once and for all, how certain factors affect you. 
And that is exactly what we are proposing here, with our Whole30 program. Grounded in 
science, based on thousands of observations and proven results, and anchored with a 
thirty-day structured self-experiment. 
Win-win-win. (It Starts With Food, p. 21) 
 
This characterization of the relationship between peer-reviewed research, observation, and 
personal experience indicates a certain degree of mistrust in relying solely on established 
scientific methods; they are characterized as impersonal, and often inaccessible, through the 
contrast between phrases like “academic evidence” and “boots-on-the-ground experience.” The 
ethos, the reason the Whole30 community finds the information credible, must come from 
somewhere else. The following memetic rhetorical analysis will explore the ways in which the 
Whole30 ecology, beginning with the books and moving to the Whole30 Community Facebook 
page, defines personal experience as a definitive requirement for the ethos of information. 
Data Collection 
I began my memetic rhetorical analysis by identifying the controlling memes at play in 
the books that form the foundation of the Whole30 program. These books were all authored by 
Melissa Hartwig (the first co-authored with her ex-husband, Dallas Hartwig), and they serve as 
comprehensive reference guides for Whole30 dieters. Their titles are as follows: 
● Food Freedom Forever: Letting Go of Bad Habits, Guilt, and Anxiety Around Food 
 
● Whole30 Cookbook 
 
● The Whole30: The 30-Day Guide to Total Health and Food Freedom 
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● It Starts With Food14 
 
I defined this set of books as a single, complex memeplex (each book alone is, of course, also a 
memeplex). I looked for memes that were consistent between books in order to determine the 
controlling memes in this memeplex. 
Next, I analyzed the officially-sanctioned content on the Whole30 Facebook page as well 
as community posts between January 1, 2018 and March 1, 2018. These dates are significant 
because activity on the page increased dramatically during the early months of the year, 
affording an analysis with ample data to characterize community trends. I chose to extend the 
analysis over two months because of the 30-day nature of the program. I noticed that many 
community members posting on the Facebook page were beginning their Whole30 Challenge 
early in January (as is not unusual with diet changes) and felt that it was important to allow 
enough time in my study for the original posters to finish their program and for other, new 
participants, to begin. This helped to ensure that I wasn’t unnecessarily limiting the scope of the 
memetic ecology by focusing specifically on one cohort of Whole30 participants. It also 
provided me with a picture of the ecology that spans all the stages of the program, rather than 
appearing artificially focused on the early days. 
I chose the Whole30 Facebook page as the site of this singular study because in my 
preliminary analysis it seemed to represent the greatest diversity of activity of any of the social 
media sites on which the Whole30 appears. While Whole30 is a popular board and tag on 
                                                 
14 I did not include two published Whole30 works, The Whole30 Fast and Easy Cookbook and 
Whole30 Day By Day: Your Daily Guide To Whole30 Success, because their publication dates in 
December 2017 were too close to the start of my Facebook analysis time-frame. I do not think it 
is reasonable to expect any unique memes in these two books to have the same potential to 
proliferate in such a short time as those in other books had in the 1.5-6 years they have been on 
the market. As such, their inclusion might have skewed my analysis. 
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Pinterest and a hashtag with a significant following on Twitter, these sites tend to contain content 
that is limited to a particular category of discussion. Pinterest, for example, is dominated by 
recipe-oriented memes, while the Whole30 website has both limited functionality and discussion 
boards that are moderated for content consistency. While memetic rhetorical analyses of these 
spaces would certainly be interesting (what is it about Pinterest that encourages the spread of 
recipe memes to the exclusion of almost anything else? How do interface memes that are 
standard in cookbook genres change as they adapt to the Pinterest ecology?) and are ideal 
projects for future research, they are not necessary to achieve the goals of this dissertation 
project. 
Whole30 Books: Defining the Memes 
The following paragraphs identify the most prevalent, and therefore the most influential, 
memes in the Whole30 books that I identified earlier in the chapter. For this discussion, I 
identified three interface memes that shape the delivery of the information in all four books and 
six content memes that appear consistently throughout the books and act as formative ideas 
within the body of texts. While countless other memes appear in the series, I identified these as 
the most influential based on the frequency with which they appear throughout the books (see 
subsequent sections for details). Together, these interface and content memes govern the ways 
that information is transmitted and understood in this memeplex.  
Interface memes 
The graph below (Table 1) illustrates the differences in frequency of appearance between 
the interface memes that I identified as key memes in the book memeplex versus another 
interface meme (the use of charts and diagrams) that appears in the book memeplex but that I did 
not identify as key. The Whole30 Cookbook and The Whole30: The 30-Day Guide to Total 
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Health and Food Freedom are segmented using units with major headings while It Starts With 
Food and Food Freedom Forever use chapters. In this graph, the Y axis counts the number of 
chapters and major headings within units in which each meme appears. There are 116 total 
chapters and major headings within units in the four books. The X axis in this graph names select 
interface memes that occur in the books in order to give an idea of the range of frequency of 
appearances for each meme. Notice that the Haptic/ Text based meme (defined at length below) 
appears in all 116 units because this meme is integral to the genre in which the material appears. 
 
Table 1: Whole30 Book Interface Meme Occurrences 
Haptic and Text-Based 
The books are textual and material objects15 that exist in the world and must be purchased 
(or shared by someone who has purchased them) in order to be read and must be read in order to 
                                                 
15 Some are available both as hard copies and on Kindle, but as all must be purchased and you 
still have to touch electronics, the characteristics I am discussing here hold true. 
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be understood. This is actually a fairly complex memeplex with memes relating to the history of 
literacy, associated factors of economic access, and embodied accessibility intersecting to 
determine how and if the books are able to communicate information and to whom; however, for 
the purposes of this analysis I am characterizing the haptic and text-based nature of the books as 
a meme so as to bound the discussion in a manageable way. Likewise, this set of features (haptic, 
text-based, purchase-oriented) is a well-established and concrete memeplex that is present in 
almost all books, so I am comfortable discussing it as a single meme here. 
Separation of Information and Sources 
All 4 books include scientifically dense information, meaning they use scientific 
terminology relating to health, nutrition, and psychology among other fields, and reference 
studies and research to support specific recommendations. However, the books physically 
distance discussions of scientific research from its original source a majority of the time. For 
example, It Starts With Food, for example, contains more than 400 references from a 
combination of peer-reviewed scientific journals, government publications, websites hosted by 
private organizations, and other books on dieting and nutritional science. These are sorted by 
chapter in a list called “Master References” just before the index near the end of the book, but 
any clear textual ties between these references and the information that the authors drew from 
them is demonstrably absent. Instead, the chapter content usually reads as a general claim that 
“research” or “studies” support the content, without tying to a particular source. In fact, there are 
very rarely (I count 4 instances in the 320-page book) references to which source particular 
pieces of information come from. Even when these textual references do occur, the connections 
are speciously defined. For example, in Dallas Hartwig’s introduction to the book, he claims “it 
was not unusual for me to read an article in the British Journal of Nutrition about dietary factors 
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that were of special relevance for individuals with rheumatoid arthritis,” and this reference 
includes a connection between a physical ailment and dietary factors, but no specific reference to 
the author, title, or year of publication of the article. A dedicated reader could closely examine 
the “Master References” list and attempt to locate the article in question, but the in-text citation 
itself is absent, and there are no textual cues to indicate that such a search would be in any way 
productive for the reader. 
This is an interface meme because the physical, spatial separation between the 
information cited and its full source helps to shape the way that the reader engages with that 
information. It does so by allowing the reader to easily engage with and recognize the 
information but makes it more difficult to find and engage with the source. 
Hypertextual design 
The Whole30 books included as part of this study were all constructed hypertextually; 
that is, the writing and formatting not only allow for, but actively encourage, non-linear reading. 
This meme appears in several instantiations, including textual indicators to “skip” or focus on 
upcoming sections to achieve specific goals or cater to specific interests (see Figure 4), calls 
forward or backward to other chapters (including references to other recipes as ingredients in 
recipe sections), call-out or definition boxes that allow readers to skim or refer back to content to 
grasp important ideas, and even chapter titles that facilitate selective reading. Figure 4 (below) is 
an example of a textual cue that signals to the reader that they can either read all the way through 
the upcoming chapters, or skip all the way to Chapter 8 without negatively impacting their 
understanding of the book as a whole. This meme also manifests in the page design of It Starts 
With Food, wherein the frequent use of call-out boxes provide summaries of key points and help 






The chart below illustrates the differences in frequency of appearance between the 
content memes that I identified as key memes in the book memeplex versus a small sampling of 
other content memes that appear in the book memeplex but that I did not identify as key. In this 
chart the Y axis counts the number of chapters and major headings within units in which each 
meme appears. The Whole30 Cookbook and The Whole30: The 30-Day Guide to Total Health 
and Food Freedom are segmented using units with major headings while It Starts With Food and 
Food Freedom Forever use chapters. There are 116 total chapters and major headings within 
units in the four books. The X axis in this chart names content memes that occur in the books, 
including those defined as key content memes in this memeplex and discussed at length below. 
 
Figure 4: Textual Indicator of Hypertextual Design in Whole30 Book Memeplex 
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Table 2: Whole30 Book Content Meme Occurrences 
Personal Testimonies 
Each chapter of It Starts With Food and The Whole 30 begins with a personal testimony16 
from an individual who self-identifies as having successfully completed the Whole30 (see Figure 
5). A few of these seem to have direct correlations to the content of the chapters (Chapter 17: 
Preface to the Program, for example, begins with Tara O. from Edwardsburg, Michigan’s 
overview of how important she found it not to think of the Whole30 as a diet), but most are 
simple reports of the benefits the participants found from completing the program in general. Of 
the 22 testimonies in It Starts With Food, for example, 18 include references to cured diseases or 
serious medical problems, while only 7 mention weight loss and three focus on self-control and 
the elimination of binge-eating. 
                                                 
16 There is an important distinction to be made here between the inclusion of personal 





It’s Not a Diet 
Throughout the books, the authors work to include but de-emphasize the idea of weight 
loss. In both the personal testimonies (see Figure 5) and the descriptive and explanatory text, the 
idea of weight loss is framed as a supplemental and less-important benefit when compared with 
the other outcomes claimed by the program, like improved mood, better overall health including 
the elimination of existing diseases or reduction of symptoms 
Likewise, while the Whole30 challenge has a recommended but flexible timeline of 30 
days, the idea that the lifestyle changes created by this 30-day challenge should be permanent is 
prevalent. Finishing the program according to the guidelines requires that participants re- 
introduce the foods that they have eliminated gradually after the 30 days are up, allowing time to 
see how their bodies react to, say, a serving of dairy, or some added sugar. This will help 
participants determine what food groups are negatively affecting their bodies so that they can 
continue to avoid those food groups while enjoying the others that have no adverse effects. This 
process, the authors repeatedly claim, necessitates a lifelong change in the participants’ 
relationship with food, rather than the colloquial understanding of a “diet” as a temporary change 
in eating habits to affect change in one’s body (usually weight loss). 
Psychological Dependence on Bad Foods 
The “Scienc-y stuff” included in these books emphasizes the idea that “bad foods” (food 
 
- Patty M., Boise, Idaho 
Figure 5: Example of Personal Testimony from Whole30 Book Memeplex 
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items that contain ingredients on the forbidden list at the beginning of the chapter) interact with 
the body to form unnatural and unhealthy physical and psychological responses. It Starts With 
Food and Food Freedom Forever characterize this psychological dependence as both a habitual 
response, built upon years of eating food for comfort, and a chemical response to the disruption 
of hormone levels caused by an unhealthy diet. The books use this construct to demonstrate the 
necessity of a strict program to disrupt these hormonal imbalances, while also pointing to the 
idea that this psychological dependence (and the resulting challenges to personal willpower) are 
common reasons for the failure of traditional “diets.” 
Freedom through Control of Eating Habits 
The idea of healthy eating as liberating is common in all 4 books; one title, Food 
Freedom Forever even specifically emphasizes this metaphor. The books describe unhealthy 
relationships with food much like a prison sentence or a war zone. They emphasize the anxiety 
that people often feel in eating situations when they don’t understand how/why their food 
choices are bad, or they feel powerless to overcome their cravings. Freedom, then, is 
characterized as the absence of this anxiety and the understanding that it is possible to escape 
from unhealthy cycles. The emphasis, again, is on making “good” food choices and the power in 
recognizing that food intake is all about making conscious decisions.17  
Tough Love 
Melissa Hartwig is famous for her tough-love approach to the Whole30 program, and the 
language that she uses as an author in the Whole30 books emphasizes this approach. The 
                                                 
17 The program contains few critical interrogations regarding the availability of “good” or 
healthy foods across geographic locations or socioeconomic backgrounds. While there are some 
references to ideas like “some people may not be able to afford organic produce” a systemic 
interrogation of barriers to “good eating” is missing altogether. 
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strictness of the program offers little room for negotiation, and Hartwig places significant 
rhetorical emphasis on the idea of choice as well as on putting food choices in perspective with 
other kinds of health and psychological issues. She famously claims that “Beating cancer is hard. 
Drinking your coffee black is not hard” (ISWF) as a way of re-framing the narrative that the 
program is ‘difficult’ and attempts to discourage emotional or automatic, unthoughtful eating 
habits by focusing on all food intake as a choice. This mentality carries through all the book in 
the collection, including warnings like “You’re not off the hook just because you’re in the 
birthplace of gelato” in Food Freedom Forever (p. 133) and reminders that adults with credit 
cards can buy treats whenever they want (this speaks somewhat to the audience for this program 
as well), so cake does not constitute a special occasion. 
Recipes and Recommendations 
All the books contain suggested recipes, tools for meal planning, and recommendations 
for best practices while completing the program. These manifest differently and in various 
quantities throughout the texts but are defining features of all four. For example, The Whole30 
Cookbook consists almost exclusively of recipes and recommendations for cooking and meal 
prepping techniques while Food Freedom Forever offers advice for navigating the Whole30 
socially and emotionally, including sections on how to talk with friends and family about your 
eating habits and how to stick to the program when on vacation.  
Whole30 Community Facebook Page: Defining the Memes 
The following paragraphs identify the most prevalent, and therefore the most influential, 
memes that make up the Whole30 Community Facebook Page. The three interface memes that I 
have included are standard interface features of the Facebook site; they are not unique to the 
Whole30 page, in part because Facebook does not allow interface customization. This means that 
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in addition to being standard features of this page, they are readily recognizable to users who 
must have Facebook accounts in order to access the page, and therefore easily understood as part 
of a larger ecology (Facebook) that users know is focused on building and maintaining 
interpersonal relationships. These interface memes are standard to the page and therefore present 
whenever allowable content is uploaded, so in 100% of posts analyzed. I likewise identified five 
prevalent content memes on the page, which I selected based on the frequency with which they 
appear in individual posts (all memes included appear in at least 40% of the 426 posts analyzed). 
Together these interface and content memes combine to form the memeplexes that define 
the Whole30 Community Facebook page ecology. Notice the drastic difference in the interface 
memes and the only partial overlap in the content memes between the books and the Facebook 
page, which the analysis following the defining of the memes will discuss. 
Interface memes 
The chart below illustrates the differences in frequency of appearance between the 
interface memes that I identified as key memes in the Facebook Whole30 Community Page 
ecology versus a small sampling of other content memes that appear in the ecology but that I did 
not identify as key. In this chart the Y axis counts the number of posts in which each meme 
appears. There were 426 total posts in the time period analyzed. The X axis in this chart names 
interface memes that occur on the page, including those defined as key interface memes in this 
ecology and discussed at length below. 
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Table 3: Whole30 Community Facebook Page Interface Meme Occurrences 
 
User Emphasis 
In the Facebook community page—and on Facebook generally speaking—there is a close 
spatial link between the content a user posts and that user’s identifying information, including 
their name (as designated on their account) and their profile picture. On the screen, the user’s 
name appears in a larger font, bold typeface, and navy-blue coloring, which emphasizes the user 
who contributed the content before the type of the content itself. 
Linear Interaction (Spatial Grouping) 
Comments, likes, etc. appear in close proximity to original content and in chronological order. 
These are organized on the page chronologically by contribution, meaning that the position of 
the post on the page depends on when it was uploaded and not on who uploaded it. As such, the 
narrative that a reader experiences is the narrative of the page as a whole, as a set of isolated 
content interactions, not the comprehensive narrative of a single user’s experience, or a set of 




The chart below illustrates the differences in frequency of appearance between the 
content memes that I identified as key memes in the Facebook Whole30 Community Page 
ecology versus a small sampling of other content memes that appear in the ecology but that I did 
not identify as key. In this chart the Y axis counts the number of posts in which each meme 
appears. There are 426 total posts that occurred within the time period analyzed. The X axis in 
this chart names content memes that occur in the ecology, including those defined as key content 
memes in this ecology and discussed at length below.  
 
Table 4: Whole30 Community Facebook Page Content Meme Occurrences 
 
Personal Tracking and Testimonies 
Community members use the forum space to report on their personal progress, intentions, 
or results. This often takes the form of a simple summary of where the user is in the program 
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(abbreviations such as R2D16, for “Round 2, Day 16” are common) and/or a brief discussion of 
how the program is going for them. Users will occasionally point out problems that they are 
encountering or benefits that they are observing. This meme also manifests as individuals 
indicating the start (or plans to start) or end of their Whole30 program. 
Looking for Tips 
Community members use the forum space to ask others for advice on solving specific 
problems related to the Whole30. These often have to do with incorporating existing habits into 
the Whole30 lifestyle (i.e., a user might indicate that they are used to taking protein supplements 
after a workout and ask if anyone knows how to get the same level of protein intake in a 
compliant way) but might also include requests for advice about cooking or shopping techniques, 
or general “I’m new to this, does anyone have any tips?” style posts. 
 “Can I have…” 
Users often post inquiries about foods or specific ingredients, asking others if these are 
allowable on the program. In many cases the user will include a picture of the food (especially 
the ingredients list) along with their post (see Figure 6 below). This meme is distinct from 
“Looking for Tips” because the users are seeking “yes” or “no” answers regarding a specific 
food or product, rather than advice more broadly. 
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Figure 6: Example of "Can I have..." Content Meme in Whole30 Facebook Community 
Sharing Recipes and Food Suggestions 
These are unsolicited posts (i.e., they are not in response to specific requests for 
suggestions) that users share on the community page containing references to brands or products 
that are Whole30 compliant or recipes for compliant meals. This meme, like others I have 
discussed, appears in a few different manifestations. Some are full recipes containing lists of 
ingredients, preparation instructions, and cook times, others are simply pictures of food with a 
brief endorsement (“yum!”), and still others are reports that the user has discovered a food that 
they like that is compliant with the plan. Many are combinations of one or more of these 
manifestations (See Figure 7 below). 
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Figure 7: Example of "Sharing Recipes and Food Suggestions" Content Meme in Whole30 Facebook Community 
Analysis 
The interface memes and content memes defined in the above sections are fully 
dependent on one another within the confines of the book memeplex and the Whole30 
Community Facebook page ecology. Together, the interface and content memes in each 
space form the memeplexes that define that space. The varying dynamics between the 
memeplex of the books and the memeplexes that shape the Facebook page determine what 
memes will succeed or fail when they move from the books to the ecology of the Facebook 
page. The interface memes in particular (and the memeplexes they create) are markedly 
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different between the Facebook community page and the Whole30 published books, which 
causes the content memes to shift and adapt accordingly.  
In the Whole30 books, the interface memes encourage participatory reading through 
hypertextual design, allowing the reader to customize their reading experience to suit their 
own interests and needs. This user focus transforms the books, which are in a genre that is 
usually more author-controlled, into interfaces that encourage user agency. Likewise, by 
physically separating sources from the information that they provide, the books de-
emphasize the traditionally academic locus of ethos (the research study authors and 
publishers) and place the emphasis again on user experience. The combination of these 
memes creates an interface memeplex that encourages agency and interaction by the reader 
rather than sole communication from expert authors and researchers to a passive audience. 
This memeplex aligns well with the content meme, prevalent in both the books and the 
Facebook community page, of personal testimony. The emphasis that the Hartwigs place on 
the individual experiences of users, both in the quote at the beginning of this chapter and in 
the frequent inclusion of personal testimonies in the book series, lays the groundwork for the 
participatory community of users on the Facebook Community page.  
Taken together, the Facebook interface memes defined above form an ecology that  
rhetorically emphasizes interpersonal communication with a focus on content-input by 
individuals. This shift takes the user focus that is present in the book interface memeplex 
and adds the element of interaction with other users. User interface is the controlling meme 
in the broader Facebook ecology and this holds true within the Whole30 community page as 
well. It is impossible to post any content without that content being directly tied to a specific 
user. 
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Moreover, Facebook has stricter parameters than many other social media sites in 
that the account regulations work hard to ensure that accounts created for individuals 
represent the off-screen lives of those individuals as closely as possible. Names thought to 
be fake, for example, are searched for and deleted by Facebook site administrators.18 This 
creates the community expectation that users will post based on their own lived experience. 
The interface memeplex will not allow any meme that does not bond with this user emphasis 
to exist on the page, so all information that is added is characterized first as personal 
experience. This is not a conscious choice made by users, but rather a default 
characterization of the content that is dictated by the features of the interface. However, the 
user input meme exists symbiotically with the content meme of isolated posts and 
anonymous personas. The content is user-focused but the users lack fully-formed personas 
within the community. The users’ names are irrelevant and carry no recognition; it is the 
fact that they have a name that makes the contribution persuasive. 
Two content memes from the books appear prominently in the Whole30 Facebook 
community: Personal testimonies and recommendations/recipes. Both of these, however, 
have evolved to better suit the ecology of the Facebook community page. Instead of 
manifesting solely as static reports as they appear in the books, personal testimonies on the 
Facebook page include elements of personal tracking as well. When reporting their results, 
users mention where they are in the program (including when or if they have finished) and 
specific details of their progress in time-oriented phrasing (i.e., “R1D15, my skin has 
                                                 
18 The way that Facebook goes about this is intensely problematic. In 2017, a Daily Beast article 
noted that transgendered users’ accounts were being deleted for use of their preferred names 
(Allen), and Native Americans reported difficulties verifying their names as well (Bodago, 
2015). 
 88 
cleared up and I have TONS of energy”). This evolution shows co-adaptation of the 
testimony meme with the user content input meme within the interface memeplex, as it is 
specific to that user and tied to their account, rather than being selected by authors or site 
administrators and used as a frame of reference. 
Because of the anonymous yet personal quality of the interface memeplex, personal 
tracking and testimony memes are rhetorically constructed as being generalizable to the 
average page user. The interface memeplex places the locus of ethos in this community on 
personal results, so users know a testimony is credible and that they can achieve similar 
results specifically because another user shared this as their own experience.  
The recipes and recommendations meme likewise evolved to suit the Facebook 
ecology. In the books, the recipes are detailed (typically one-page) and often organized by 
category cookbook-style so that finding desired recipes is facilitated by the hypertextual 
design. The recommendations are also detailed and often supported by what the authors call 
“scienc-y stuff” (that is research). On the Facebook page, however, recipes tend to either be 
short and non-descriptive, including only ingredient proportions and summary instructions, 
or simple links outward to other sites, while recommendations come in the form of simple 
endorsements or images of food products or brands. While links outward occur, these are 
framed in the context of recommendations or suggestions, again meaning that the inclusion 
of the content is contingent on the original poster’s personal experience with it, rather than 
any intrinsic quality of the linked content itself. Hence, the ethos (the credibility) of the post 
relies on that recommendation meme and the content only spreads as a result of its 
inclusion. 
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These posts rely on the ethos of the named yet anonymous user, much like the 
tracking and testimony memes; however, recipes and recommendations are focused on a 
tangible product rather than an anticipated outcome. The shared source of ethos means that 
tracking and testimony and recipes and recommendations are rhetorically linked within the 
site interface, suggesting that even though all of these are posted by different users, utilizing 
the recipes and recommendations from one group of users will allow page readers to achieve 
the same results as the users who reported their tracking and testimony.  
The multi-user site interface also allowed the recipes and recommendations meme 
from the books to evolve into requests for information that users can expect to be answered. 
This function created the looking for tips and “can I have…?” memes that are present on the 
Facebook site. The ecology of the Facebook page that utilizes interpersonal communication 
and includes the sharing of recipes and recommendations allows memes that seek out this 
kind of information to co-exist symbiotically. 
The combination of these interface and content memeplexes means that the Facebook 
community page is an ecology that not only emphasizes but is built on personal testimony 
and anecdotal results. These are used as community resources as well as support 
mechanisms, meaning that it is among the most common and integral memeplexes in this 
ecology. This also means that ethos in this ecology is derived from the relationship between 
information and individuals, and not from scientific methodology or personal credentials.  
Discussion 
At the beginning of the chapter, I offered a quote from It Starts With Food that 
characterized the Whole30 founders’ beliefs about how readers should decide if an eating 
regimen will work for them. In summary, the Hartwigs claimed that a program that is put 
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forth by experts, supported by research, and proven through an individual’s personal 
experience is the epitome of dietary credibility—the “win, win, win” scenario. As a 
rhetorician, I understand this quote to be a characterization of how the authors understand 
the origins of ethos in their program; if it works, then it is credible, and if it is credible then 
it has ethos. In the books, which are a static genre that must be purchased and focus on 
interaction solely between the author(s) and the reader, this ethos is distributed according to 
the Hartwigs’ summary: they are the experts who support the program, they include (but 
obfuscate) research from credible and often academic sources, and they encourage readers to 
make the program their own along with the reading. On the Facebook page, however, there 
are far more interactants; there are many authors and many readers. The ecology on the 
Facebook page is therefore much more focused on interpersonal interaction, and the expert 
endorsements and scientific research that are present in the books have no memeplex that 
they can readily adapt into. The personal experience resource is the only locus of ethos 
within the books that is suited to the ecology in Facebook, and so the only one that survives 
the transition. The Whole30 Facebook page is therefore an ecology that eschews traditional 
academic interpretations of ethos and relies instead on methods of validating information 
that are usually disregarded by scientific researchers—personal experience. 
There is no standard set of criteria, agreed upon by the multitude of public and 
academic audiences, for determining the validity of scientific practice. While scientists tend 
to agree that the scientific method is a universally validating practice, many public 
audiences do not agree that this is the case. The general public is unlikely to trust studies 
that they do not understand (largely because they have no access to these studies) and cannot 
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replicate, and the myriad sources offering contradictory information on best practices for 
health and wellness are both overwhelming and dismissive of any one-size-fits all approach. 
Science has prided itself too long on being impersonal, but now that distance makes it 
inaccessible for practical application by the populations that need it most. This is a 
commonly recognized barrier to scientific communication, recognized in Randy Olson’s 
Don’t Be Such a Scientist: Talking Substance in an Age of Style (2009) as well as Yu and 
Northcut’s recent (2017) addition to the Routledge Studies in Technical Communication, 
Rhetoric, and Culture series, Scientific Communication: Practices, Theories, and 
Pedagogies. Melissa and Dallas Hartwig emphasize this distance between academic science 
and personal application in the Whole30 program books, and so offered participants 
(starting with themselves) equal voice in determining whether or not the program works for 
them. This effect was magnified intensely in the online community, where the experience of 
the users is rhetorically foregrounded by the interface of the site. 
As academics who value traditional conceptions of ethos, our inclination might be to 
dismiss spaces like the Whole30 Facebook community page as breeding ground for junk 
science, as places where intellectualism goes to die and our life’s work as researchers is 
dismissed as boring. Admittedly, my first inclination as a researcher was to think of this 
rhetorical turn as anti-intellectual, but this was short-sighted and ultimately an unproductive 
lens for my analysis. As a technical communicator, I find it more valuable to think of the 
junk science designation as a rhetorical tool too often used for deriding public science and a 
way of dismissing the responsibility that we have to communicate our research in an 
accessible way. The memetic rhetorical analysis in this chapter suggests that the site users 
on this page are looking for answers, they are looking for ways to use science, but they rely 
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on the personal experiences of people like them, with the same goals and struggles, to find 
answers they can trust.  
 
Chapter 4: The Memetic Proliferation of Fake News 
 
Intellectually and emotionally weakened by years of steadily degraded public discourse, we 
are now two separate ideological countries, LeftLand and RightLand, speaking different 
languages, the lines between us down. Not only do our two subcountries reason differently; 
they draw upon non-intersecting data sets and access entirely different mythological 
systems. You and I approach a castle. One of us has watched only “Monty Python and the 
Holy Grail,” the other only “Game of Thrones.” What is the meaning, to the collective 
“we,” of yon castle? We have no common basis from which to discuss it. You, the other 
knight, strike me as bafflingly ignorant, a little unmoored. In the old days, a liberal and a 
conservative (a “dove” and a “hawk,” say) got their data from one of three nightly news 
programs, a local paper, and a handful of national magazines, and were thus starting with 
the same basic facts (even if those facts were questionable, limited, or erroneous). Now each 
of us constructs a custom informational universe, wittingly (we choose to go to the sources 
that uphold our existing beliefs and thus flatter us) or unwittingly (our app algorithms do the 











Chapter 3 used memetic rhetorical analysis to explain how and why some memes 
from the original ecology of the Whole30 book selection successfully proliferate on the 
Whole30 Facebook community page while others do not. This analysis speaks to an 
understanding of ethos that relies on the distribution of agency among interfaces, 
community ideologies, and community members, rather than investing ethos solely in the 
person of Whole30 founder and book collection author Melissa Hartwig. This understanding 
of ethos suggests that the Whole30 community finds information credible because of the 
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adaptation, both in form and content, of that information to the ecology into which it has 
been introduced. 
This chapter, Chapter 4, interrogates a similar relationship between ethos and agency 
through the memetic rhetorical analysis of a fake news item. This fake news item began as a 
Twitter post. Interestingly, the original poster himself debunked the claim within 48 hours; 
however, the claim continued to spread. The following analysis suggests that the original 
twitter post did not gain its immense popularity because of any ethos inherent in the original 
poster’s identity, because if that were the case then the original poster’s retraction would 
have gained the same level of popularity. Instead, this case demonstrates the 
characterization of ethos that Memetic Rhetorical Theory proposes: ethos comes from the 
successful adaptation of the memes that comprise new content to the memetic ecology into 
which they are introduced. I begin this analysis with a brief discussion of the term fake 
news, including the ways in which this term acts as a meme itself, the meaning of which is 
different (and even contradictory) depending on the ecology in which it appears. Next, I 
offer the story and analysis of a fake news item made by a Twitter user claiming that he had 
found proof that the Hillary Clinton presidential campaign or other powerful democrats had 
created fake protests in an attempt to discredit Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 
presidential race. Using Memetic Rhetorical Theory to analyze the proliferation of this 
story, as well as the failure of the same poster’s retraction to proliferate, I conclude that the 
memes that made up the original tweet were so successful in spreading through conservative 
online fora because they were well adapted to the ecologies that were already in place in 




Fake News as Two Distinct Memes 
Fake news has become a buzzword in American politics. The popularity of this term, 
as well as the increasing polarization of political discourse, allowed for a memetic evolution 
of the term itself. The term or designation “fake news” is a meme, as evidenced by its 
frequent replication in all kinds of political and journalistic discourses throughout the past 
half century, while the practices of intentional false reporting and intentional smear 
campaigns, which could be considered related memes, date back thousands of years 
(Burkhardt, 2017). Originally, the fake news meme was associated with news stories  that 
conveyed information that was demonstrably factually inaccurate. Because it is the earliest 
iteration of the meme, I will call this version FNOriginal. FNOriginal formed as part of a 
memeplex that relied on other memes of journalistic integrity and objective factual 
accuracy, and it continues to be well-adapted to this memeplex. As such, FNOriginal still 
exists in its original form, as discussed below. Scholars and journalists in the mainstream 
media usually are referring to FNOriginal when they use the term fake news. This is 
likewise the reason that the academic publications cited below maintain this original 
definition. 
The memes of journalistic integrity and objective factual accuracy with which 
FNOriginal co- evolved do not exist in all ecologies; as Chapter 1 of this dissertation 
demonstrated, the introduction of “alternative facts” into political discourse signaled the rise 
of changing ideas about media objectivity, leaving room for multiple and conflicting 
representations of events. A drastic increase in public interest in fake news began in 2016, 
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and in many ways was supported by the idea that mainstream news sources ignore or alter 
certain stories to fit a political agenda. As Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) report, these traits 
are particularly strong in conservative political discourse, creating a conservative political 
discourse ecology in which the memes of journalistic integrity and objective factual 
accuracy are not present. However, because news media and political discourse of all kinds 
intersect often, the term fake news was introduced into the conservative political discourse 
ecology. This introduction took place both through the frequent practice of scholars and 
media sources repeatedly accusing conservative media sources of propagating fake news, 
and through the repeated use of the term by Donald Trump, as discussed below. With its 
original co-adaptive memes absent, FNOriginal evolved, as memes do, to adapt to this new 
ecology and so took on a new meaning, becoming a new iteration of the meme which I call 
FNEvolution. FNEvolution is the label that describes the use of the term fake news as a 
rhetorical strategy for undermining media outlets. In this progression of definitions, it is  
clear that the term “fake news” as used in political contexts, is itself a meme that has adapted 
from journalistic and academic discourses to suit the current ecology of conservative 
political rhetoric. 
In scholarly and journalistic communities, fake news was originally used to refer to 
the factual accuracy of information and whether something was correct, right, or true. 
Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) define “fake news” as “articles that are intentionally and 
verifiably false, and could mislead readers.” Pulitzer Prize-winning news source PolitiFact 
likewise defines fake news in saying, “When PolitiFact fact-checks fake news, we are 
calling out fabricated content that intentionally masquerades as news coverage of actual 
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events” (Holan, 2017). In both of these definitions, there is a clear distinction between truth 
or “actual events” and the content that the authors define as fake news. This dichotomy 
suggests an inherent belief in the existence of irrefutable fact. Both journalism and academic 
studies exist within memetic ecologies that value capital-F Facts, and both utilize research 
methods that seek to uncover facts. This ecology consists of a set of memeplexes that 
foreground the idea of indisputable or universal facts and the ability to discover and 
communicate those facts through established methods. As such, in this ecology the ‘fake’ in 
fake news simply means that the content of the news piece does not match with those 
universal and identifiable facts. 
The presumption of objective falsehood built into these definitions as part of the 
criteria for identifying fake news relies on a set of agreed upon standards for establishing 
fact in public discourse. However, as this dissertation has shown, such agreed upon 
standards for identifying true facts are difficult to come by and, as this chapter will show, 
they are particularly difficult to come by in contentious political discourse. If facts can have 
alternative facts, then fake news is no longer an objective classification, but rather a 
rhetorical one that is used to achieve specific goals. This inability to agree upon a standard 
set of facts that holds true for all factions of political discourse is what led to the second 
iteration of the meme “fake news,” FNEvolution.  
FNEvolution is the use of the term fake news to denigrate media outlets, especially 
by calling those media outlets out for bias against conservatives. FNEvolution comes in part 
from the appropriation of the term fake news by the Trump campaign and by Trump himself 
after it had already entered public discourse. They used it as a way of undermining media 
outlets that published content portraying Trump in a negative light. Jankowski (2018) 
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explains that, “Trump and other politicians have usurped the term and use it to brand 
traditional media sources [e.g. The New York Times, CNN], with which they disagree. In this 
manner, the term has acquired status as a pejorative label for liberal media outlets, and has 
lost commonly accepted meaning” (p. 248). This tactic is widely used, with the president 
having infamously referred to a CNN reporter saying “You are Fake News” and using the 
term 223 times in personal tweets since the election (as of May 3, 2018- Trump Twitter 
Archive). 
Notably, Trump’s usage of this term shifts over time from reference to a specific 
story or piece of information as shown in a tweet claiming, “intelligence agencies should 
never have allowed this fake news to ‘leak’ into the public. One last shot at me. Are we 
living in Nazi Germany?” (Donald Trump, January 11, 2017), to a general reference that 
seems to refer to the mainstream media at large, or to specific organizations (usually CNN 
or NY Times), as when he says “At some point the Fake News will be forced to discuss our 
great jobs numbers, strong economy, success with ISIS, the border & so much else!” 
(Donald Trump, July 3 2017) and “Steve Bannon will be a tough and smart new voice 
@BreitbartNews…maybe even better than ever before. Fake News needs the competition” 
(Donald Trump, August 19 2017). Not surprisingly, this definition of fake news raises 
particular concern for journalists, causing a number of reflective and opinion pieces that 
warn that mistrust and degradation of the media are common forerunners of totalitarian 
governments (Garofalo, 2017; Tharoor, 2017; Yates, 2016). 
These two parallel but conflicting memes of the designation fake news are able to 
exist at the same time because they appear in different memetic ecologies: so-called 
‘mainstream’ journalism and academe (which tend to lean politically left) and far right-
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leaning conservative political discourse (Donald Trump’s twitter account, Fox News, and 
Breitbart being notable examples). Conservative political discourse, however, has long 
accused traditional media sources of left-leaning bias, and this manifests as a distrust of 
mass media which grew even more significant during the 2016 election. Fake news in this 
context, then, is more akin to a “calling out” on political bias in reporting than a judgement 
about factual accuracy. 
These differences play out clearly in the saga of one tweet, identified by the New 
York Times as fake news, discussed in the following sections. While the Times article uses 
the FNOriginal meme to emphasize the factual inaccuracy of a particular tweet, it is the 
FNEvolution meme that contributes to the memeplex in conservative political discourse 
with which that original tweet aligns, meaning that the FNEvolution meme is the co-
adaptive meme that allows the information in the tweet to proliferate. 
Introduction of Fake News Story 
On November 9, 2016, a tweet, posted 
by user Eric Tucker, claimed that a series of 
busses that he had photographed on his way to 
work in Austin, Texas were being used to 
transport protesters to “fake protests” against 
Donald Trump’s election. Tucker’s tweet 
shows photographs of several busses parked 
along a street along with the claim, “Anti-
Trump protesters in Austin today are not as 
Figure 8: Eric Tucker's Original Tweet 
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organic as they seem. Here are the busses they came in. #fakeprotests #trump2016 #austin” 
(Maheshwari, 2016). 
The New York Times commented on the rapid spread of this tweet in a brief article 
titled “How Fake News Goes Viral: A Case Study.” In this article, author Sapna Maheshwari 
characterized a Twitter user’s tweet as fake news and discussed its rapid progress through 
various online fora. The Times article also reported that Tucker rescinded his claim shortly 
following his original post, but that this retraction did not have the same reach as the 
original tweet (Maheshwari, 2016). The following sections of this chapter discuss the 
movement of this tweet (or its content) through several micro-ecologies. These micro-
ecologies were originally identified by the New York Times as sites that had “picked up” 
Tucker’s tweet. I add to their identification of these sites with the addition of a memetic 
rhetorical analysis in order to illustrate why and how Tucker’s original tweet was able to 
spread successfully in these spaces while his retraction was not. This analysis shows that the 
naming of this fake news item by traditional media sources (such as the New York Times) 
and the retraction of this fake news item by the original source were ineffective means of 
disrupting its spread. This is in part because this fake news item co-adapts so successfully 
with the FNEvolution meme as it proliferates in conservative political discourse 
communities. 
Maheshwari, as a journalist, uses the term fake news to refer to the FNOriginal meme 
and its attendant definition, and demonstrates that the story contained in Tucker’s tweet 
matches this criteria both by referring to his own retraction and by independently verifying 
that the busses were actually in town that day to transport attendees to and from a 
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convention that was unrelated to the election. She then tracks the content of the tweet from 
Tucker’s network of about 40 followers to a re-post of the same tweet in a Reddit 
community supporting Donald Trump along with the headline, “BREAKING: They found 
the buses! Dozens lined up just blocks away from the Austin protests” (Maheshwari, 2016). 
Through the use of the word “Breaking” and its affiliation with language typically used in 
journalism, the post was rhetorically associated with news reporting rather than an 
observational post by a private user. 
Because Tucker’s tweet contains a set of co-adapted memes (identified below), 
Tucker’s tweet qualifies as a memeplex. It is well-adapted to the conservative political 
discourse ecology, which spans several social media sites as well as other kinds of websites 
and offline fora as well. As a memeplex, Tucker’s tweet contains a set of memes, all of 
which appear in various other memeplexes and ecologies at the same time. The memes 
present in this one tweet rely on a thorough understanding of conservative political rhetoric 
at the time that the tweet was introduced, meaning that the memes are part of an already 
complex memetic ecology. These memes are also a part of other ideological memeplexes 
that make up the ecology of conservative political discourse, meaning that Tucker’s tweet is 
able to allude to these other memeplexes as a way of making meaning within this ecology. 
The memes both derive meaning from and contribute meaning to this ecology. As such, the 
tweet exists as part of a larger conversation that relies on a set of understood facts and logics 
that are characteristic of conservative ideological rhetoric at this time.  
The following paragraphs identify the memes present within this memeplex (Eric 
Tucker’s original Tweet). Because memes are identified through repetition, I have identified 
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these memes based on their appearance in one or more of the memetic ecologies that 
intersect with Tucker’s tweet; these ecologies are the social media site twitter and 
conservative political discourse during to 2016 election. Characteristic features of Twitter 
are, by definition, replicated in every Twitter post and for that reason are defining memes in 
that ecology. I identified memes for this analysis that were features of conservative political 
rhetoric during the 2016 presidential election by looking for ideas, phrases, or images that 
appear in Tucker’s tweet and then looking for repetition of those ideas, phrases, or images in 
conservative news sources, blogs, or other ideologically-oriented fora in the 18 months 
surrounding the post of the tweet19. The appearance of these memes in outside fora is cited in 
the discussion of each meme. 
The Memes 
Caption-to-Image 
This feature of Twitter foregrounds the text and allows the images to follow 
sequentially; it is therefore an interface meme that rhetorically emphasizes the textual 
content by influencing the way that users view and interact with the information contained 
in the tweet. In the case of Tucker’s tweet, his caption “Anti-Trump protesters in Austin 
today are not as organic as they seem. Here are the busses they came in. #fakeprotests 
#trump2016 #austin,” comes prior to the three images of busses on the street in Austin. This 
                                                 
19 The repetition of these ideas, phrases, or images in these fora as well as in the tweet fulfills the 
repetition requirement to classify them as memes. Per the definition in Chapter 2, repetition only 
technically needs to occur once to classify the repeated element as a meme. The success or 
prominence of the meme is determined by the frequency of repetition of the meme in question as 
compared to other memes in the ecology. 
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arrangement allows the text to provide immediate framing context for the three images, 
linking the images to the already established conservative rhetorical approaches that suggest 
deliberate (and “fake”) attempts to discredit Donald Trump and priming the audience to 
interpret the pictures of busses accordingly. In this way the caption-to-image structure is 
reminiscent of a claim-to-evidence argument structure in which the photographs provide 
evidence in support of Tucker’s claim that the “Anti-Trump protesters are not as organic as 
they seem.” 
In many ways, this process mimics what Eric Tucker might have experienced before 
posting the tweet: with a set of internalized ideologies that allowed or encouraged him to 
believe that certain groups of people have a vested interest in making it (artificially) appear 
that many citizens are against the election of Trump, by his own later admission he 
immediately connected the presence of busses full of people to the construction of these 
supposed artificial protests. In other words, when exposed to a new meme (the presence of 
busses on that particular day in Austin) his brain interpreted that meme according to the 
ecology that it already had in place, and therefore fit it in with the memeplex of artificial 
protests that Tucker already believed. 
#hashtag 
In identifying the memes in the Tucker’s tweet memeplex, I want to begin by 
distinguishing the use of a hashtag as a function, which is an interface meme, from a 
specific hashtag itself, which is a content meme. The #hashtag feature on Twitter as an 
interface meme allows users to share tweets with others who have similar interests but may 
be outside their immediate circle of followers. This is achieved through the hashtag search 
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function that Twitter offers. As interface memes, the hashtags function rhetorically as a 
means of audience selection and act as features that can help determine who interacts with 
the post in addition to the original poster’s followers and how they do so. Tucker’s tweet 
makes use of the hashtag interface meme by tagging the tweet to appear in searches for 
#fakeprotests, #trump2016, and #austin. The search for #fakeprotests would have been 
populated largely by conservative commentators, as would #trump2016, and Tucker’s post 
uses this interface meme to expose the content of the tweet to an ecology to which it is 
already well adapted and therefore likely to proliferate. #austin is a reference marker for the 
city of Austin, Texas. Its use in this context, then, ensures that a wide variety of people, not 
only those with political interests that align with Tucker’s, might come across this post. The 
local focus of the hashtag also means that the people who would physically encounter the 
protests on that day (Austin locals or visitors) are also the people who are most likely to see 
the post suggesting that they are fake. The use of this hashtag shows that the post was 
introduced into the #austin ecology on Twitter; however, this post or its constituent memes 
did not spread through the #austin ecology. Memetic Rhetorical Theory would suggest that 
the reason it did not spread through this ecology is because it lacked the necessary content 
memes to co-adapt with the existing memeplexes in that ecology; however, that is an 
analysis for another study. 
Notice that, as an interface meme, the hashtag function only works because of the 
way that hashtags characterize, and therefore help define, the content of the post. As a 
search tool, the hashtag interface meme relies on a relationship between the hashtags 
included in a tweet and the other content of that tweet to return appropriate responses when 
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the search function is used. In memetic terms, this means that the interface hashtag meme is 
co-adapted to the content memes of each individual hashtag in the post (in this case, 
#fakeprotests, #trump2016, and #austin). This is further proof of the theoretical idea that 
content memes and interface memes are symbiotic, not mutually exclusive, categories.  
Hashtags allow users who produce tweets to categorize their tweets according to the 
content they contain. This also allows the user to link the content of the tweet to a specific 
idea or ideas, and the implied associations between the content of the tweet and those ideas 
is a way of expressing a maximum number of ideas in the limited space that Twitter posts 
allow. In Figure 2, for example, the user uses #yesallwomen to connect the content of her 
tweet to the larger idea that all women experience sexual harassment and feelings of fear in 
the way she is describing. The hashtag also mirrors and dismisses the common rebuttal to 
stories of sexual harassment that “not all men” behave in these harmful ways. Use of the 
hashtag allows the poster to convey the complex idea of her experience in the larger social 
context and participate in that conversation without using a higher percentage of her limited 
allotment of characters to spell out something like “while this is my personal experience, it 
is not unique to me, and in fact all women face similar struggles simply because we are 
women; let’s talk about it.”  
 
Figure 9: Example of Hashtag Use to Link Tweet to Larger Ideas 
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#austin 
As a content meme, #austin conveys the idea that the content of the post relates to or 
takes place in the city of Austin, Texas. It is used for a variety of topics that are of interest to 
citizens or others who are somehow invested in the city. Examples of common uses of this 
hashtag include weather updates and rescue pets local to Austin as well as citywide events 
or tweets by travelers visiting the city. This particular hashtag, at the time Tucker’s tweet 
was posted, did not carry partisan political affiliations. As such, its inclusion in Tucker’s 
tweet signaled only that Tucker himself was referring to the protests specifically taking 
place in Austin on that day. It serves as a geographical marker, rather than an ideological 
one. 
#fakeprotests 
As a content meme embodied by the hashtag #fakeprotests to characterize the 
content of the tweet, the belief in fake protests as a feature of the American political 
landscape appears twice in Tucker’s tweet, both as the hashtag and implied in the text 
content stating that the protests happening on that day in Austin were “not as organic as they 
seem.”  
The idea of fake protests, that is, protests that were staged for political purposes and 
made up of participants who are not truly invested in the cause, was a prominent feature of 
the 2016 presidential election (Bond, 2016). I call this idea, and the belief in it, the fake 
protest memeplex. A central meme in this memeplex is the rhetorical act of naming a 
political demonstration a fake protest—call this FakeProtestNamed. Like the related 
FNOriginal meme, this meme has evolved substantially from its inception; it is now 
habitually applied to protests that accusers simply wish to discredit. The idea of a fake 
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protest paints participants as unthinking (often money-hungry) pawns of larger powers who 
seek to discredit Trump and his presidency or conservative policies more broadly. This 
allegation was a particular feature of conservative online sources targeting the Clinton 
campaign. On October 12, 2016, about a month prior to Tucker’s tweet, Eric Trump  shared 
a story via Twitter in which a woman claims to have been paid $3,500 to protest at a Trump 
rally (Firozi, 2016). Buck Clay of SOFREP News, a conservative-leaning and heavily 
military-focused news site, published an exposé (6/10/2016) of alleged attempts by the 
Clinton campaign to hire protesters to disrupt Trump rallies; however, Snopes debunked the 
claim that liberal groups were using Craigslist to recruit protesters-for-pay around that same 
time (Snopes.com). These allegations, shared often on social media and repeated across 
various news sites (used loosely), are individual iterations of the FakeProtestNamed meme 
that together form a memeplex within the ecology of conservative political discourse during 
the 2016 election. This memeplex consists of several similar memes that co-adapt to 
reinforce the claims that paid protests were being used to discredit conservative candidates, 
and Donald Trump in particular. 
Ideologically, the fake protest memeplex is part of a larger memeplex consisting of 
the belief that the majority (often called “silent” with a certain degree of dramatic irony) of 
Americans are (or were at the time) pro-Trump and, as such, reports of large number of 
people expressing disagreement/ dissatisfaction with him are deliberate attempts at 
misdirection by the liberal media and/or individual powerful liberals. Conservative news site 
Breitbart contributor A.J. Delgado adamantly voices these beliefs in his article, “20 Reasons 
Why It Should Be Donald Trump In 2016,” and cites various social media posts by citizens 
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as evidence that others understand the true situation (Delgado, 2015). The article draws 
specifically on the memeplex outlined at the start of this paragraph by claiming that 
suggestions by “the liberals” that Trump is “losing” (that is, losing the presidential primary 
race at the time and therefore unpopular) are deliberate attempts at misdirection intended to 
cause Trump supporters to shift their support to another candidate, thereby losing Trump’s 
essential votes and costing him the race. According to the article, such misdirection and 
falsified attempts to paint Trump as unpopular are common tactics of the liberal media. 
Delgado uses the Facebook post in Figure 2 (below) as an example of a citizen who “nails 
it” with their description (Delgado, 2015). Fox News likewise notes that CNN blurred out a 
man’s pro-Trump t-shirt logo when featuring him on an unrelated story (Fox News, 2016). 
The CNN Headline News story, which praises retired police officer Steven Eckel for saving 
a baby left in a car on a hot day, originally showed Eckel’s t-shirt slogan reading “Trump for 
President 2016” but blurred out the slogan in a later showing. Fox News’ Bias Alert segment 
frames this as an attempt to make support for Trump appear obscene (Fox News, 2016), 




Figure 10: Facebook Post Cited by Breitbart News 
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Eckel from support of Donald Trump and eliminates representation of Trump supporters 
from popular media. 
#trump2016 
#trump2016 is, not surprisingly, the most politically charged of the hashtags, and is 
generally used to aggregate posts that show support for Donald Trump’s presidential 
campaign during the 2016 election cycle. Posts that use this hashtag will always have some 
association or commentary regarding Trump and/or his role as a candidate for the 
presidency; as such, users who search this tag are presumably those who are interested in 
following conversations about Trump, whether their opinions of him as a candidate are 
positive or negative. 
 
Figure 11: Images Showing the Trump2016 Meme in Non-Digital Formats 
 #trump2016 is an evolution of another meme, “Trump 2016,”20 that exists in both 
digital and non-digital spheres. Both of these memes, and the various evolutions thereof, 
                                                 
20 Notably, “Trump 2016” it itself an evolution of a common political meme in the United States 
in which the pairing of a political candidate’s last name with the year of the election indicates 
support for that candidate or association with the candidate’s campaign (for example: “Obama 
2008,” “Bush 2004,” and “Clinton 2016”). This meme evolves every election cycle as new 
candidates run for office. 
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show support for or association with Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign.21 The 
inclusion of the #trump2016 hashtag in conjunction with the other memes in the tweet 
marks Tucker’s tweet as supportive of Trump and helps readers to make the association 
between that support and the idea of fake, “bussed in” protesters: namely, that these protests  
are a deliberate attempt to undermine the newly-elected Trump rather than a genuine 
expression of dissatisfaction by members of the public. 
Together, these memes form the memeplex contained within Tucker’s tweet. 
Because these memes also appear in other, connected memeplexes within conservative 
political discourse surrounding the 2016 presidential election, Tucker’s tweet memeplex was 
able to successfully adapt and proliferate through the ecology based on those connections. 
The following sections of this chapter will analyze this proliferation in two specific micro-
ecologies as a way of understanding how this adaptation took place, and how that adaptation 
translates to a new understanding of ethos in this context.  
The Proliferation of Tucker’s Tweet 
Tucker’s tweet spread extremely quickly through select memetic ecologies. The 
tweet was introduced to the conservative political discourse ecology through the use of the 
hashtags #fakeprotests and #trump2016 as discussed above. Conservative political discourse 
is not bound to a particular geographic location or site but instead spans the entire country 
and countless internet fora. This means that, once introduced to this ecology, Tucker’s tweet 
                                                 
21 The “or” in this sentence is important, as many internet users would tag negative stories or 
comments about Trump with #Trump2016 as a way of associating the content of their post with 
the campaign and emphasizing the connection between that content and Trump as a candidate 
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as a memeplex and its constituent memes were able to spread into new spaces and 
proliferate by adapting to the memeplexes at play in those particular spaces. We can think of 
these spaces as micro-ecologies that all fall under the larger umbrella ecology of 
conservative political discourse. This means that these micro-ecologies likely have several 
memeplexes in common, but they may differ in other ways, especially in their reliance on 
different interface memes that shape the various site platforms. To explore this 
phenomenon, I use MRT to briefly analyze the proliferation and evolution of Tucker’s 
Tweet in two of these micro-ecologies: the #fakeprotests ecology on Twitter and the 
Robertson Family Values page on Facebook. While the information in Tucker’s tweet 
appeared in many other micro-ecologies both on and off social media, I chose these two 
spaces because Tucker’s tweet was the origin of the common use of #fakeprotests on 
Twitter, and therefore the beginning of a new micro-ecology. The Robertson Family Values 
page, however, was already a well-established ecology at the time the tweet was released. 
This contrast allows for an illustrative analysis both of a space where a memeplex 
(#fakeprotests) adapts to suit an existing environment (conservative politics) as well as a 
space that grows out of connections between that memeplex and other memes from 
intersecting ecologies.  
Proliferation through #fakeprotests on Twitter 
Tucker’s tweet was the beginning of widespread use of #fakeprotests on Twitter, 
although the idea of fake protests, as described previously, did appear in other places 
relating to conservative political discourse surrounding the 2016 presidential election. This 
tweet marked the start of conversations surrounding the aggregated #fakeprotests, and so 
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was the birthplace of a new micro-ecology. In the 6 months prior to the posting of Tucker’s 
tweet, #fakeprotests appears 8 times on Twitter (other tweets that reference the idea of fake 
protests but do not include the hashtag are much more common and not included in this 
count). The hashtag then appears 11 times on November 9th, and 298 times in unique tweets 
(including links to other tweets or news stories) on November 10th. Of these, 36 individual 
tweets reference Tucker’s tweet specifically, either by quoting from him or tweeting 
@erictucker. 153 of these tweets reference or quote directly from a Gateway Pundit article 
that quotes Tucker’s tweet and shares the images from it. Since widespread use of the 
hashtag began, #fakeprotests has been used to refer to a variety of other political 
demonstrations across the United States.22 These include allegations tying #fakeprotests to 
the demonstrations organized by student victims of the Parkland school shooting, March For 
Our Lives, countless anti-Trump demonstrations, kneeling NFL players, and many others. 
However, as of May 18, 2018 (about 18 months after Tucker’s tweet was first posted) 
#fakeprotests tweets tying back to Tucker’s tweet still hold the top 2 spots on Twitter’s Top 
Tweets for the hashtag and 33 of the top 50 tweets for the hashtag date to within 5 days of 
November 9, 2016 (the date of the original post of Tucker’s tweet, but also the day after the 
presidential election). The prevalence of these tweets shows that memes from the original 
memeplex of Tucker’s tweet remain controlling concepts in this ecology, even as the 
                                                 
22 #fakeprotests is often also now used to refer to political demonstrations around the world, but 
as this chapter is so heavily focused on United States politics I will exclude these from the 
discussion. A larger argument could be made, however, for intersections between memetic 
ecologies of United States political discourse and political discourses around the world as 
evidenced by the proliferation of these ideas. 
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specific memes of fake protest and distrust of the media become associated with new events 
that have joined the ecology in this space over time. 
The memes from Tucker’s tweet spread quickly to create this new ecology. This 
occurred through adaptation of these memes to existing conspiracy memeplexes, most 
notably the financial corruption and political involvement of George Soros, who was almost 
immediately accused of paying the protesters who arrived on the busses to attend (see 
Figure 3) and who is still accused of funding many demonstrations that are seen as anti-
conservative. 
 
The hashtag #fakenews was also quickly introduced to this ecology (see Figure 4), 
providing for successful co-adaptation between #fakenews as associated with the 
FNEvolution meme and #fakeprotests as it is used in Tucker’s tweet. These two memes 
were ideally constructed for co-adaptation, as both evolved to suit memeplexes that rely on 
similar content memes: a distrust of (often liberal) powerful entities who are thought to be 
intentionally misleading the public and the desire to discredit or challenge anti-Trump 
discourse.  
Figure 12: Tweet accusing George Soros of Funding #FakeProtests 
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Figure 13: Co-adaptation of #FakeNews and #FakeProtests 
The memes within Tucker’s tweet, along with their associations and adaptations with 
existing conservative and conspiracy memeplexes, form the central memeplexes of this 
ecology. This means that when Tucker’s tweet or other tweets that use #fakeprotests are 
shared, they rely on a single set of (possibly alternative) facts and assumptions that create a 
unifying rhetoric—a set of controlling memeplexes that cross micro-ecologies and are 
characteristic of the ecology of conservative political rhetoric during this time. #fakeprotests 
as a memetic ecology relies on these controlling memeplexes for coherency, and these 
memeplexes determine which new memes will succeed and proliferate when introduced to 
this ecology. It is the successful adaptation of #fakeprotests as a meme to the ecology of 
conservative political discourse that makes this process possible and that allowed the 
#fakeprotest ecology to continue to grow over time. However, the #fakeprotests ecology 
itself is based on a tweet (Tucker’s tweet) which has been proved false by various media 
outlets and publicly disavowed by its creator. The entire ecology is based on one simple 
piece of misinformation which only proliferated because of its successful co-adaptation with 
existing memeplexes within conservative political discourse at the time. Because the basis 
of this ecology is this piece of misinformation, any new memes that do not fit the 
memeplexes established and drawn upon by that misinformation are unable to proliferate 
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within the ecology. As such, any attempts to intervene in this ecology that are incompatible 
with these memeplexes will be unsuccessful, regardless of their source or strategy. This 
became evident when Tucker himself posted the retraction of his original tweet, removed 
the tweet from Twitter, and publicly apologized for  his mistake (Tucker, 2016). Even 
though the retraction came from the same source, it did not spread through the ecology 
created by that source less than 24 hours previously because it failed to adapt to the 
memeplexes that defined that ecology. 
The Move to Facebook through Co-Adaptation 
Twenty-four hours after Tucker posted his original tweet, a conservative forum 
called Free Republic had caught wind of the story from a Reddit thread. From Free 
Republic the story was posted to the Facebook page “Robertson Family Values” 
(Maheshwari, 2016). While not affiliated with the Robertson family who gained fame 
through the popular television series Duck Dynasty, the page uses images from the 
television show and seems to align with the rural, outdoor-focused emphasis of the show as 
well as the family dynamics between the characters. The Robertson Family Values page 
describes itself as a page that “promotes Christian, rural, and conservative American 
values.” This description holds true in the content memes that were posted on the site 
around the same time as the content from Tucker’s tweet, meaning that conservatism, 
rurality, and Christianity were the defining memeplexes on the page at this time. Figure 14, 
for example, shows content memes that support conservatism in the validation of Donald 
Trump’s election through support of the electoral college23 while emphasizing the need for 
                                                 
23 Trump was elected through victory in the electoral college, though not the popular vote. This 
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fairness to rural voters (indicated in the gray areas of the map). Other posts argue that big 
government (traditionally liberal) de-emphasizes religion by taking on powers that should be 
attributed to God, and that Hillary Clinton is a liar and/or criminal.  
 
Figure 14: Post Shared by Robertson Family Values Facebook page on November10, 2016 showing rural and conservative 
content memes 
The content of Tucker’s tweet was shared from this page by individual Facebook 
users, all of whom are page followers, more than 7,500 times. In order to proliferate from 
this page, the story in Tucker’s tweet had to make the seemingly unlikely leap between  a 
discussion of supposed ‘fake’ protests in Austin, TX and the other content that causes users 
to follow this page to begin with. In other words, the memes in the memeplex that made up 
Tucker’s tweet had to co-adapt with the memeplexes on the Robertson Family Values page. 
The conservative emphasis already built into these memeplexes made this possible, as this 
                                                 
disparity caused some ideological dispute in the aftermath of the election, with many liberal 
commentators claiming that the electoral college does not accurately reflect the will of the voters 
while conservative commentators argued that the electoral college more fairly distributes voting 
power among densely and sparsely populated states. 
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emphasis consists of memes derived from or already present in the conservative political 
discourse ecology discussed above. Because Tucker’s tweet was successfully adapted to the 
conservative political discourse ecology, then, it was also successfully adapted to the 
Robertson Family Values Facebook page. 
The Retraction 
By the afternoon of November 11th, two days after the original tweet went up, Tucker 
had rescinded his claim that the busses, actually in Austin to provide transportation for a 
local conference, had anything to do with bringing in protesters. Late that night, he also 
deleted the original tweet and re-posted the image with the word “False” superimposed at 
the top in red (Maheshwari, 2016). Neither Tucker’s denial of his claim nor the responses 
from fact-checking websites like Snopes gained any real traction with the community of 
sharers of the original post (Maheshwari, 2016). While introduced into the same 
communities by the same individual, the retraction tweet did not contain the necessary 
memes to adapt within the ecologies where the original tweet was successful, so it was 
ignored both on Twitter and on Facebook. 
Had the ethos been an embodied characteristic of Eric Tucker, then the retraction 
tweet should have proliferated with the same degree of rapidity. This, however, was not the 
case. This failure of the correction-meme to proliferate despite sharing an origin point with 
the original story suggests that the ethos of the original story came from the ability of the 
content to align with the existing beliefs of the groups who were sharing it, rather than 
relying on any presumed authority of Tucker himself. These attempts at intervention relied 
on the presumption of a unified understanding of truth and facts; however, this unified 
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understanding is not present in disparate ecologies where truth and fact are characterized by 
different and often contradictory memeplexes. As such, a simple introduction of corrections 
or new and contradictory facts into these ecologies cannot be the most productive way of 
intervening in these spaces. 
Memetic rhetorical analysis shows that new memes, and therefore new information 
(which is made up of memes), are successful when introduced to a new ecology only if 
those memes draw on and co-adapt with the memeplexes that constitute those ecologies. 
When ecologies are made up of memeplexes containing content memes based on 
misinformation, corrections of that misinformation that contradict these memeplexes are 
doomed to fail. In Chapter 5, I discuss the difficulties associated with this kind of 
intervention in detail and offer solutions for addressing these difficulties using MRT. I 
conclude with one such example of successful memetic intervention and the caveat that 
memetic interventions, while more likely to succeed because of their co-adaptive nature, are 
often gradual, uncomfortable and/or problematic. 
 
Chapter 5: Memetic Intervention 
Introduction 
This dissertation began in Chapter 1 by identifying the ways in which the intersections of 
conversations about ethos and agency contribute to the social changes that lead to the modern era 
being known as “post-fact”. In particular, Chapter 1 argues that because ethos is a culturally 
constructed concept, much like rhetoric itself, it exists in a mutually constructive relationship 
with the agentic actors that influence how people communicate, and therefore how culture is 
(re)formed over time. Chapter 2 builds on this discussion by laying out a model for 
understanding this mutually constructive relationship in the form of memetic rhetorical theory 
(MRT). MRT suggests that all the building blocks of culture (and rhetorical action) called memes 
evolve together to create rhetorical environments called memetic ecologies, and that the co- 
adaptive nature of these ecologies determines what new memes are able to spread successfully; 
in other words, these meme ecologies determine what new memes have ethos in that space. 
Chapters 3 and 4 show MRT in action by conducting memetic rhetorical analyses of the 
proliferation of memes through specific memetic ecologies, with both cases demonstrating that 
the original source who authored the information has little effect on how or if that information 
spreads within communities. This analysis suggests that ethos, then, is a characteristic indicating 
successful adaptation of a meme to a memetic ecology and not an inherent or embodied 
characteristic of a person. 
The case studies discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation illustrate the idea that 
the agency of the various memes in these memetic ecologies affects the creation and distribution 
of ethos in those ecologies. In both cases, the original source of the information seems to be 
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relevant to the spread of that information through new ecologies only if the ethos of that source 
is already an established memeplex within that ecology. This is evident based on the fact that of 
the Whole30 information published by Melissa Hartwig via her published books, only the memes 
that were adaptive to the interface structure of the Whole30 Community Facebook page gained 
traction and remained able to proliferate in that ecology. This would suggest that, because of the 
interactive and user-focused nature of the Whole30 Community Facebook page, the community 
on that page values content from other participants more than the content from the books or their 
author. This is a characteristic derived from the unique features of the memetic ecology in this 
space, rather than a characteristic of the Whole30 community more broadly. For example, simple 
observation suggests that Melissa Hartwig participates much more actively on the Whole30 
website fora, frequently referencing her own experiences as well as various parts of her written 
works (books as well as published articles and interviews) to answer questions or give advice to 
participants on the site. On the Whole30 website, then, Hartwig’s ethos is emphasized and 
cultivated through the structure of the site and her own use of its features, while that same ethos 
is virtually non-existent on the Community Facebook page where members have learned to rely 
on each other. Likewise, Eric Tucker was the source both of the original claim of fake protestors 
in Austin and of the retraction, but only the memeplex of the original claim proliferated through 
the communities that were predisposed to believe it.  
In other words, the communities studied in this dissertation do not invest either Hartwig 
or Tucker with ethos as individuals. Rather, certain memes gain traction in the ecologies based 
on their adaptability to the memeplexes that are already in place. In the public Whole30 
Facebook community page discussed in chapter 3, as well as the public Robertson Family Values 
page and #fakeprotests Twitter hashtag in chapter 4, the social media platforms rely on interface 
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memes that rhetorically emphasize the act of posting by an individual rather than the profile or 
identity of the individual poster themselves. 
These cases also demonstrate the tenacity of successfully-proliferated memes, as they 
become characteristic of the ecologies through which they have spread. This tenacity is the 
reason why misinformation memes are so difficult to counter once they have spread through a 
particular ecology; they cannot be corrected through simple contradiction or even redactions 
because they have already co-adapted with other defining memes. 
 
Intervening in the Spread of Misinformation 
Interventions in the spread of misinformation must follow the same process of co- 
adaptation that other successful memes in an ecology have followed in order to intervene in the 
memeplexes to which the original piece of misinformation has adapted. While numerous 
attempts to disrupt the spread of misinformation in both science and politics have been made, 
these often take the form of simple fact-checks or corrections, rather than gradual co-adaptations. 
In the early 2000s, fact-checking sites like Snopes (as well as other, less popular sites) began to 
appear online in an attempt to counter attempts at misinformation regarding politics, or false 
claims made by political figures (Young et al., 2018; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). Existing research 
in the fields of communication and digital media show that the introduction of fact-checks— 
contradictions or corrections of information that has been posted on social media, usually 
sourced from news articles or fact-checking websites—is not usually effective at changing minds 
on social media (Garrett et al, 2013; Hannak et al, 2014; Lewandowsky et al., 2012), making the 
disruption of the spread of misinformation extremely challenging. Research also suggests that 
varying techniques can be used to mitigate this resistance; however, these techniques tend to be 
focused on individuals’ acceptance of the corrected information. For example, in a study of fact-
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checking as a social undertaking via Twitter, Hannak et al. (2014) argue that while fact-checks 
are usually ignored by original posters on social media, this effect is lessened if the original 
poster has a reciprocal social media relationship with the fact-checker. 
 Their study demonstrates that when original posters and fact-checking posters have 
frequently commented on each other’s posts and/or posted to each other’s timelines, the original 
poster is more likely (though still not extremely likely) to respond to a fact-check by agreeing 
with the correction or backing off their original claim (Hannak et al. 2014). In their study of the 
spread and disruption of misinformation, Lewandowsky et al. (2012) similarly suggest that the 
compatibility of information with things that the reader already assumes to be true is a key factor 
in determining whether or not that information will be accepted by that reader. 
Both of the above studies suggest appeals to the credibility of the correction as possible 
avenues for successful intervention. However, they determine that credibility in different ways: 
Hannak et al (2014) emphasize the personal relationship between the original poster and the fact- 
checker, placing the locus of ethos in the embodied personage of the fact-checker themselves; 
Lewandowsky et al., however, focus the locus of ethos on the information itself and its 
relationship to the reader’s pre-existing beliefs. 
At first glance, the studies by Hannak et al. and Lewandowsky et al. might appear 
contradictory; while Hannak et al. suggest that ethos is derived from interpersonal relationships, 
Lewandowsky et al. argue that ethos is tied to relationships between pieces of information, not 
individuals. Memetic rhetorical theory suggests that, rather than being contradictory, these ways 
of determining the origin of credibility both point to the contextual nature of ethos. In other 
words, in both scenarios ethos is derived from a concept or relationship that is already valued in 
the space in which the study takes place. Understanding how that derivation takes places requires 
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acknowledgement of both the ecologies that influence these spaces and the ways in which new 
content has adapted to fit those ecologies. In this understanding, ethos that is built through 
interpersonal relationships, as Hannak et al. discuss, is derived from complex reasoning 
regarding the nature of that relationship and the kinds of qualities that the original poster (based 
on their cultural conditioning) recognizes as trustworthy as well as the established practice 
between the original poster and the fact-checker of sharing information, thoughts, and ideas 
through the social media site. Ethos that is derived from the relationship between the fact- 
checker and previously accepted information, as Lewandowsky et al describe, follows a similar 
process in adapting to the existing ecology. However, in this case the ecology is based primarily 
on the logical24 construction and coherence of ideas rather than an interpersonal relationship. The 
successful cultivation of that ethos is a matter of recognizing the memeplexes that control the 
ecology into which the fact-check has entered, and introducing the fact-check meme in such a 
way as to allow it to adapt to and build on those memeplexes. In both cases, the credibility (the 
ethos) of the newly-introduced fact-check meme is derived from the existing ethos of another 
memeplex already operating in the ecology, be that a personal relationship, a logical construction 
of ideas, or some other construction. 
Ecker, Lewandowsky, and Tang (2010) demonstrate that providing prior warnings about 
the possibility of false or misleading content can help individuals to fact-check within their own 
memories, however, notably more than a third of participants in their study continued to rely on 
misinformation to make inferences even after acknowledging that the misinformation had been 
retracted (2010). This continued reliance on misinformation by more than one third of 
                                                 
24 I am using “logic” here in a literal sense; it does not imply inherent accuracy or correctness, 
but rather the process of drawing conclusions and defining relationships between ideas using 
inferential reasoning 
 124 
participants means that while individuals might be persuaded by specific conversational tools or 
interpersonal relationships in one-on-one interactions, the misinformation remains a part of 
group discourse even after that successful persuasion occurs. In this way, misinformation 
remains a part of the memetic ecology once it has been introduced. It is therefore available as an 
established meme, if not a dominant meme, in that ecology for other newly introduced memes to 
co-adapt with and gain traction through. As an existing feature of an ecology, the misinformation 
meme continues to hold persuasive power in this way and can allow other memes to cultivate 
ethos based on co-adaptation with it. 
As a rhetoric and technical communication project, this dissertation concludes by offering 
ways we can intervene in the memetic ecology of community discourse as a whole, rather than in 
the individual beliefs of specific community members. As such, intervention through memetic 
rhetorical theory must work to introduce correction memes in a way that allows those correction 
memes to adapt and proliferate widely within the existing ecology. Successful intervention in 
this context would mean that the correction meme proliferates to such an extent that other memes 
within the ecology begin to adapt to it (the correction meme) rather than to the original 
misinformation meme. Notice that this successful intervention is not absolute; the 
misinformation meme might continue to proliferate alongside the correction meme, or the 
ecology might split into two separate ecologies: one in which the correction meme is dominant, 
and one in which the misinformation meme is dominant. It is nearly impossible to entirely wipe 
out a meme that has once been successful, and as such whether or not a misinformation meme 
continues to proliferate in some form or space should never be considered a measure of the 
success of an intervention. For example, if you recall the proliferation of the Copernican model 
of the solar system in Chapter 2 as a successful, well-adapted correction to misinformation, the 
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modern Flat-Earth theory is an example of the continued proliferation of certain elements of the 
Ptolemaic model. Nevertheless, successful memetic intervention serves the dual function of both 
introducing a correction meme into an existing ecology in such a way as to allow that meme to 
co-adapt and proliferate, altering the ecology slightly in the process, as well as possibly creating 
new ecologies through that evolution in which further interventions are possible. 
This kind of intervention is gradual, not radical, and in order to succeed it requires a 
thorough understanding of and engagement with the memetic ecology as it stands. As such, 
successful interventions in the Whole30 Facebook community would, by necessity, require a 
cultivation of ethos through engagement with personal testimony as the controlling memeplex in 
that ecology. For example, if a person were to determine that the restrictive eating habits 
promoted by the Whole30 program (and therefore discussed on the Whole30 Community 
Facebook page) are harmful25 and wish to intervene in that community, then personal testimonies 
from many individuals who have experienced specific, harmful effects posted to the page would 
be significantly more effective than research-based posts from a single individual cautioning 
against these practices. If, however, the goal of the intervention was to disrupt the strength of the 
personal testimony meme and attempt to cultivate more traditional or academic understandings 
of ethos in this space (not necessarily something I would recommend, but I am speaking 
hypothetically here) then a way of doing so might involve altering the interface memeplex of that 
page (not something the average user has access to) and transitioning slowly toward a platform 
with a more consolidated information distribution interface, so that content flows from a 
centralized point and is not aggregated from multiple users. 
                                                 
25 Note that this dissertation does not make this argument, though I acknowledge that another 
person might. This example is hypothetical, and interventions are always determined by the 
goals of the intervener and therefore subject to that individual’s judgement and values. 
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Eric Tucker’s own experience proved that the ecology formed by #fakeprotests is 
incredibly difficult to disrupt through intervention. The flaw in Tucker’s attempted intervention 
was that it attempted overthrow the ecology rather than engage with it—with his retraction, 
Tucker effectively tried to initiate a memetic cataclysm in this community, but without the 
violent means was ultimately ineffective. A more effective memetic intervention would have 
challenged only one memeplex within this ecology, rather than attempting to disrupt all of them 
simultaneously. A responsible technical communicator should determine the specific meme or 
memeplex that is most crucial to disrupt for their intervention to succeed, as well as whether or 
not such an intervention would be worth engaging with the other memeplexes that support that 
ecology. For example, because Tucker’s tweet was eventually shared through several prominent 
news sources, an argument that discredits the tweet by associating it with the media (which 
Chapters 1 & 4 demonstrate is a popular target of conservative political conspiracy theories) 
might be effective in this space. However, such an intervention requires that the intervener is 
comfortable perpetuating these anti-media conspiracy theories (not something I would be 
comfortable with myself). Memetic intervention is therefore a useful tool, but not wholly perfect 
and not always appropriate for those for whom the emotional labor costs of such a gradual 
method outweigh the benefits of engaging with members of wholly disparate memetic ecologies. 
However, for those with both the mental fortitude and social currency to engage successfully in 
these ecologies, memetic intervention is a powerful tool for initiating social change.  
With this goal of intervention in mind, I turn to a brief analysis of #MeToo as an example 
of successful memetic intervention. I want to preface this example by emphasizing that I am 
characterizing this example as successful memetic intervention because the #MeToo movement 
utilized successful adaptation to an existing ecology to achieve a specific goal. This does not 
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mean that the movement is in any way perfect or without problems. Because the co-adaptation of 
memetic ecologies is so strong, and because memetic cataclysms as defined in Chapter 2 are 
inherently violent, examples of a memetic intervention that do not rely on existing power 
structures, social dynamics, and cultural tropes as part of the memeplexes that support the 
ecology in question are impossible. Most troubling of all, interventions that rely on these 
memeplexes also inherently reinforce them through that same process of co-adaptation, so by 
intervening with one problematic memeplex, we often strengthen others by default. Critical 
awareness of this kind of compromise is essential, as the following discussion of #MeToo will 
demonstrate. 
 
#MeToo: An Example of Successful Memetic Intervention 
In the 2017 iteration of #MeToo, the goal seems to have been the intervention in rape 
culture, and specifically in the element of rape culture that seeks to undermine accusations of 
rape, sexual assault, or sexual harassment by women. When successful (which it often 
unfortunately is) this undermining results in mitigated or eliminated consequences for the sexual 
predator. The widely-proliferated misinformation in this sense, then, is a cultural assumption that 
it is for whatever reason acceptable to dismiss accusations of sexual assault. 
Conversations about sexual assault were at the forefront of public discourse in the United 
States in October of 2017 due to an article published in The New York Times on October 5th 
exposing Harvey Weinstein’s history of sexual misconduct (Kantor and Twohey, 2016). The 
article cites a memo written by Lauren O’Connor, a Weinstein Company employee, that outlines 
details of what O’Connor calls “a toxic environment for women at this company” (Kantor and 
Twohey, 2016). In particular, O’Connor and many other women referenced both by name and 
anonymously within the article, accused Weinstein of abusing his influence and position of 
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authority within the film industry to coerce women into performing sexual acts with him. 
Within the same article, the authors cite comments from Weinstein’s lawyer, Lisa Bloom, 
saying that “[Mr. Weinstein] denies many of the accusations as patently false,” and from 
Weinstein himself referring to content in Ms. O’Connor’s memo as “off base.” These comments 
are evidence of a rhetorical move to discredit the accusing women almost as soon as the scandal 
broke, drawing on the same piece of misinformation cited above that encourages the dismissal of 
these kinds of accusations. 
In response to this scandal and as a way of drawing attention to the pervasive nature of 
sexual harassment and assault in Hollywood, actress Alyssa Milano posted a Tweet on October 
15th asking all women who have been victims of sexual harassment or assault to respond with 
“Me Too” (see Figure 15). Her post was wildly successful: by the next evening the hashtag 
#MeToo was trending #1 on Twitter, and by December 1 it had spread through Twitter users 
representing 85 countries (Sayej, 2017). 
 
Milano claimed that her goal was to give “some idea of the magnitude of how big this 
problem is [and] get the focus off these horrible men and to put the focus back on the victims and 
Figure 15: Alyssa Milano's "Me Too" Tweet 
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survivors” (Sayej, 2017). By demonstrating the magnitude of the problem, the #MeToo 
movement following Milano’s tweet made it more difficult to dismiss individual accusations as 
false money- or attention-seeking behavior by one woman, and instead pointed to these 
accusations as symptomatic of a pervasive issue within the power structures of Hollywood. As 
an intervention in the misinformation ideology described above, #MeToo was demonstrably 
effective as it drastically increased conversations surrounding sexual assault and harassment 
around the world. Many articles (Burke, 2018; Finn, 2018; Morris, 2018; and others) also credit 
the hashtag with social acceptance of these kinds of stories when told by women. Reuters reports 
that calls to U.S. sexual assault hotlines also skyrocketed following the trending of #MeToo, 
with calls increasing 25% in November, 2017 and 30% in December, 2017 from numbers the 
previous year (Lambert, 2018). Repercussions, both legal and social, for sexual misconduct also 
surged as the movement gained prominence, with prominent figures such as Louis CK, Morgan 
Freeman, Charlie Rose, and many other losing contract deals or their jobs, and/or facing criminal 
charges for sexual misconduct. While a post hoc ergo propter hoc claim that #MeToo directly 
caused these changes would be unsubstantiated, at present #MeToo is the largest aggregator of 
sexual assault claims that is publicly available, meaning that the hashtag movement was 
indisputably successful in generating public conversations surrounding sexual misconduct and in 
achieving Milano’s goal of emphasizing both the magnitude of the problem and the experiences 
of survivors. 
This particular goal was well-suited to the Twitter ecology because Twitter (as 
established in Chapter 4) allows for the sharing and aggregation of ideas through the use of 
#hashtags across groups of users who may not follow one another. Within this platform, 
#hashtag movements are able to de-emphasize the focus on the identities of individual users who 
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post using the tags and instead demonstrate the quantities of people discussing a given topic. By 
using this feature to tag stories of sexual assault or harassment, the #MeToo movement was able 
to function itself as a demonstration of the pervasiveness of sexual misconduct. This 
demonstration likewise crossed many boundaries, from geographic to economic, and helped to 
spark similar conversations in a variety of locations and industries. 
While this hashtag movement has been a positive cultural influence in many ways, it is 
also indicative of the strength of white and socioeconomic privilege as memeplexes in our 
national discourse. Catherine Rottenberg articulates this problem most concisely when she says, 
“it is only when powerful, wealthy and mostly white women come forward that influential men 
have been forced to resign from high-profile positions” (Rottenberg, 2017). It is also true that 
successful proliferation of #MeToo on a national scale did not occur until a white, wealthy 
actress tweeted the call; however, the Me Too movement (outside of the #hashtag) actually 
began more than 10 years prior to both Milano’s Tweet and the Weinstein scandal as a campaign 
built by activist Tarana Burke to help women and girls of color to cope with sexual violence. 
Burke’s movement, while it achieved substantial success as a community effort, did not gain 
national attention until it was recognized by participants in #MeToo, and like many modern 
feminist movements #MeToo is hindered in its intersectional reach by persistent privilege of 
white, wealthy, able-bodied, cisgender women. By building on the established ethos of these 
women, #MeToo was able to achieve its interventional goal, but did so by participating within 
the confines of existing misogynoir (Bailey, 2010) as a memeplex in the ecology of our national 
discourse. This is not to say that any leaders of or participants of the #MeToo movement post 
2017 did so intentionally, but rather that the co-adapted memeplexes of racism, sexism, 
misogyny, and rape culture are so strong within our national discourse that projects that attempt 
 131 
to disrupt them simultaneously are unfortunately ill-adapted to the ecology and therefore only 
proliferate within micro-ecologies that have already evolved to challenge one or more of these 
constructs 
 As the #MeToo movement demonstrates, though intervention in the spread of 
misinformation is possible, its success on a mass scale tends to be incomplete as well as 
problematic. This unfortunate fact is true because of the strength of the memeplexes that define 
the ecology of our national discourse and the co-adaptive nature of these memeplexes that makes 
disrupting them simultaneously extremely difficult. In the modern era, with social media and its 
various forms acting as interface memeplexes that shape the way that communities share and 
receive information, the connections among these memeplexes are both newly transparent and 
especially fraught with new dimensions of old socio-economic power dynamics. 
Successful memetic intervention that is critical of both the memeplexes that it relies 
upon and the memeplexes that it challenges is essential to avoid exacerbating both the spread of 
misinformation and the social harms that that misinformation can cause. Memetic intervention 
relies on the cultivation of ethos within an existing ecology; however, this ethos cannot be a 
quality of an individual. Instead, the ethos necessary for successful memetic intervention must be 
understood as a quality derived from the ecology itself. Technical communicators can better 
intervene in the proliferation of misinformation by interrogating the relationships between 
genres, media, and community rhetorics in order to understand the memeplexes that shape the 
ecologies where intervention is necessary. Successful intervention can only occur through 
adaptation of correction memes based on this understanding. Moreover, we must never consider 
the relationships between these memeplexes to be static, but rather representative of the evolving 
nature of mass consciousness and the technologies that mediate it. 
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 Technical communicators are in an ideal position to undertake this challenge critically. 
 
Because interventions must, by necessity, rely on enough existing memeplexes within an ecology 
to gain traction and proliferate extensively enough to overcome misinformation within that 
ecology, critical analysis of what memeplexes an intervention relies on and where those 
memeplexes intersect with others is crucial to avoid doing more social harm than good. As 
technical communicators, we are well-positioned to use our expertise to interrogate the 
relationships between community ideologies and the genres and media through which they 
proliferate. With our knowledge of the ways that form and function work together to create 
meaning, we can examine the interactions among content and interface memeplexes to better 
understand and intervene in the spread of misinformation. 
Technical communication research has long interrogated the connections between content 
and interface in communicative scenarios. With the continued evolution of communication 
technologies, new theories and methods of analysis are needed to shed light on the symbiotic 
relationships between these technologies and the cultures that they shape and are shaped by. 
 Memetic Rhetorical Theory provides a way of understanding the mechanisms through 
which this relationship takes place. Such an understanding is necessary if we are to craft 
successful interventions that draw on the full range of affordances available in communicative 





Ahmed, S. (2006). Queer phenomenology: Orientations, objects, others. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press.  
Alexander, R. J. (16 June 2008). Ptolemaic system. In Encyclopedia Brittannica Online. 
Retrieved from https://www.britannica.com/topic/Ptolemaic-system 
Allcott, H., & Gentzkow, M. (2017). Social media and fake news in the 2016 election. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 31(2), 211-36 
Allen, J. (1994). Women and authority in business/technical communication scholarship: An 
analysis of writing features, methods, and strategies. Technical Communication 
Quarterly, 3(3), 271-292. 10.1080/10572259409364572 
Andrews, D. C., (2017). A space for place in business communication research. International 
Journal of Business Communication, 54 (3), p325-336.  
Aunger, R. (2000). Darwinizing culture: The status of memetics as a science. New York; 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Baca, D., & Villanueva, V. (2010). Rhetorics of the Americas: 3114 BCE to 2012 CE (1st ed.). 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan 
Bar-Itzhak, H. (1999). "The unknown variable hidden underground" and the Zionist idea: 
Rhetoric of place in an Israeli kibbutz and cultural interpretation. Journal of American 
Folklore, 112, 497-513. 
Barnett, S., & Boyle, C. (Eds.). (2016). Rhetoric, through everyday things. University of 
Alabama Press. 
Baca, Damian. (2008) Mestiz@ scripts, digital migrations, and the territories of writing. New 
York: Palgrave. 
 134 
Beck, E. N. (2015). The invisible digital identity: Assemblages in digital networks. Computers 
and Composition, 35, 125-140. doi:10.1016/j.compcom.2015.01.005 
Beck, E., Blair, K., & Grohowski, M. (2015). Gendered labor: The work of feminist digital 
praxis. Kairos, 20(1). Retrieved from http://kairos.technorhetoric.net/20.1/reviews/blair-
et-al/index.html  
Bizzell, P. (2006). Frances Willard, Phoebe Palmer, and the ethos of the Methodist woman 
preacher. Rhetoric Society Quarterly, 36(4), 377. 
Blackmore, S.J. (1998), Imitation and the definition of a meme. Journal of Memetics: 
Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission, 2. http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-
emit/1998/vol2/blackmore_s.html  
Blackmore, S. J. (1999). The meme machine. Oxford [England]; New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Blair, Kristine, Gajjala, Radhika, & Tulley, Christine (Eds.). (2009). Webbing cyberfeminist 
practice: Communities, pedagogies and social action. Creskill, NJ: Hampton Press. 
Bogost, I. (2007) Persuasive games: the expressive power of video games. Cambridge, MA: The 
MIT Press. 
Bond, S. (2016, July 8). In the game of politics, paying protesters, supporters and rabble-rousers 
is nothing new. Forbes. Retrieved from 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/drsarahbond/2016/07/08/in-the-game-of-politics-paying-
protesters-supporters-and-rabble-rousers-is-nothing-new/- 2f48d95d2c3e 
Bowdon, M. A. (2014). Tweeting an ethos: Emergency messaging, social media, and teaching 
technical communication. Technical Communication Quarterly, 23(1), 35-54. 
10.1080/10572252.2014.850853 
 135 
Bray, F. (1997) Technology and gender: Fabrics of power in late imperial China. Los Angeles: 
University of California Press. 
Brock, K., & Shepherd, D. (2016). Understanding how algorithms work persuasively through the 
procedural enthymeme. Computers and Composition, 42, 17-27. 
doi:10.1016/j.compcom.2016.08.007 
Brodie, R. (2009). Virus of the mind: The new science of the meme. Seattle, WA: Hay House, 
Inc. 
Burke, L. (2018, March 9). The #MeToo shockwave: How the movement has reverberated 
around the world. The Telegraph. Retrieved from 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world/metoo-shockwave/ 
Burkhardt, J. M. (2017). History of fake news. Library Technology Reports, 53(8), 5-2. 
Butler, J. (2004). Undoing gender. New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203499627 
Cillizza, Chris (2017, January 21). Sean Spicer held a press conference. He didn't take questions. 
Or tell the whole truth. The Washington Post. Retrieved from 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/21/sean-spicer-held-a-press-
conference-he-didnt-take-questions-or-tell-the-whole-truth/?utm_term=.6279922e8467  
Clay, B. (2016, June 10). Paid, confrontational protesters: The Hillary Clinton ‘dirty tricks’ 
campaign. SOFREP News. Retrieved from https://sofrep.com/56106/paid-
confrontational-protesters-hillary-clinton-dirty-tricks-campaign/ 
Coddington, M., Molyneux, L., & Lawrence, R. G. (2014). Fact checking the campaign: How 
political reporters use Twitter to set the record straight (or not). The International Journal 
of Press/Politics, 19(4), 391-409. 
 136 
Conte, R. (2000). Memes through (social) minds. In R. Aunger (Ed.) Darwinizing culture: The 
status of memetics as a science, 83-120. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Couture, B. (1998) Toward a phenomenological rhetoric: Writing professionalism and altruism. 
Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.  
Cramer, P., & Eisenhart, C. (2014). Examining readers’ evaluations of objectivity and bias in 
news discourse. Written Communication, 31(3), 280-303. 
doi:10.1177/0741088314532429 
DeLanda, M. (2011). Introduction to war in the age of intelligent machines. In S. Giddings & M. 
Lister (Eds.), The new media and technocultures reader (pp.70- 76). New York: 
Routledge. 
Dawkins, R. (1989). The selfish gene. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Davis, A. P. (2010). Ethos and cooperative behavior: An exploration of the relationships between 
an organization's identity and its collaborative review processes. 
Davis, S. (2017, November 15). ‘Me Too’ legislation aims to combat sexual harassment in 
congress. NPR. Retrieved from  https://www.npr.org/2017/11/15/564405871/me-too-
legislation-aims-to-combat-sexual-harassment-in-congress 
Delgado, A. J. (2015, October 22). 20 reasons why it should be Donald Trump in 2016. 
Breitbart. Retrieved from http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2015/10/22/20-
reasons-donald-trump-2016/ 
Diamond, J. M. (1997). Guns, germs, and steel: The fates of human societies (1st ed.). New 
York: W.W. Norton & Co. 
 137 
Dickinson, G., & Ott, B. L. (2013). Neoliberal capitalism, globalization, and lines of flight: 
Vectors and velocities at the 16th street mall. Cultural Studies ↔ Critical 
Methodologies, 13(6), 529-535. doi:10.1177/1532708613503780 
Ecker, U. K., Lewandowsky, S., & Tang, D.T. (2010). Explicit warnings reduce but do not 
eliminate the continued influence of misinformation. Memory & Cognition, 38(8), 1087-
1100. doi:10.3758/MC.38.8.1087. 
Edmonds, B. (1997). Information about JoM-EMIT. Retrieved from http://cfpm.org/jom-
emit/about.html  
Edwards, D. & Cromwell, D. (2006) Guardians of power: The myth of the liberal media. Ann 
Arbor, MI: Pluto Press. 
Endres, D., Senda-Cook, S., & Cozen, B. (2014). Not just a place to park your car: PARK as 
spatial argument. Argumentation and Advocacy, 50(3), 121. 
Finn, N. (2017, Jan. 7). Why Hollywood won’t ever be the same after the #MeToo movement—
Because it can’t. ENews. Retrieved from  https://www.eonline.com/news/903960/why-
hollywood-won-t-ever-be-the-same-after-the-metoo-movement-because-it-can-t 
Firozi, P. A. (2016, Oct 12). Trump’s son tweets fake news story about paid protestors. The Hill. 
Retrieved from http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/presidential-races/300742-trumps-son-
tweets-fake-news-story-about-paid-protesters 
Fox News (2016, Sept. 1). Bias alert: HLN blurs out retired officer’s Trump 2016 shirt. Fox 
News Politics. Retrieved from http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/09/01/bias-alert-
hln-blurs-out-retired-officers-trump-2016-shirt.html 
Foucault, M. (1977). Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison (1st American ed.). New 
York: Pantheon Books. 
 138 
Frost, E. A., & Haas, A. M. (2017). Seeing and knowing the womb: A technofeminist reframing 
of fetal ultrasound toward a decolonization of our bodies. Computers and 
Composition, 43, 88-105. doi:10.1016/j.compcom.2016.11.004 
Frost, E.A. & Sharp-Hoskins, K. (2017). Authorial ethos as location: How technical manuals 
embody authorial ethos without authors. In A. E. Robillard & R. Fortune 
(Eds.), Authorship contested: Cultural challenges to the authentic, autonomous author 
(71-88) New York, NY: Routledge. 
Frostenson, S. (2017, January 24). A crowd scientist says trump’s inauguration attendance was 
pretty average. Vox. Retrieved from https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2017/1/24/14354036/crowds-presidential-inaugurations-trump-average  
Gajjala, R., & Oh, Y.J. (Eds.). (2012). Cyberfeminism 2.0. New York, NY: Peter Lang. 
Garofalo, P.( 2017, December 20). Crying ‘fake news’ is more than annoying. U.S. News. 
Retrieved from https://www.usnews.com/opinion/thomas-jefferson-street/articles/2017-
12-20/donald-trumps-fake-news-cries-are-dangerous-for-democracy 
Garrett, R. K., Nisbet, E. C., & Lynch, E. K. (2013). Undermining the corrective effects of 
media-based political fact checking? The role of contextual cues and naïve theory. 
Journal of Communication, 63(4), 617-637. 
Garrett, R. K., Weeks, B. E., & Neo, R. L. (2016). Driving a wedge between evidence and 
beliefs: how online ideological news exposure promotes political misperceptions. Journal 
of Computer-Mediated Communication, 21, 331-348. doi:10.1111/jcc4.12164 
Gatherer, D. (2002). The spread of irrational behaviours by contagion: An agent micro-
simulation. Journal of Memetics—Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission 
6(1). 1-20.  
 139 
Gries, L. (2015). Still life with rhetoric. Boulder, CO. Utah State University Press, Inc.  
Gruwell, L. (2015). Wikipedia's politics of exclusion: Gender, epistemology, and feminist 
rhetorical (in)action. Computers and Composition, 37, 117-131. 
doi:10.1016/j.compcom.2015.06.009 
Hannak, A., Margolin, D., Keegan, B., & Weber, I. (2014). Get back! You don't know me like 
that: The social mediation of fact checking interventions in Twitter conversations. 
Proceedings of the Eighth International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media. 
Ann Arbor, MI: AAAI Press. 
https://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/ICWSM/ICWSM14/paper/view/8115 
Haas, A. M. (2012). Race, rhetoric, and technology: A case study of decolonial technical 
communication theory, methodology, and pedagogy. Journal of Business and Technical 
Communication, 26(3), 277-310. doi:10.1177/1050651912439539 
Henze, B. (2013). What do technical communicators need to know about genre? In J. Johnson-
Eilola & S. A. Selber (Eds.), Solving problems in technical communication (337-361). 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Herrick, J. A. (2005). The history and theory of rhetoric: An introduction (3rd ed.). Boston: 
Allyn and Beacon. 
Holan, A. D. (2017, October 18). The media’s definition of fake news vs Donald Trump’s. 
Politifact. Retrieved from http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/article/2017/oct/18/deciding-whats-fake-medias-definition-fake-news-vs/ 
hooks, bell. (2004) Black vernacular: Archetecture as cultural practice. In Carolyn Handa (Ed.). 
Visual rhetoric in a digital world: A critical sourcebook. (pp. 395-400). Boston, MA: 
Bedford/ St. Martin’s.  
 140 
Howard, R. M. (1999). Standing in the shadow of giants: Plagiarists, authors, 
collaborators (No. 2). Greenwood Publishing Group. 
Howard, R. M. (1995). Plagiarisms, authorships, and the academic death penalty. College 
English, 57(7), 788-806. 
Hunt, E. (2017, Jan 22). Trump’s inauguration crowd: Sean Spicer’s claims versus the 
evidence. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2017/jan/22/trump-inauguration-crowd-sean-spicers-claims-versus-the-evidence  
Jankowski, N. W. (2018). Researching fake news: A selective examination of empirical 
studies. Javnost-The Public, 25(1-2), 248-255 
Jenkins, H., Ford, S., & Green, J.B. (2013). Spreadable media: Creating value and meaning in a 
networked culture. London; New York: New York University Press. 
Johnson, J. (1988). Mixing human and nonhumans together: The sociology of a door-closer. 
Social Problems, 35(3), 298-310. http://www.jstor.org/stable/800624 
Johnson-Eilola, J., & Selber, S. A. (2007). Plagiarism, originality, assemblage. Computers and 
Composition, 24(4), 375-403. doi:10.1016/j.compcom.2007.08.003 
Jones, A. (Ed.). (2009). Ptolemy in perspective: use and criticism of his work from antiquity to 
the nineteenth century (Vol. 23). Springer Science & Business Media. 
Jung, J. (2014). Systems rhetoric: A dynamic coupling of explanation and 
description. Enculturation: A Journal of Rhetoric, Writing, and Culture. Retrieved from  
http://enculturation.net/systems-rhetoric  
Kantor, J., & Twohey, M. (2017, October 5). Harvey Weinstein paid off sexual harassment 
accusers for decades. The New York Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harvey-weinstein-harassment-allegations.html 
 141 
Katz, S. B. (1992). The ethic of expediency: Classical rhetoric, technology, and the 
holocaust. College English, 54(3), 255-275. 
Kiely, E., & Robertson, L. (2016, November 18). How to spot fake news. Retrieved from 
https://www.factcheck.org/2016/11/how-to-spot-fake-news/ 
Kiili, C., Laurinen, L., & Marttunen, M. (2008). Students evaluating Internet sources: From 
versatile evaluators to uncritical readers. Journal of Educational Computing Research, 
39(1), 75-95. 
King, L. M., Gubele, R., & Anderson, J. R. (2015). Survivance, sovereignty, and story: Teaching 
American Indian rhetorics. Logan: Utah State University Press. 
Lambert, L. (2018, January 17). #MeToo effect: Calls flood U.S. sexual assault hotlines. Reuters. 
Retrieved from  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-harassment-helplines/metoo-
effect-calls-flood-u-s-sexual-assault-hotlines-idUSKBN1F6194 
Latour, B. (2005). Reassembling the social: An introduction to actor-network-theory. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
Latour, B. (2011). Where are the missing masses? The sociology of a few mundane artifacts. In 
S. Giddings & M. Lister (Eds.), The new media and technocultures reader (pp.105-109). 
Lessig, L. (2008). Remix: making art and commerce thrive in the hybrid economy. New York: 
Penguin Press. 
Lewandowsky, S., Ecker, U. K., Seifert, C. M., Schwarz, N., & Cook, J. (2012). Misinformation 
and its correction: Continued influence and successful debiasing. Psychological Science 
in the Public Interest, 13(3), 106-131. 
 142 
Mao, L. (2013) Beyond bias, binary, and border: Mapping out the future of comparative rhetoric, 
Rhetoric Society Quarterly, 43(3), 209-225, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02773945.2013.792690 
Maheshwari, Sapna. (2016). “How fake news goes viral: A case study.” The New York Times. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/business/media/how-fake-news-spreads.html 
Mandalios, J. (2013). RADAR: An approach for helping students evaluate Internet sources. 
Journal of Information Science, 39(4), 470-478. 
Mantzarlis, A. (2016, July 21). No, we’re not in a ‘post-fact’ era. Poynter. Retrieved from  
https://www.poynter.org/news/no-were-not-post-fact-era  
Mara, A. (2008). Ethos as market maker: The creative role of technical marketing 
communication in an aviation start-up. Journal of Business and Technical 
Communication, 22(4), 429-453. 10.1177/1050651908320379 
Marsden, P. (1998). Memetics and social contagion: Two sides of the same coin? Journal of 
Memetics—Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission, 2(2). Retrieved from  
http://jom-emit.cfpm.org/1998/vol2/marsden_p.html  
McChesney, R. Waterman. (2008). The political economy of media: enduring issues, emerging 
dilemmas. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
Moeller, M., & Jung, J. (2014). Sites of normalcy: Understanding online education as prosthetic 
technology. Disability Studies Quarterly, 34(4) doi:10.18061/dsq.v34i4.4020 
Mohanty, C. (1988). Under western eyes: Feminist scholarship and colonial discourses. Feminist 
Review, 30, 61-88. doi:10.2307/1395054 
Morris, R. (2018, March 3). Is #meToo changing Hollywood? BBC News. Retrieved from  
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-43219531 
 143 
Nuklos, Ben (2017, January 18). Inaugural crowds sure to be huge—but how huge? The 
Washington Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jan/18/when-it-comes-to-inaugural-
crowds-does-size-matter/  
Nyhan, B., & Reifler, J. (2010). When corrections fail: The persistence of political 
misperceptions. Political Behavior, 32(2), 303-330 
Olson, R. (2018). Don't be such a scientist: Talking substance in an age of style. Washington: 
Island Press. 
Pittman, C. (2007). Black women writers and the trouble with ethos: Harriet Jacobs, Billie 
Holiday, and Sister Souljah. Rhetoric Society Quarterly, 37(1), 43. 
Pogge, R. (2005, January 2). A brief note on religious objections to Copernicus. Retrieved from 
http://www.astronomy.ohio-state.edu/~pogge/Ast161/Unit3/response.html 
Powell, M., Levy, D., Riley-Mukavetz, A., Brooks-Gillies, M., Novotny, M. Fisch-Ferguson, J. 
(2014). Our story begins here: Constellating cultural rhetorics. Enculturation. 
http://enculturation.net/book/export/html/6096 
Powell, M. (2004). Down by the river, or how Susan La Flesche Picotte can teach us about 
alliance as a practice of survivance. College English, 67(1), 38-60. https://search-
proquest-com.jproxy.lib.ecu.edu/docview/236929660?pq-
origsite=summon&accountid=10639  
Powell, M. (2008). Dreaming Charles Eastman: Cultural memory, autobiography, and geography 
in Indigenous rhetorical histories. In G. E. Kirsch and L. Rohan (Eds.), Beyond the 
archives: Research as a lived process (115-127). Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press. 
 144 
Qiu, L. (2017, Jan 21). Donald Trump had biggest inaugural crowd ever? Metrics don’t show 
it. PolitiFact. Retrieved from http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/statements/2017/jan/21/sean-spicer/trump-had-biggest-inaugural-crowd-ever-
metrics-don/  
Pariser, E. (2011) Filter bubble: What the internet is hiding from you. New York: Penguin Press. 
Pittman, C. (2006). Black women writers and the trouble with Ethos: Harriet Jacobs, Billie 
Holiday, and Sister Souljah. Rhetoric Society Quarterly, 37(1), 43-70. 
doi:10.1080/02773940600860074 
Post-fact. (2018.). In Oxford English Dictionary. Retrieved from 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/post-fact  
Ratcliffe, K. (2005). Rhetorical listening: Identification, gender, whiteness. Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press. 
Reynolds, N. (1993). Ethos as location: New sites for understanding discursive authority. 
Rhetoric Review, 11(2), 325-338. doi:10.1080/07350199309389009 
Richerson, P.J. and Robert Boyd. (2005). Not by genes alone: How culture transformed human 
evolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Rickert, Thomas J. (2013). Ambient rhetoric: The attunements of rhetorical being. Pittsburgh, 
PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Ridolfo, J. & De Voss, N. (2009).  Composing for recomposition: Rhetorical velocity and 
delivery. Kairos. 13.2.  Retrieved from 
http://kairos.technorhetoric.net/13.2/topoi/ridolfo_devoss/velocity.html 
Rose, N. (1998). Controversies in meme theory. Journal of Memetics-Evolutionary Models of 
Information Transmission, 2. http://jom-emit.cfpm.org/1998/vol2/rose_n.html  
 145 
Robertson, L. & Farley, R. (2017, January 23). The facts on crowd size. FactCheck.org. 
Retrieved from https://www.factcheck.org/2017/01/the-facts-on-crowd-size/  
Sanchez, C. A., Wiley, J., & Goldman, S. R. (2006, June). Teaching students to evaluate source 
reliability during Internet research tasks. In Proceedings of the 7th international 
conference on Learning sciences (pp. 662-666). International Society of the Learning 
Sciences. 
Sayej, N. (2017, December 1). Alyssa Milano on the #MeToo movement: ‘We’re not going to 
stand for it any more.’ The Guardian. Retrieved from 
https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2017/dec/01/alyssa-milano-mee-too-sexual-
harassment-abuse 
Schultz, D. (2016, June 29). Trump vs. Clinton: How the design of their campaign merchandise 
stacks up. 6sqft. Retrieved from https://www.6sqft.com/trump-vs-clinton-how-the-
merchandise-stacks-up/ 
Skinner, C. (2009). "She will have science": Ethos and audience in Mary Gove's lectures to 
ladies. Rhetoric Society Quarterly, 39(3), 240. 10.1080/02773940902766730 
Smith, J. M. (2017). A gay girl in Damascus: Multi-vocal construction and refutation of authorial 
ethos. In A. E. Robillard & R. Fortune (Eds.), Authorship contested: Cultural challenges 
to the authentic, autonomous author (21-39) New York, NY: Routledge. 
Snopes (2016, March 14). Craigslist ads recruit paid protesters for Trump rallies. Snopes. 
Retrieved from https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/craigslist-ad-trump-rally/ 
Soja, Edward W. (1989). Postmodern geographies: The reassertion of space in critical social 
theory. London, UK: Verso.  
 146 
Sperber, D. (2000). An objection to the memetic approach to culture. In R. Aunger (Ed) 
Darwinizing culture: The status of memetics as a science, 163-173. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Spivak, G. (1988). Can the subaltern speak? Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. Ed. Cary 
Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg. Urbana: U of Illinois P, 1988. 271-313. 
Spoel, P. (2008). Communicating values, valuing community through health-care websites: 
Midwifery's online ethos and public communication in Ontario. Technical 
Communication Quarterly, 17(3), 264-288. 10.1080/10572250802100360 
Swarts, J. (2007). Mobility and composition: The architecture of coherence in non-places. 
Technical Communication Quarterly, 16(3). 279-309 
Tharoor, I. (2018, February 7). ‘Fake news’ and the Trumpian threat to democracy. The 
Washington Post. Retrieved from 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/02/07/fake-news-and-the-
trumpian-threat-to-democracy/?utm_term=.db1b3b3c2fa3 
Trump Twitter Archive. (2018). TrumpTwitterArchive.com [data]. 
http://www.trumptwitterarchive.com/archive/fake%20news%20%7C%7C%20fakenews
%20%7C%7C%20fake%20media/ttff/1-19-2017_  
Tucker, E. (2016, November 11) Why I’m considering to remove the fake protests twitter post. 
[Web log entry] Retrieved from https://blog.erictucker.com/2016/11/11/why-im-
considering-to-remove-the-fake-protests-twitter-post/ 
Van Helden, A. (1995). The Galileo project. Retrieved from 
http://galileo.rice.edu/sci/theories/copernican_system.html 
 147 
Wall, A., & Spinuzzi, C. (2018). The art of selling-without-selling: Understanding the genre 
ecologies of content marketing. Technical Communication Quarterly, 27(2), 137. 
doi:10.1080/10572252.2018.1425483 
Wright, E. A. (2005). Rhetorical spaces in memorial places: The cemetery as a rhetorical 
memory place/space. Rhetoric Society Quarterly, 35(4), 51-81. 
doi:10.1080/02773940509391322 
Wudka, J. (24 September 1998). The Copernican revolution. Retrieved from 
http://physics.ucr.edu/~wudka/Physics7/Notes_www/node41.html 
Yates, Simeon. 2016. ‘Fake News’ – Why People Believe It and What Can Be Done to Counter 
It. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/fake-news-why-people-believe-it-and- 
what-can-be-done-to-counter-it-70013.  
Young, D. G., Jamieson, K. H., Poulson, S., & Goldring, A. (2018). Fact-checking effectiveness 
as a function of format and tone: Evaluating fact-check.org and flackcheck.org. 
Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 95(1), 49-75. 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1077699017710453. 
Yu, H., & Northcut, K. M. (Eds.). (2017). Scientific communication: Practices, theories, and 
pedagogies. New York, NY: Routledge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
